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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
During the recent, successful effort to adhere to the Berne Conven-
tion for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Congress exten-
sively debated the issue of "moral rights" in general, and as applied to
the motion picture industry. The term "moral rights" does not refer to a
judgment about a work's morality (or lack thereof). Instead, it concerns
the personal relationship of the author to his or her work apart from
economic rights. In particular, it relates to the author's interest in hav-
ing his or her authorship of the work acknowledged ("the right of attri-
bution"), and to the author's interest in preventing unauthorized
alterations in the work that are prejudicial to his or her reputation ("the
right of integrity").'
In deciding on the form of implementing legislation for Berne adher-
ence, Congress adopted the "minimalist approach;" i.e., to make only
those changes absolutely required to join the Convention. After two
years of hearings and consultations with foreign experts, Congress
reached the conclusion that the totality of existing U.S. law - federal,
state statutory, and common law - satisfied our obligations under the
Convention to accord moral rights.
Accordingly, under the minimalist approach, Congress decided
against amending the Copyright Act in the Berne implementing legisla-
tion to provide for a single, unified, federal system of moral rights.
This decision was not, however, based on hostility to moral rights in
general, nor to such rights as applied specifically to the motion picture
industry. In fact, both Senate and House subcommittees held hearings
on colorization and other alterations to motion pictures during the sec-
ond session of the 100th Congress. In addition, on February 25, 1988,
Chairman Kastenmeier and Ranking Minority Member Carlos Moor-
head of the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and
the Administration of Justice 2 requested the Copyright Office to inquire
into the present and future uses of technologies such as computer color
encoding ("colorization"), panning/scanning, and time compression and
expansion ("lexiconning"), and how these technologies affect "consum-
ers, artists, producers, distributors and other affected individuals and in-
dustries." We were directed to consult with creators of motion pictures,
broadcasters, consumers, and preservationists.
In order to fulfill this mandate, the Copyright Office staff visited two
1. See BERNE CONVENTION ARTICLE 6bis.
2. The Subcommittee was formerly known as the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liber-
ties and the Administration of Justice.
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companies engaged in computer color encoding of motion pictures as
well as a company that modifies theatrical motion pictures for viewing on
television. The staff also interviewed representatives of motion picture
companies, Turner Entertainment Company, the Directors' Guild of
America, and the Screen Actors' Guild of America. In response to a
Notice of Inquiry, we received twenty comments from all industry inter-
ests, as well as from educators, preservationists, and scholars. On Sep-
tember 8, 1988, we held a public hearing and received testimony from
witnesses from all of the above groups.
This report represents the culmination of our interviews and of our
review of the congressional hearings, the statements submitted in re-
sponse to our Notice of Inquiry, and the testimony received at our Sep-
tember 8th hearing.
The report is comprised of seven chapters and two appendices. The
first appendix reproduces the statements submitted in response to our
Notice of Inquiry; the second reproduces the transcript of our September
8, 1988 hearing.
Chapter 1: Introduction
After noting the genesis of this report, the introduction provides an
overview of previous Copyright Office actions in accepting claims to
copyright in colorized versions of black and white motion pictures. It
then briefly notes the issues to be examined, including how the use of
technologies permitting the alteration of theatrical motion pictures has
affected the interest of creators, distributor-copyright owners, and the
public.
Chapter 2: Copyright in the Motion Picture
and Television Industries
The second chapter of the report reviews copyright protection for
motion pictures and television programs in the United States and under
the Universal Copyright and Berne Convention.
The chapter also examines the various claims for authorship in mo-
tion pictures, beginning with a review of the U.S. case law, the treatment
of authorship under the 1976 Copyright Act and the Berne Convention,
as well as the national legislation of France, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, and the United Kingdom.
This review serves as background for a discussion of the position of
U.S. motion picture directors that, for purposes of preventing material
alterations to their works, the principal director and principal screen-
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writer should be considered the "authors" of the motion picture. This
position is based on a number of arguments; first, that the principal direc-
tor is the single individual primarily responsible for the actual composi-
tion of the picture; second, that only the principal director and principal
screenwriter represent the logical place to draw that line.
We then give the response of academics and motion picture industry
representatives to the directors' arguments. Testimony by a law profes-
sor that motion picture scholarship has, in recent years, come to recog-
nize the importance of the contributions of several groups of filmmaking
professionals (e.g., cinematographers, art directors, and editors) is given.
Testimony from motion picture industry representatives challenging the
directors' position is recited. These representatives assert that for most
of the motion pictures at issue, the old studio movie moguls are more
properly regarded as the author of the work. Testimony on the current
important role of certain producers is recounted.
The chapter concludes by noting the difficulties faced internationally
in determining authorship in cinematographic works and notes that, due
to the use of work made for hire arrangements in the United States, the
issue generally has relevance only with respect to moral rights, a topic
addressed in Chapter 5.
Chapter 3: Post Exhibition Alterations to Motion Pictures
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part reviews the
current and projected future technologies used to adapt theatrical motion
pictures for viewing on television screens and notes the reason why these
adaptations are believed necessary. The second part analyzes the effect
of these adaptations on the aesthetics of motion pictures.
The chapter begins with an explanation of the predominance of
post-theatrical markets (videocassettes, cable television and broadcast
television) for motion pictures, and the reasons theatrical motion pictures
are technologically adapted to be distributed to these markets. The prin-
cipal technologies are:
Computer Color Encoding. This is a process by which black
and white film prints are transferred to videotape and the
videotape is electronically encoded with color.
Panning and Scanning. This is a process by which theatrical
motion pictures, composed for viewing on large screens, are al-
tered to fit on the narrower television screen.
Lexiconning. This technology involves the electronic time
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compression or expansion of a motion picture in order to fit the
picture into broadcast time slots.
Letterboxing. This technique permits the original composition
of a theatrical motion picture to be retained on television by
reducing the size of the image. This process leaves dark bands
at the top and bottom of the screen.
We then analyze the aesthetic effects that each of these technologies
have on motion pictures. We conclude that colorization has an adverse
effect on the aesthetics of black and white motion pictures, that panning/
scanning has had an adverse effect in the past, but that such effects have
been somewhat ameliorated through the voluntary decision of directors
and cinematographers to film theatrical motion pictures within the pa-
rameters of television. This decision has, however, also resulted in fewer
motion pictures being shot in a widescreen format due to the predomi-
nance of the post-theatrical markets. We conclude that lexiconning can
have an adverse aesthetic effect on motion pictures but that no informa-
tion was presented indicating the extent to which it is employed or the
effect to which it is employed in a manner resulting in an adverse aes-
thetic effect.
The chapter concludes with a review of future technologies such as
High Definition Television and computer generation of characters.
Chapter 4: Impact of Collective and Individual Bargaining on the
Development and Distribution of Motion Pictures
In this chapter, we discuss the nature of collective and individual
bargaining. We note that the Directors' Guild of America's Basic Agree-
ment contains a detailed set of minimum conditions for the preparation,
production, post-production stages of motion pictures, and for post-the-
atrical release editing. Directors are given an absolute right to a "Direc-
tor's Cut" - the penultimate form in which the motion picture is
released. Directors do not have, and for purposes of legislative reform
have disavowed, any desire to obtain the "Final Cut;" i.e., the right to
determine the final form of the work as theatrically viewed.
Under the Basic Agreement, however, directors have obtained the
right of consultation regarding post-theatrical alterations to motion pic-
tures as viewed on videocassettes, and on cable and broadcast television.
We recount the directors' unsuccessful efforts to transform, under the
Basic Agreement, the provision that grants them right of consultation
into an absolute right to permit or prohibit such alterations. We also
discuss the position of producers that directors should not have such an
1990]
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absolute right. We note that only a very few directors have obtained the
desired rights in their individual contracts.
We then analyze the pros and cons of reliance upon collective and
individual bargaining, and question whether the failure of the directors to
obtain the rights they seek necessarily indicates a breakdown in labor
relations, and one that requires federal legislation to repair it.
Chapter 5: Moral Rights
This lengthy chapter begins with a review of the nature of moral
rights, with special emphasis on the Berne Convention and U.S. case law.
We review recent state and federal legislative efforts to grant moral rights
during hearings on U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention. We go into
the testimony of directors, producers, and computer color encoding com-
panies in detail, as well as the remarks of various Members of Congress.
We then set forth the directors' claims for moral rights legislation,
the producers' response to those claims, and conclude with our analysis
of the issue.
The directors' claim is based, essentially, on three premises: first,
that no artist should have his or her work materially altered without his
or her consent; second, that collective and individual bargaining is an
inadequate means to obtain the right to prevent material alterations that
are injurious to their reputation; and, third, that the public has an inter-
est in viewing motion pictures in their original form.
The directors would limit these rights to the principal director and
principal screenwriter. All of the other creative collaborators in the mo-
tion picture would have to rely on the principal director and principal
screenwriters for vindication of their rights. Authors of preexisting
works used in motion pictures, such as novelists and composers, are to
rely on contractual provisions for prevention of unwanted material alter-
ations to their works in the motion picture.
The producers' and "colorizers' " response to the directors' claim
rests on the assertion that their activities are consistent with both the
purposes of the Copyright Act and the rights they have fairly obtained
through collective and individual bargaining. Additionally, they argue
that imposition of restrictions on existing motion pictures would violate
the "takings" clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
The producers and colorizers reject the directors' attempt to invoke the
public interest, arguing that the directors actually seek a right permitting
them to insist that the original version be the only version distributed to
the public. They note the public's preference for color television viewing,
and they point to their preservation efforts in restoring and making avail-
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able black and white versions of motion pictures along with the colorized
version. They stress the critical economic need and benefit of distribut-
ing motion pictures in nontheatrical markets. The producers and
colorizers deny that directors should have the final say over the form in
which their works are distributed in post-theatrical markets.
We then analyze these various arguments, concluding as follows.
Proponents of change in the existing law should bear the burden of
showing that a "meritorious public purpose is served by the proposed
congressional action." If this threshold is met, Congress is then faced
with the "delicate job of bartering between what are often contrary
interests."
In analyzing the directors' assertion that a meritorious public pur-
pose is served by protecting the integrity of their works, we note that in
adhering to the Berne Convention, the United States has declared that its
law satisfies the obligations of that Convention, one part of which is Arti-
cle 6bis, the moral rights provision. In adhering to the Convention, the
United States specifically declared that the totality of existing U.S. law -
federal, state statutory and common law - provides a level of moral
rights protection that at least rises to the minimum level required by Ar-
ticle 6bis. The question of whether moral rights should be unified in a
single federal system under the Copyright Act is the subject of dispute,
but, after joining the Berne Union, it cannot be denied that the United
States recognizes moral rights. Accordingly, the prevention of material
alterations to motion pictures in a manner that injures the reputation of
the creative collaborators of the film does represent a "meritorious public
purpose," at least on its face.
Invocation of the public interest by some of the directors gives rise
to a degree of ambiguity since they do not, strictly speaking, seek to pre-
serve the original version of motion pictures, but instead seek to obtain
rights for individual directors to decide whether the theatrical version
should be materially altered.3
Additionally, we conclude that if Congress is persuaded that it
should vest directors and screenwriters with increased moral rights, then
Congress should also include the other creators in the list of beneficiaries.
For example, the authors of the underlying works used in motion pic-
tures get such benefit and should not be forced to rely on contractual
protection, which the directors claim is inadequate for vindication of
their rights.
3. The ambiguity of this invocation of public interest does not, of course, apply to direc-
tors' attempts to prevent material alterations to the works of other directors created during
Hollywood's "Golden Era."
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Finally, we discuss the likelihood that a violation of the takings
clause of the Fifth Amendment would result from the grant of a new
federal moral right as applied to existing motion pictures. Given this
problem, the issue becomes whether legislation is required for future mo-
tion pictures since very few motion pictures are now shot in black and
white, and many theatrical motion pictures are shot in a form that ame-
liorates the need for extensive panning/scanning for television viewing.
We also discuss the important interest in ensuring that new motion pic-
tures are created, and the interests of broadcasters, cable systems, and
video retailers in delivering motion pictures to the public.
Chapter 6: Preservation
In this chapter we discuss issues of preservation: the availability of
the original version of motion pictures, and the opportunity to view that
version in theatrical exhibition, on videocassettes, and on cable and
broadcast television. We review the steps taken by various private and
public organizations to preserve motion pictures and the approaches that
may be taken to better coordinate these various efforts.
Chapter 7: Conclusions
Chapter 7 contains our conclusions. Based on the testimony before
the congressional committees and the Copyright Office, and the various
written comments submitted to us in this inquiry, the Copyright Office
reached the following conclusions.
(1) The Subcommittee should seriously consider a unified fed-
eral system of moral rights;
(2) If a unified federal system of moral rights is adopted, state
moral rights protection should be partially preempted. Pre-
emption should apply to rights equivalent to those granted in
the amended federal statute but not to nonequivalent rights;
(3) If the Subcommittee prefers an industry-by-industry ap-
proach to moral rights, and chooses to zero in on the motion
picture industry, the Subcommittee should carefully consider
whether the existing web of collective and individual bargaining
is adequate to protect directors' legitimate interests;
(4) If the Subcommittee chooses to grant a higher level of
moral rights in the motion picture industry than now exists, the
Copyright Office could support this effort in principle. This
legislation would accord rights only to works created on or af-
ter the effective date of the legislation and would be granted to
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authors of preexisting works used in motion pictures on or after
the effective date, as well as to other creative participants in the
motion picture (e.g., cinematographer, art directors, editors,
and perhaps, actors and actresses).
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Office has prepared this report at the request of the
chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin-
istration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Robert W.
Kastenmeier, and ranking minority member Carlos Moorhead.4
In their letter of request, sent in recognition of the extraordinary
cultural and economic importance of motion pictures, Chairman Kas-
tenmeier and Mr. Moorhead asked the Office to inquire broadly into the
present and future use of technologies in the motion picture industry -
technologies such as computer color encoding ("colorization"), panning
and scanning, and time compression and expansion ("lexiconning") -
and how they affect "consumers, artists, producers, distributors and
other affected individuals and industries." They asked the Office to con-
sult with the creators of motion pictures, the distributors of motion pic-
tures, and the broadcast industry as well as "other commercial interests
that exploit such works or own copyrights interests in them, and with
consumers, archivists, academics and appropriate governmental
agencies ......
A. Scope of the Copyright Office Study
On May 25, 1988, the Office published in the Federal Register a
Request for Information and a Notice of Hearing.5 In addition to re-
questing information describing the aforementioned technologies, the Of-
fice solicited comments in four areas: (1) nature and impact of the
technology; (2) contractual practices; (3) foreign practices; and, (4) possi-
ble future legislative action.6
4. Letter of Feb. 25, 1988 to Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights, United States Copy-
right Office reprinted in the Appendix. The subcommittee changed its name in the 101st Con-
gress to the SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
5. 53 Fed. Reg. 18937-18938 (May 25, 1988).
6. The areas of inquiry and specific questions examined are as follows:
(1) A description of the technologies of colorization, time compression and expansion and
panning and scanning and how these technologies are utilized after the creation of a motion
picture (so called post-production changes) and other audiovisual works and the reasons these
techniques are used. Are these technologies used, for example, to enhance the commercial
value of the film? Are there possible aesthetic considerations - both for the use and preven-
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In response to the Request for Information, the Office received
twenty written comments from the following groups and individuals: (1)
Society for Cinema Studies; (2) Max Planck Institute for Foreign and
International Patent, Copyright, and Competition Law (Munich, Federal
Republic of Germany); (3) Color Systems Technology, Inc.; (4) Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc.; (5) the Motion Picture Association of
America, Inc.; (6) Quintex Entertainment, Inc. (Colorization, Inc.); (7)
Professor Peter Jaszi; (8) the Directors Guild of America; (9) American
Movie Classics; (10) Erol's Inc.; (11) Video Treasures, Inc. and Video
Cassette Sales, Inc.; (12) Donald L. Pevsner, Esq.; (13) International Al-
liance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Machine Oper-
ators of the United States and Canada (IATSE); (14) George Stevens, Jr.;
(15) National Broadcasting Company, Inc.; (16) National Association of
tion of the use of these technologies? What is the impact of the use of such techniques on both
the economic rewards flowing to the creators of films and the producers of such films?
(2) What is the present extent of the use of the technologies and what is the present impact of
the technologies on those involved in the distribution of the original and the altered versions of
the work? What is the projected future use and impact of these technologies and any new
technologies currently in the planning or development stages?
(3) How do existing contractual practices (both private contracts and collective bargaining
agreements) between creators and producers govern the use of these techniques? What about
contracts between producers and their assignees, such as broadcasters or intermediary-distrib-
utors? Are there differences in contract provisions negotiated by established creators and those
negotiated by lesser-known artists?
(4) Is it possible to identify the creative interests affected by these techniques with any preci-
sion? What is the present status of such interests under copyright law in relation to the audio-
visual works they create? Would new provisions in the Copyright Act, such as new moral
rights provisions, be required to accord to such creators, a means to control or influence the
use of these technologies in relation to their work? What public policy considerations are
involved?
(5) Have foreign countries addressed any of the issues raised by these new technologies, and
if so, how are these foreign practices relevant or applicable to practices in the United States?
(6) What, if any, is the impact of the use of such techniques on the public's access to audiovi-
sual materials? Do these techniques essentially extend potential distribution of works by creat-
ing new commercial opportunities for public exploitation? Do these techniques have the effect
of crowding out of the marketplace original versions of pre-existing works? Do these tech-
niques affect the profitability of broadcasting or other distribution enterprises so as to permit
them to acquire new works of other authors?
(7) Notwithstanding the answers to any of these questions, is there an overriding public pol-
icy problem posed by the unchecked use of these technologies? Are nationally and internation-
ally recognized "classics" of American cinema being lost in their original form to future
generations? What is, and what should be the government's role in the preservation of works?
Should it be all works or is it in fact, possible to distinguish among audiovisual works so as to
protect such classic works from any negative effects of these techniques and practices? Do the
subsequent changes made to works misrepresent or unreasonably diminish the artistry in-
volved in creating such classics?
(8) Finally, is a legislative solution to these issues appropriate, or would voluntary agree-
ments (among the concerned parties or by industry agreement or code of conduct) suffice? If
legislation is the best solution, what form should it take?
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Broadcasters; (17) Morality in Media, Inc.; (18) American Film Technol-
ogies, Inc.; (19) Filmlife, Inc.; and (20) National Center for Film and
Video Preservation of the American Film Institute.'
To better understand the technologies and current practices in the
motion picture industry, the Copyright Office sent two staff members to
Toronto, Canada, where they received a demonstration of the computer
color encoding process used by Colorization, Inc. They also visited Los
Angeles, California, and interviewed representatives of Color Systems
Technology, Inc. (and received another in-depth demonstration of its
computer color encoding process), as well as American Film Technol-
ogy, Inc. (another computer color encoding process), Turner Entertain-
ment Company, Walt Disney, Inc., the Alliance of Motion Picture and
Television Producers, the Directors' Guild of America, the Screen Ac-
tors Guild of America, directors Elliot Silverstein and Sydney Pollack,
and finally AME, Inc., a company which specializes in film to videotape
transfers using panning and scanning techniques, where they witnessed a
demonstration of that technology.
Pursuant to the May 25, 1988 Federal Register notice, the Copy-
right Office held a public hearing in the Library of Congress on Septem-
ber 8, 1988. Testimony was taken from fourteen public witnesses
representing a broad spectrum of interests including all of the industries
involved in the invention and use of the technologies, producers, distribu-
tors, artists, film preservationists and academicians.'
In order of appearance (and grouped by panel), the witnesses were:
(1) "Colorization" Panel: Joseph Adelman (Color Systems Technology)
with Jon Baumgarten, counsel, Bernard Weitzman (American Film
Technology), and Rob Word (Quintex Corporation, Colorization, Inc.);
(2) Roger Mayer (Turner Entertainment Company); (3) Arnold Lutzker,
Esq. (Directors' Guild of America); (4) Joshua Sapan (American Movie
Classics, cable television channel); (5) Preservation Panel: George Ste-
vens, Jr. and John Belton (Society for Cinema Studies); (6) Video Retail-
ers Panel: Vans Stevenson (Erol's, Inc.) and Burton Wides, Esq. (Video
Software Dealers Association); (7) Academic Panel: Professor L. Jaszi
(Washington College of Law, American University), and Dr. Thomas
Dreier and Silke von Lewinski (Max Planck Institute for Foreign and
International Patent, Copyright, and Unfair Competition Law, Munich,
Federal Republic of Germany).
7. These statements are reprinted as Volume II of this report.
8. A transcript of the hearing is reproduced as Volume III of this report.
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B. Previous Copyright Office Actions
The present study is, at least in part, the result of the Copyright
Office's 1987 decision to accept, on a class basis, claims to copyright in
computer color encoded versions of black and white motion pictures and
television programs.9 In light of this decision, it is appropriate to review
briefly that history.
Between 1985 and 1986, several parties submitted claims to copy-
right in computer color encoded versions of black and white motion pic-
tures and television programs. To assist it in developing practices
regarding these claims, the Copyright Office published a Notice of In-
quiry in the Federal Register on September 15, 1986, soliciting public
comment and technical information on the computer color encoding
process.'°
The Notice stated the Office was "aware of sharply held differences
of view on the aesthetic consequences of colorizing previously distributed
black and white film." The Notice cautioned, however, that while the
Copyright Office would follow that debate with interest, issues such as
whether colorization "risks 'mutilating' the conscious artistry of black-
and-white cinematographers ... cannot and do not form any part of this
present inquiry." "
The reason for this position is simply stated and firmly rooted in the
case law: it is not the role of the courts or the Copyright Office to pass
judgment on the aesthetic value of a work. As Justice Holmes stated in
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903):
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvi-
ous limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be
sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them
repulsive until the public had learned the new language in
which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for
instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Ma-
net would have been sure of protection when seen for the first
time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures
which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet, if
they command the interest of any public, they have a commer-
9. 52 Fed. Reg. 23443-23446 (June 22, 1987).
10. 51 Fed. Reg. 32665-32667 (Sept. 15, 1986).
11. Despite this caveat, many of the forty-six written comments submitted focused on the
aesthetic merits of computer color encoding.
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cial value - it would be bold to say that they have not an aes-
thetic and educational value - and the taste of any public is
not to be treated with contempt. It is an ultimate fact for the
moment, whatever may be our hopes for a change.
Original works of authorship, including computer color versions of
black and white motion pictures that meet the legal and formal require-
ments of the Copyright Act, are entitled to registration, regardless of
their aesthetic or artistic value. Congress, naturally, may amend the
Copyright Act to prohibit copyright in "objectionable works," but for
good reason it has never indicated a desire to do so. Such a radical rever-
sal of current law should be undertaken, if at all, only after thorough
review of the many adverse consequences that would inevitably result
from such a step.
On June 22, 1987, the Copyright Office issued a Notice of Registra-
tion Decision.' 2 The Notice informed the public that, after having re-
viewed the comments, the Office concluded some computer color
encoded motion pictures and television programming may contain suffi-
cient authorship to justify registration as derivative works. Of course,
the copyright in such a derivative work has no effect whatsoever on the
copyright status of the preexisting black and white work. 17 U.S.C. Sec.
103(b) (1978).
The Notice further announced that the Office would apply the same
standard in determining whether the color added to a black and white
motion picture or television program satisfies the requirements for regis-
tration as is currently applied to all other derivative works: that is,
whether or not the modifications, taken as a whole, represent an original
work of authorship.13 This standard is taken directly from the statute, 17
U.S.C. Sec. 101 (1978) (definition of "derivative work") and from the
Committee on the Judiciary's conclusion in 1976 that the statutory
12. 52 Fed. Reg. 23443-23466 (June 22, 1987).
13. The Notice enumerated five criteria the Office would apply in determining whether the
coloring of a particular black and white film is a modification that satisfies this statutory stan-
dard of new authorship. The criteria to be used are:
(1) [n]umerous color selection must be made by human beings from an extensive
color inventory;
(2) The range and extent of colors added to the black and white work must repre-
sent more than a trivial variation;
(3) The overall appearance of the motion picture must be modified; registration will
not be made for the coloring of a few frames or the enhancement of color in a previ-
ously colored film;
(4) Removal of color from a motion picture or other work will not justify
registration;
(5) The existing regulatory prohibitions on copyright registration based on mere
variations of color is confirmed.
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phrase "original works of authorship" "is intended to incorporate with-
out change the standard of originality established by the courts under the
present [1909] copyright statute." H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong.,
(1976).
Two days later, on June 24, 1987, the Copyright Office issued a pro-
posed deposit regulation for claims to copyright in computer color en-
coded versions of black and white motion pictures and television
programming." Only six comments on the proposed regulation were
received.
On August 9, 1988, the Office adopted a final deposit regulation. 5
The regulation adheres to the proposed requirement that a copy of the
black and white version of the work be deposited when registration is
sought for computer color encoding, and specifies that the black and
white copy be an archival quality print where one is available.
1 6
The Office based its authority to require deposit of a copy of the
preexisting black and white work - in addition to a copy of the com-
puter color encoded work when registration is sought for the latter - on
both its general rulemaking authority and the authority given to the Reg-
ister of Copyrights to specify by regulation the "nature of the copies or
phonorecords to be deposited in the various classes ..... " See 17 U.S.C.
Secs. 408(c)(1), 702 (1978). The Office concluded that the deposit of a
black and white print would facilitate the examination necessary to de-
termine whether a computer color encoded version represents more than
a trivial variation from the underlying black and white work, and would
also "enrich the collections of the Library of Congress for the benefit of
the public and posterity."
C. Issues Examined in this Report
The issues raised by computer color encoding of black and white
films are but the latest manifestation of a centuries-old interplay between
creativity, copyright, and technology: between the need to encourage au-
thors to create works, the need to provide a framework within which
lawful distributors of works can successfully market them to the public,
14. 52 Fed. Reg. 2369 (June 24, 1987).
15. 53 Fed. Reg. 29887-29890 (Aug. 9, 1988).
16. The order of preference is that followed in the "Best Edition Statement" of the Library
of Congress, and will usually be a 35mm print. The Motion Picture Agreement, developed in
1941, by the Library of Congress and the motion picture copyright owners, is designed to
encourage registration of motion pictures while allowing a registrant to keep copies of the print
in circulation while the motion picture is being initially exhibited. The Motion Picture Agree-
ment would not apply to the colorized versions because they are not being exhibited theatri-
cally, and are on a videotape format.
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and the desire of the public to have access to works of authorship in a
convenient and affordable manner. The Supreme Court recently noted
that "[flrom its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response
to significant changes in technology." Sony Corporation of America, Inc.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984).
By their very nature, the technologies involved in this report pose
new problems, but the introduction of technologies that affect the rights
of creators and the marketplace is not new. As in the past, in keeping
with the constitutional goal of encouraging the promotion of the progress
of science, any solution to the problems posed by such technologies must
carefully balance the rights of all interests involved: creators, distribu-
tor-copyright owners, and the public.
The technologies at issue here are important to distributor copyright
owners of theatrical motion pictures because they allow exploitation in
other markets, e.g., broadcast television, cable television, videocassette
markets, and airlines. The artistic creators of motion pictures argue that
these technologies have materially altered the aesthetic value of their
contributions. The public interest is in having access to works of author-
ship, including both the new altered versions and the original, unaltered
version of the work.
In Chapter 3, we discuss these technologies in detail; however, by
way of preface, we briefly summarize them here.
Computer color encoding ("colorization") is a process that uses com-
puter technology and standard video signal processing to transform a
black and white video signal into color. First, a new one-inch tape of the
black and white film is made from a 35mm print. Next, each individual
shot in the motion picture is identified and catalogued. The artistic di-
rector then adopts an overall look and color selection for the entire film.
In order to accomplish this selection, a "storyboard" - a visual presen-
tation of key shots - is created. Next, each individual shot is color en-
coded. The color is then balanced from one scene to the next, and
ultimately within the entire work. Colorization is currently used only for
videocassettes and television broadcasts. While there are no plans to use
the process for theatrical exhibition, such an application may arise in the
future with further improvements in technology and the existence of a
viable marketplace.
Panning and scanning is a process by which motion pictures, created
for the wide theatrical screen, are adapted for broadcast on narrower
television screens. This process involves reconciling the larger theatrical
''aspect ratio" (ratio of width to height) to the smaller space available on
a television. In the case of theatrical motion pictures shot in 1.66, 1.75,
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or 1.85:1 aspect ratios, little of the original image is lost in the transfer to
the 1.33:1 aspect ratio of television; however, what was a close up in the
theatre becomes a medium close up on TV; what was a medium shot in
the theatre (waist up) becomes a three-quarter shot (knees up) on
television.
In the case of larger theatrical aspect ratios, though, the image loss
can be significant. To retain as much of the essential parts of the original
theatrical image as possible under these circumstances, panning and
scanning is used.17 First, a film to tape transfer is made on a "telecine
machine." A telecine operator then views the tape image on a video
monitor and, in essence, electronically reframes the shot within the tele-
vision parameters. Generally, the operators attempt to follow the central
action, focusing on whoever is speaking, or, on the movements of the
characters.
Time compression or expansion ("lexiconning") involves the actual
speeding up or slowing down (without appreciably altering the voices) of
films when screened on television, or, (much less often), when transferred
to videotape. The film is viewed at a rate faster or slower than the stan-
dard theatrical rate of 24 frames per second. Lexiconning is used little, if
at all, outside of commercial television which adheres to "on-the-hour"
and "on-the-half-hour" time slots.
Later in this report, we shall examine other technologies, such as
High-Definition Television and computer generation of images, as well as
editing for airplanes. The critical point is not the mechanics of any par-
ticular technology, or necessarily whether the technology is new or old,"8
but rather whether or not the use of the technology affects a work's aes-
thetics and whether or not it impedes access to the original, unaltered
version of the work.
CHAPTER 2: COPYRIGHT IN THE MOTION PICTURE AND
TELEVISION INDUSTRIES
Due to the collaborative nature of filmmaking and its extensive use
of preexisting works such as novels and musical compositions, the
number of parties affected by copyright in the motion picture and televi-
17. An alternate approach to this problem known as "letterboxing," is discussed below in
Chapter Three.
18. This point is demonstrated by directors' complaints about the routine deletion of sub-
stantial parts of their work for broadcast on television and exhibition on airlines, deletions that
may have a deleterious effect on the aesthetics as the new technologies. See generally, Gins-
burg, The Right of Integrity in Audiovisual Works in the United States, 135 R.I.D.A. 2 (1988);




sion industries goes beyond the archetype of author, publisher, and pub-
lic. In this chapter, we examine these complex relationships. We begin
with a brief history of copyright protection for motion pictures and tele-
vision programming.
A. Copyright Protection for Motion Pictures and Television Programs
Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 grants certain exclusive
rights in original works of authorship, including "motion pictures and
other audiovisual works." 17 U.S.C. Sec. 102(a)(6) (1978).' 9 The term
of protection is the same as that granted to all other works of authorship.
However, given the fact that motion pictures are generally created under
work made for hire agreements, the usual term is that provided in Sec-
tion 302(c): to wit, seventy-five years from the year of first publication or
one hundred years from creation, whichever expires first.
The history of copyright for motion pictures may be traced to the
late 1890's and early 1900's. See Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240 (3d Cir.
1903), appeal dismissed, 195 U.S. 625 (1904) (motion picture of launch-
ing of yacht held predictable under Act of 1870 as a single photograph;
originality was found in its "artistic conception and expression. To ob-
tain it requires a study of light, shadows, general surroundings, and a
vantage point adapted to securing the entire effect."); American Muto-
scope & Biograph Co. v. Edison, 137 F. 262 (C.C.D.N.J. 1905) (series of
pictures telling a connected story similarly protected); Harper Bros. v.
Kalem Co., 169 F. 61 (2d Cir. 1909), aff'd on other grounds, 222 U.S. 55
(1911).
Protection for motion pictures as photographs continued under the
1909 Act, as originally codified. See 17 U.S.C. Sec. 50) (1909). Three
years later, however, under the amendatory Act of August 24, 1912, 37
Stat. 488, motion pictures were expressly protected as either "motion-
picture photoplays" or "motion-pictures other than photoplays." The
first category, registered in class 1, was reserved for motion pictures that
19. Motion pictures are defined as "audiovisual works consisting of a series of related
images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, together with ac-
companying sounds, if any." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1986). Audiovisual works are defined as
"works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown
by the use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together
with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as
films or tapes, in which the works are embodied." Id. The 1909 Act had no definition of these
terms. Compendium I of Copyright Office Practices contained the following definition: "A
motion picture is a series of pictures presenting to the eye the illusion of motion, which pic-
tures are projected on a screen or transmitted by means of television or otherwise, and have as
their origin a series of connected pictures on film or other recording media." Chapter Two,
Part 2.14.1.
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were dramatic in character and told a connected story. The second cate-
gory, registered in class m, was reserved for newsreels, travelogs and the
like. Television programs were later accepted for registration in the ap-
propriate motion picture category.
In expressly protecting motion pictures under the amendatory Act
of 1912, the Congressional reports stated:
The occasion for this proposed amendment is the fact that the
production of motion-picture photoplays and motion-pictures
other than photoplays has become a business of vast propor-
tions. The money invested therein is so great and the property
rights so valuable that the committee is of the opinion that the
copyright law ought to be so amended as to give them distinct
and definite recognition.
H.R. Rep. No. 756, 62d Sess. 1 (1912); S. Rep. No. 906, 62d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1912).
There is evidence of another motive for the amendatory Act - that
of limiting the liability of motion pictures for infringement of "undrama-
tized" or "nondramatic works." See Id., and Townsend Copyright
Amendment: Complete File of Arguments Before the Committee on Pat-
ents on H.R. 15263 and H.R. 20596, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912). Yet a
third reason for the amendment - ease of classification by the Copyright
Office - is suggested in Study No. 3, The Meaning of "Writings" in the
Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 43, 76 (Comm.
Print 1960).
B. International Conventions
1. Universal Copyright Convention
Article I of the Universal Copyright Convention provides that each
contracting state "undertakes to provide for the adequate and effective
protection of the rights of authors and other copyright proprietors in
literary, scientific and artistic works, including writings, musical, dra-
matic and cinematographic works. . . ." There is no special provision
governing the term of protection for cinematographic works, thus leaving
national legislation to accord a term within the rules provided by Article
IV(2). The general rule requires a term of life of the author plus 25
years; however, some countries measure the term of at least twenty-five
years from first publication or from registration prior to publication.
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2. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works
Cinematographic works were first protected under Articles 14(2)
and (3) of the 1908 Berlin Revision. Article 14(2) provided:
Cinematographic productions shall be protected as literary or
artistic works if, by the arrangement of the acting form or the
combination of the incidents represented, the author has given
the work a personal and original character.
This provision "regarded [cinematographic works] simply as an-
other species of dramatic work, and little, if any, account was to be taken
of the technical skills required to make them. . . ." Ricketson, The Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: 1886-1986
at p.550 (1987).20 Article 14(3) provided:
Without prejudice to the rights of the author of the original
work, the reproduction by cinematography of a literary, scien-
tific or artistic work shall be protected as an original work.
Unlike Article 14(3), this provision protected cinematographic
works in their own right. The 1971 Paris text of Berne, to which the
United States adheres, combines the two Berlin revisions into a single
provision, found in Article l4bis(1): "Without prejudice to the copy-
right in any work which may have been adapted or reproduced, a cine-
matographic work shall be protected as an original work. The owner of
copyright in a cinematographic work shall enjoy the same rights as the
author of an original work, including the rights in the preceding
Article."'"
Article 7(1) provides the basic term of protection of life of the au-
thor plus fifty years. Article 7(2), however, permits countries, in the case
of cinematographic works, to provide that the term of protection shall
expire "fifty years after the work has been made available to the public
with the consent of the author, or, failing such an event within fifty years
after the making." See W.I.P.O. Guide to the Berne Convention at 46-47
(1978); Ricketson, supra at 566-69.
20. See id. at 551-62 for discussion of subsequent revisions and proposals.
21. See also Article 2(1) listing cinematographic works as encompassed by "literary and
artistic works," and W.I.P.O. GLOSSARY OF TERMS OF THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBORING RIGHTS at 35 (1981) (defining "cinematographic work" as "Any sequence of
images recorded successively on an appropriate sensitive material, mostly accompanied by
sound, for the purpose of being shown as a moving picture").
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C. The Nature of Authorship in Motion Pictures2 2
1. Case Law in the United States
There is little U.S. case law on the nature of authorship in motion
pictures. In Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240, 242-43 (3d Cir. 1903), appeal
dismissed, 195 U.S. 625 (1904), the court held that a motion picture of
the launching of Kaiser Wilhelm's yacht "Meteor" embodied:
artistic conception and expression. To obtain it requires a
study of light, shadows, general surroundings, and a vantage
point adapted to securing the entire effect. In Bolles v. The
Outing Co., 77 F. 966 (2d Cir. 1897), depicting a yacht under
full sail was held to constitute an original work of art; and in
view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court (Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 ... (1903)) in refer-
ence to the character, in that regard, of a circus poster, we have
no question that the present photograph sufficiently fulfills the
character of a work of the fine arts.
Two years later, in American Mutoscope & Biograph Co. v. Edison
Mfg. Co., 137 F. 262, 266 (C.C.D.N.J. 1905), a motion picture of staged
scenes occurring at and around Grant's Tomb was held copyrightable
because the
pictures express the author's ideas and conceptions embodied
in the one story. In that story, it is true, there are different
scenes. But no one has ever suggested that a story told in writ-
ten words may not be copyrighted merely because, in unfolding
its incidents, the reader is carried from one scene to another.
Cases under the 1909 Act do not appear to have delved into the
nature of motion picture authorship. In Epoch Producing Corp. v. Kil-
liam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975), a case involving D. W.
Griffith's film "Birth of a Nation," the parties extensively briefed the is-
sue, but the court of appeals based its dismissal of Epoch's claim that
Griffith was its work made for hire employee on factors other than the
nature of Griffith's contributions.
2. Authorship in Motion Pictures Under the 1976 Copyright Act
During the revision process leading to passage of the 1976 Act, is-
sues involving motion pictures and other audiovisual works centered on
22. For simplicity's sake, we do not separately discuss the nature of authorship in
television programming. It is generally recognized that unlike motion pictures, television
programming is a "producer's medium." See testimony of Rob Word, Quintex Corporation
before the Copyright Office, Sept. 8, 1988 hearing. Transcript at 38.
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nonauthorship questions such as infringement by exhibition, the making
of ephemeral copies, copyright in transmissions of live broadcasts that
are simultaneously taped, termination of transfers, and work made for
hire. This is also true of the legislative reports accompanying the Act.
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-
473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
The Copyright Office's regulations under the 1976 Act 23 do not con-
tain any discussion on point. Compendium II of Copyright Office Prac-
tices makes only one reference:
A motion picture may embody the contributions of many per-
sons whose efforts are brought together to make a cinemato-
graphic work of authorship. Some examples of copyrightable
elements might be camera work, directing, editing, sound engi-
neering, and other cinematographic contributions. By contrast,
mere mechanical acts cannot serve as the basis for copyright
registration; for example, a claim based on conversion from
35mm film to one-half-inch videocassette is not subject to
registration.
Chapter 4, Sec. 480.03.
See also Copyright Office Circular R45 at 6: "The production of a
motion picture nearly always begins with some broad ideas and concepts
which the various creators.., then proceed to embody in a number of
different concrete forms of creative expression: dialogue, dramatic ac-
tion, camera work, visual effects, editing, music and so forth."
Likely reasons for the paucity of legal commentary on the nature of
authorship in motion pictures in the United States are the work made for
hire doctrine and the early dominance of the industry by the studios.
These two reasons are, moreover, related. Under the studio system, large
numbers of script writers, directors, actors and other creative contribu-
tors were retained on a salaried basis, and the studio accordingly would
have been regarded as the employer for hire. See 17 U.S.C. Sec. 26 (1909
repealed 1978); Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
997 (1972) (musical composition "Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf"
used in motion picture cartoon "Three Little Pigs" created by Walt Dis-
ney staff pianist).
Even outside of the studio system, directors and others were, of
course, required to sign employment contracts for specific films. These
contracts typically contained work made for hire clauses.
23. 37 C.F.R. §§ 201-308.
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While the studio system no longer prevails, work made for hire
does.24 Under this system, directors, screenplay writers, cinematogra-
phers, and others typically assign all rights to the producing or distribut-
ing company in exchange for compensation. During the omnibus
revision of the 1909 Act, screenplay writers and composers attempted to
alter the work made for hire doctrine by statutorily adopting something
similar to the "shop right" doctrine of patent law. Under this approach,
the employer acquires the right to use the work for purposes of his or her
regular business, but the employee retains all other rights that do not
compete with the employer. Congress, however, rejected the proposal:
[W]hile this change might theoretically improve the bargaining
position of screenwriters and others as a group, the practical
benefits that individual authors would receive are highly con-
jectural. The presumption that initial ownership rights vest in
the employer for hire is well established in American copyright
law, and to exchange that for the uncertainties of the shop right
doctrine would not only be of dubious value to employers and
employees alike, but would also reopen a number of other
issues.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976); S.
Rep. No. 94-473, 1st Sess. 104-105 (1975).
Following rejection of this proposal, nothing further was mentioned
about authorship or ownership in motion pictures. The Berne Conven-
tion and some foreign statutes contain provisions on ownership of cine-
matographic works, which may be profitably examined.25
24. See second subdivision of the definition of "work made for hire" in § 101 of the 1976
Act, which includes contributions to motion pictures.
25. The Universal Copyright Convention does not contain any special provisions on own-
ership of cinematographic works. Article I provides generally that protection must be granted
to the rights of "authors and other copyright proprietors." In his treatise on the Convention,
Arpad Bogsch, Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organization explains:
[t]he fact that the Convention does not refer only to authors but also to "other copy-
right proprietors" seems to have at least two good reasons.
The first reason is that "author" has a different meaning in the various copyright
laws of the world. Some countries recognize as authors only physical persons, others
recognize also legal entities. In the case of works made by an employee in the course
of his employment, some countries recognize the employer, others the employee as
author. The question of who is the author or are the authors of a photograph or a
motion picture belongs among the most controversial problems of copyright law and
the replies may considerably vary from one country to another. (second reason
omitted).





Article 14bis(2)(a) of the Berne Convention provides: "Ownership
of copyright in a cinematographic work shall be a matter for legislation
in the country where protection is claimed." The W.I.P.O. Guide to the
Berne Convention explains that such owners "may be the maker in his
own right, as under the 'film copyright' system, or the maker by reason
of a legal assignment, or it may be the various artistic contributors to the
film. National legislation is free to adopt any of the systems." W.I.P.O.
Guide at 85. The term "maker" is, absent proof to the contrary, consid-
ered to be "[tihe person or body corporate whose name appears on a
cinematographic work in the usual manner." Article 15(2).
These provisions have an extensive and controversial history due to
the widely differing approaches taken in national laws.26 The "film copy-
right" system, found generally in common law countries (including the
U.S.) vests all rights in one person or entity, typically the producing or
distributing company. The "legal assignment" system vests ownership
rights only in the natural persons who contribute to the film, but estab-
lish a statutory assignment of exploitation rights to the producer. A vari-
ant on this system establishes a presumption that such an assignment has
taken place.
These different approaches to ownership of cinematographic works
led to problems in exploiting them across national boundaries, a problem
that was solved within Europe with respect to television programs by a
1958 agreement concluded under the auspices of the Council of Europe,
which adopted the presumption of assignment system. This agreement
led to initiatives to include similar provisions in the Berne Convention.
After considerable debate and study,2" the current provisions found in
Article 14bis were agreed upon.
In addition to the provisions of Article l4bis(l) quoted above, Arti-
cle 14bis(2) subsections (b)-(d) contain a special provision for authors of
preexisting works used in cinematographic works created in countries
that regard such authors as co-authors of the cinematographic work.28
Under this provision - called a "presumption of legitimation" - au-
thors of preexisting works may not, in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, object to enumerated forms of exploitation of the cinemato-
26. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 (1987) at 572-89 [hereinafter RICKETSON].
27. See RICKETSON, supra note 26, at 574-82.
28. The question of the moral rights of authors of such preexisting works is critical to this
study, and is discussed in Chapter Five.
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graphic work. 9 The purpose of the provision is to give film companies
"complete freedom to do everything needed to ensure the international
circulation of their films." 3
Article 14bis (3) states that these provisions do not apply to "authors
of scenarios, dialogues and musical works created for the making of the
cinematographic work, or to the principal director thereof." If, however,
national law does not make the presumption binding on the principal
director, the country must notify the Director General of the World In-
tellectual Property Organization who will then notify the countries of the
Union. The purpose of this provision is to "take[ ] into account those
countries which treat the director as merely another employee of the film
company" and to exclude from the presumption "authors whose works
... can enjoy an existence other than in the film itself.. .."" The Guide
explains, however, that the presumption does apply to
assistant producers and directors, those responsible for decor,
costumers, cameramen and cutters, and also actors, to the ex-
tent that some countries treat them as co-authors of the film. It
was agreed in Stockholm (1967) that no country in the Union
which gives the copyright in films to the artistic contributors
may adopt a law which does not allow for such a presumption
of legitimation. In other words it is binding on all the countries
concerned.
National legislation does however remain free to provide that
authors must share in the proceeds of the exhibition or other
exploitation of the films to which they contributed.
In his thorough review of these provisions, Ricketson notes that
they have been described as "devoid of practically any real substance," a
description he agrees with, adding: "The purpose.., was the production
of a uniform international code to regulate exploitation of cinemato-
graphic works so as to promote the free circulation of films. This objec-
tive was hardly achieved, and the provisions adopted are the most
obscure and least useful in the whole convention."32
The W.I.P.O. Guide Commentary on Article 14 understandably
contains a more neutral discussion:
The rules [on ownership] were formulated at the Stockholm
29. These forms are: reproduction, distribution, public performance, communication to
the public by wire, broadcasting or any other communication to the public, or to the subtitling
or dubbing of texts, of the work.
30. W.I.P.O. GUIDE at 87.
31. W.I.P.O. GUIDE at 89.
32. RICKETSON, supra note 26, at 582. See also id. at 589.
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Revision (1967); they gave rise, both in Stockholm and during
the preparatory meetings, to much discussion and protracted
negotiations. The result is Articles 14 and 14bis.
Their objective is to facilitate the international circulation of
films and, to this end, to seek to bring closer together, if not
unify, the legal theories on the subject in the various countries
of the Union. Basically there are three different legal systems.
The "film copyright" system in which only the maker is the
first owner of the copyright in the film (and not the producer,
director, cameraman, etc.), but in which the rights in those
works which go to make up the film and which enjoy an exist-
ence apart from the film (scenarios, script music, etc.) belong
without restriction to their authors, from whom the film-maker
must acquire them by contract, express or implied. In other
words these authors enjoy copyright in their respective contri-
butions and grant the maker of the film permission to use them.
On the other hand, the latter owns all the copyright in the film
itself and is therefore free, subject to any contractual stipula-
tions to the contrary, to exploit it as he wishes.
A system in which the film is treated as a work of joint author-
ship of a number of artistic contributors (sometimes, but not
always, listed in national law) from whom the maker must take
assignments of their contributions in order to be able to exploit
the film.
The system called "legal assignment" which also treats the cin-
ematographic work as one of joint authorship but where the
national law presumes a contract with the maker, assigning the
right to exploit the film.
Since the Convention governs international situations, the
problem was how to build a bridge between the systems with-
out entirely ruling any of them out; this was done in Stockholm
(1967) by adding a rule covering the interpretation of contracts
known as "presumption of legitimation." This wedding of legal
systems made a distinction between the author's pre-existing
works (on which the film was based and from which it is
adapted) and those of contributions which only come into exist-
ence during the making of the film. Article 14 governs the first
and Article 14bis the second.
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W.I.P.O Guide at 82-83. 33
To see how national legislation has treated the ownership question,
we shall examine the statutes of three countries: France, the Federal Re-
public of Germany, and the United Kingdom.34
E. France
The French Copyright Law of 1957, as amended in 1985, contains
numerous provisions on cinematographic works."
Article 14 of the Copyright Law provides:
Authorship of an audiovisual work shall be deemed to belong
to the physical person or persons who brought about the intel-
lectual creation thereof.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, the co-authors of an
audiovisual work made in collaboration are presumed to be
1. The author of the script
2. The author of the adaptation
3. The author of the dialogue
4. The author of the musical composition, with or with-
out words, especially composed for the work
5. The director (realisateur)
When an audiovisual work is adapted from a pre-exisiting work
or script which is still protected, the authors of the original
work shall be assimilated to the authors of the new work.
Article 17 states that "[t]he producer of an audiovisual work shall
be the natural or legal person who takes the initiative and responsibility
for making the work." Article 63-1, which tracks Article 14bis(2) of the
Berne Convention, declares:
Contracts binding the producer and the authors of an audiovi-
33. For similar reasons, the Berne Convention does not define the more general term "au-
thor." See W.I.P.O GUIDE at 11: "The Convention speaks of 'the rights of authors in their
works' but it does not specifically define the word 'author' because on this point ... national
laws diverge widely, some recognizing only natural persons as authors, while others treat cer-
tain legal entities as copyright owners, some imposing conditions for the recognition of author-
ship which others do not accept."
34. For a good review of the laws of Latin American countries, see Emery, Copyright in
Cinematographic Works - A Study of Comparative Law in Latin America, COPYRIGHT 291
(Sept. 1987).
35. See, e.g., Articles 14-17, 63; as well as the 1985 Law on Author's Rights and the
Rights of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Videograms and Audiovisual Communi-
cation Enterprises, Title II, Articles 15-20, and Decree No. 56-158 (1956) Registration of Con-
tracts and Judgments Concerning Cinematographic Films.
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sual work, other than the authors of a musical composition
with or without words, imply, unless otherwise stipulated...
assignment to the producer of the exclusive exploitation rights
in the audiovisual work.
The advantages of this presumption are, however, severely restricted
by Article 31 of Title II, which requires that "[t]he transfer of author's
rights shall be subject to the condition that each of the rights transferred
shall be specifically mentioned in the act of transfer." In reviewing these
various provisions, one commentator concluded that "[w]e must.. . as-
sume that this presumption of assignment is more philosophical (symbol-
izing the producer's privileged status) than truly legal." Kerever,
Audiovisual Works Under the French Law of July 3, 1985, Copyright,
July-August 1987 at p. 247.
F Federal Republic of Germany
The German copyright law does not expressly state who is the au-
thor of a cinematographic work. Article 94(1) states, though, that:
The producer of a cinematographic work shall have the exclu-
sive right to reproduce the visual record or the visual or sound
record on which the cinematographic work is fixed, and to dis-
tribute it, and to utilize it for public presentation, or for
broadcast.
Article 94(3) provides for a 25 year term of protection for this right,
while Article 94(2) permits for transfer of the right.
G. United Kingdom
Section 9(2)(a) of the 1988 U.K. Copyright, Designs and Patents
Bill provides that in the case of a film the term "author" is to be regarded
as "the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the making of
the ... film are undertaken."36 In practice, therefore, in the United
Kingdom, the producer or studio is the author of the work.
Based on the foregoing discussion, particularly the provisions of Ar-
ticle l4bis of the Berne Convention and the approach taken by the
United Kingdom, it seems clear that U.S. law is consistent with interna-
tional norms in its treatment of the producer as the work made for hire
owner or author of a cinematographic work. The issue is principally sig-
nificant in the United States only because of the directors' claims for a
36. See also Article 11 which states a general rule that works made by employees in the
course of their employment are first owned by the employer, subject to any agreement to the
contrary.
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higher level of moral rights, an issue discussed in Chapter 8; however,
since to some extent those claims are based upon a conception of author-
ship as encompassing only the principal director and screenplay writer,
we briefly address them here.
H The Directors' Position
The directors and writers concede that the producer or other com-
missioning party should, in the absence of an individual contract to the
contrary, have final say over the content of the work as it is initially
distributed.37 They seek, however, to prohibit material alterations to the
work after it has been so distributed, and seek to limit those who can
object to such alterations to the principal director and screenplay
writer.38
The basis for this approach appears to be two-fold. First, it is
claimed that all of the other creative participants place their trust in the
director .31 Second, it is claimed, in any event, that aside from the princi-
pal screenplay writer, these other creative participants "do not compose
the yam" and are "professionally subject to the disciplines imposed by
the script and the director."'
These contentions have been disputed by producers and academics.
In a statement submitted in this inquiry, Professor Peter Jaszi noted that
developments in film criticism "have called the continued usefulness of
the traditional concept of 'authorship' into question, at least as a way of
understanding how works of creativity (including motion pictures) func-
tion to create meaning."'" Professor Jaszi added:
One important accomplishment of motion picture scholarship
in the past two decades has been to emphasize the importance
of the contributions of many different sorts of participants in
the process of filmmaking. Clearly, several groups of filmmak-
37. See DGA Basic Agreement at § 7-206 ("Individual with Final Cutting Authority");
§ 7-505 (director's cut is presented to producer and other person designated as having final
cutting authority). Statement of Directors Guild of America in Berne Convention Implementa-
tion Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 1623 Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties
and the Administration of Justice, House Judiciary Committee, 100th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 421
(1987 & 1988); and id. at 427 (testimony of Frank Pierson on behalf of the Writers Guild of
America); Berne Convention: Hearings on S. 1301 and S. 1971 Before the Subcommittee on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, Senate Judiciary Committee, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 523
(1988)("1988 Senate Berne Hearings").
38. See H.R. 2400, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1988)(Gephardt, "Film Integrity Act of 1987").
39. See testimony of George Lucas in 1988 Senate Berne Hearings, supra note 37, at 480.
40. Response of Steven Spielberg to Questions Posed by Sen. DeConcini, 1988 Senate
Berne Hearings, supra note 37, at 536.
41. Comment No. 7 at 4.
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ing professionals, other than directors, have claims to be con-
sidered. Among others, the list would include art directors,
cinematographers and film editors. Id. at 2.
Predictably, motion picture industry representatives have also dis-
agreed with the directors' and screenwriters' claims. In a written state-
ment submitted to the Subcommittee for its June 21, 1988 hearing on
H.R. 2400, Roger Mayer of the Turner Entertainment Company wrote:
[W]e need to explore a minor myth: the contention that the old
movies were exclusively the director's vision, and thus the di-
rector has the right to control. There are a few exceptions but
movie making - even today - is a hugely collaborative effort
among many creators. Most of the black and white movies in
question were made in the heyday of the studio system. De-
spite propaganda to the contrary, these old movies are not the
immaculately conceived "children" of the directors. They are,
for the most part, the "children" of the old movie moguls and
their staff producers. Theirs was the "creative concept," and
the financial responsibility. They chose the project, worked on
the script with the writer, and then assigned all other jobs on
the film, including the job of the director. As anyone familiar
with the studio system knows, several writers or directors
worked on many pictures, including such classics as "Gone
With the Wind" and "The Wizard of Oz." The spiritual heirs
of the moguls and producers, the true "parents" of these old
films, are not the directors but the copyright holders - who
want to show off their children proudly to as large an audience
as possible. Nobody has more of a stake in preventing the de-
struction of these pictures than the copyright holders.
Statement at p. 6. See also comments of Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. in this inquiry, Comment 4 at p. 21.
In his statement, David Brown, on behalf of the Motion Picture As-
sociation of America and his own production company, wrote:
The American motion picture is a fusion of a variety of creative
talents. It is a group collaboration. The worth and popularity
of films depends on the skill of a legion of artists: the produ-
cers, directors, screenwriters, special effects artisans, actors,
cinematographers, musicians, composers, lyricists, set design-
ers, make-up artists, and others.
Would Chariots of Fire have beguiled audiences if Vangelis had
not created such a memorable score? Would Jaws have been so
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riveting and tension-packed without John Williams' thumping
shark theme? Would the Exorcist have terrified and captivated
audiences without the extraordinary make-up created for the
young child? Would Star Wars have won such global applause
without its astonishing special effects?
The producer is no less a creative contributor than the director
or screenwriter. Many of our most treasured motion pictures
came to life because a producer had an idea and pursued it.42
Statement at 4.
I. Conclusion
We noted above the considerable difficulties faced over a period of
decades in attempts to revise the Berne Convention to come up with a
satisfactory uniform treatment of authorship in cinematographic works,
and how the ultimate result of those efforts has been described as being
"devoid of practically any real substance."43 In light of these difficulties
and the history of the film industry in the United States, we predict that
Congress would find problematic any effort to define the authors of a
cinematographic film. In any event, since directors and writers did not
seek to alter the rules for the exploitation of the first distributed product,
the question is only faced in the context of moral rights, a question that
adds even more complications, and which is discussed in detail in Chap-
ter 5.
CHAPTER 3: POST EXHIBITION ALTERATIONS To MOTION PICTURES
If motion pictures were only viewed in theatres, Chairman Kas-
tenmeier and Mr. Moorhead would not have requested this report, since
directors have, for purposes of legislative reform, disavowed any desire to
alter the traditional work made for hire relationship, according to which
the producer retains the power to determine the "final cut," - the power
to determine the form in which the motion picture is first released for
theatrical exhibition." Instead, the directors' complaints concern only
42. For references in the nonlegal literature discussing the nature of authorship of these
other contributors, see e.g., CARRINGER, THE MAKING OF CITIZEN KANE; MORDDEN, THE
HOLLYWOOD STUDIOS: HOUSE STYLE IN THE GOLDEN AGE; LOURIE, MY WORK IN
FILM (autobiography of art director); BALSHOFER & MILLER, ONE REEL A WEEK
(cinematographers).
43. RICKETSON, supra note 26, at 582.
44. See DGA Basic Agreement §§ 505, 1502 and especially 1500, "[t]he Employer's deci-
sion in all business and creative matters shall be final;" and House Berne Hearings at 421, 427
and 521; 1988 Senate Hearings 523 and Oral Statement of Sydney Pollack prepared for the
[Vol. 10
REPORT
post exhibition changes, changes that occur almost exclusively45 in
adapting the theatrical film for the different technical requirements of the
television screen.
The economic reason for adapting theatrical motion pictures for
viewing on television screens - whether via free broadcast, cable, or
videocassette - is obvious. The average cost of producing a feature film
for a Motion Picture Association of America member is estimated to be
over $20 million, up 113% from 1980. An additional $9 million is, on
average, spent on advertising.46 It has also been estimated that approxi-
mately two-thirds of MPAA member company films never recoup their
costs.47 Thus, "[o]nly through revenues from non-theatrical sources here
and abroad, are MPAA members able to reduce their losses with respect
to some films and recoup their costs as to others."4
While we cannot obtain exact figures, some estimates state that only
10 percent of a film's total audience views the work in the theatre: of the
remaining 90 percent, 20 percent see it on videocassette or on cable tele-
vision, while 70 percent view it on broadcast television, with the video-
cassette market growing in importance. In 1986, for the first time, video
rentals and sales surpassed proceeds from the box office. In 1988, box
office sales were $4,458,400,000. Videocassette rentals alone were
$5,490,600,000, videocassette sales added another $1,394,900,000. For
obvious reasons, directors are not, to our knowledge, seeking to prohibit
any distribution of their works in these media.49
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, Sept.
30, 1987, reprinted in Comment No. 3 of this inquiry (directors have "no intention of upsetting
the economic rights. The marketing, licensing, buying, selling, and theatrical exhibition of
motion pictures rest solely with the proprietor. Our concern is subsequent to the time at which
the film has begun to live in some form of exhibition, when it has acquired an identity." Id. at
5.).
45. Recently, the Library of Congress was the scene of an embarrassing and regrettable
example of theatrical alteration. On July 29, 1988, before an audience that included the Libra-
rian of Congress, the Register of Copyrights, Members of Congress, and diplomats, Soviet
director Alexandr Askoldov complained bitterly that his long suppressed film "Commissar"
was altered by the removal of certain opening shots, and retitling. Additionally, publicity
photographs were altered by removing Stars of David from the clothing of characters repre-
senting oppressed Jews.
As Mr. Askoldov informed the surprised and chagrined audience at the screening, these
changes were made by the American distributor without his permission or knowledge. In
commenting on these changes, Mr. Askoldov said: "I am absolutely appalled. What the Rus-
sian bureaucrats did not do to my film in the Soviet Union [the distributor] did in the United
States." Washington Post, July 30, 1988 at C3.
46. Comment No. 5, Statement of Motion Picture Association of America at 5.
47. Id. at 6.
48. Id.
49. Distribution of motion pictures for free television broadcast may be declining. See
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Instead, the directors complain about certain forms of alterations
made to their works in the process of converting them for viewing on
television sets. However, colorization aside, the alterations complained
of have been in existence for quite some time (as long as 25 years in some
cases), and with little public complaint by directors." In responding to
this point during hearings in the Senate on May 12, 1987, several direc-
tors testified they had unsuccessfully attempted, through collective bar-
gaining, to prohibit such alterations.5 The directors have, nevertheless,
obtained certain contractual provisions concerning editing for televi-
sion. 2 And, certain individual directors have obtained considerable con-
trol over both the original form of the film and post-theatrical release
alterations.
The issue of whether collective and individual bargaining should be
relied upon in lieu of legislation is complex and is addressed below in
Chapter 4. However, in order to understand the nature and efficacy of
such bargaining, we need a basic understanding of the technologies in-
volved and how they affect the aesthetics of filmmaking and the habits
and preferences of viewers.
A. Adoption of Broadcast Standards for Television
Just as theatrical screens and television monitors come in different
sizes, methods for projecting the images displayed vary as well. The
Academy of Motion Pictures projection standard is 1.85:1, meaning that
the projected image is 1.85 times as wide as it is high. This relationship
testimony of Sydney Pollack in House Berne Hearings at 531 ("Most movies don't sell to
television anymore and the few that do are the best movies."); testimony of Steven Spielberg in
Senate 1988 Berne Hearings at 533 ("You don't see a lot of films on television any more. They
don't work as well. They show them on HBO. They show movies on cassettes because people
would rather see them without them being all chopped up."). This may explain the apparent
rise in the number of "made for television" movies. However, even these movies have been
subsequently altered. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1989 at H27 (article by director Nicholas
Meyer, complaining that his two hour and fifteen minute made for television movie The Day
After was going to be broadcast the next night "with more than 23 minutes removed and 4
more minutes 'gained' through use of compression.").
50. Individual directors have, of course, protested editing of their films for television. See
Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 913 (App. Div.), aff'd mem., 173
N.Y.S.2d 80 (N.Y. 1966); Stevens v. NBC, 148 U.S.P.Q. 572 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1966); 76 Cal.
Rptr. 106 (Ct. App. 1969).
51. See Legal Issues that Arise When Color is Added to Films Originally Produced, Sold,
and Distributed in Black and White, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Technology & The
Law, Senate Judiciary Committee, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1987) (testimony of Elliot Silver-
stein); 44 (testimony of Woody Allen).
52. See id. at 15 and DGA Basic Agreement Para. 7-509, as well as a right of consultation
for "coloring, time compression and expansion, changes in the exhibition of the aspect ratio
(e.g., 'panning and scanning.').
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between width and height is called the "aspect ratio." In an effort to
create panoramic effects and lure audiences away from television,
processes that permitted even wider screens were developed in the 1950s.
Among the better known of these processes are CinemaScope and
PanaVision, which have aspect ratios of 2.35:1.
The net aesthetic result of these higher " 'Scope" aspect ratios has
been called into question by one prominent critic:
The compression of the wide image onto the film and its subse-
quent expansion in the projector made the photography grainy,
especially in black and white, which was henceforth virtually
abandoned .... The new shape was impossible to compose for
.... Editing was cut to a minimum because on an image so
large each cut made the audience jump. Instead, and cheaper,
the camera stayed still while the cast roved around the empty
spaces in front of it, and there was an absurd number of shots
in which the leading actors reclined so as to better fit the frame.
Close-ups and subtle nuances were forgotten: no longer did the
camera direct the drama, you had to look around and find it
yourself .... In many cinemas CinemaScope was even a fraud,
for it had to be on a screen smaller in area than the old image,
which was now being referred to sneeringly as 'postage stamp.'
This happened when the old screen had already occupied all
the width allowed by the cinema's structure: to get the
CinemaScope shape, if you could not go any wider, height had
to be sacrificed, and audiences wondered why suddenly they
were looking at a ribbon of picture across the middle of the
space which the old screen had occupied.
Halliwell, Halliwell's Film Guide 1002 (2d ed. 1979). See also
Transcript of the Copyright Office September 8, 1988 hearing
at 13.
Even Halliwell admits, though, that directors enjoyed composing for
'Scope.5 3 It is, though, ironic that in the late 1950's and early 1960's, the
motion picture companies began selling these films for viewing on televi-
53. A number of current directors would like to compose in 'Scope but are faced with a
dilemma. If they do so, they must either forego the extremely important television market, or
see their films significantly altered for adaptation for television. See Balton, The Shape of
Money, 57 SIGHT & SOUND 45, 46 (Winter 1987), reprinted in Comment No. 1 (quoting
director Martin Scorsese as wanting to shoot all his films in 'Scope, "but I realize that when it's
shown on TV the power of the picture will be completely lost."). This reluctance to shoot in
'Scope has resulted in a tacit acceptance of the 1.85:1 aspect ratio.
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sion in order to recoup the increased costs of production.54
This increased economic dependence on the television market led
the motion picture companies to develop "pan and scan" systems that
would avoid severe problems that inevitably result in unaltered transmis-
sion of 'Scope films on television. The source of the problem is found in
the smaller aspect ratio used in television, a ratio that is the result of a
decision made in the 1940's by the engineering community in setting the
broadcast standards for television. The National Television System
Committee standard agreed upon is an aspect ratio of 1.33:1.
Accordingly, if a theatrical motion picture shot in larger aspect ratio
is to be viewed on a television screen,55 the motion picture aspect ratio
must be reconciled with the (smaller) aspect ratio of the television screen.
There are two principal ways of doing this: "letterboxing" and "pan-
ning/scanning."
B. Letterboxing
Letterboxing is the technique favored by a number of directors, in-
cluding Woody Allen, who used it in adapting his film "Manhattan" for
nontheatrical distribution. In addition, letterboxed versions of "Hidden
Fortress," "The Graduate," "Blade Runner,"56 "New York, New
York," and "Ferris Bueller's Day Off," among others are available on
videocassette.
With letterboxing, the theatrical aspect ratio is retained, but the pic-
ture is shrunk, resulting in the image being "boxed in" by dark bands
above and below. The aesthetic effect of letterboxing is subject to some
dispute. For directors and cinematographers, letterboxing affords the
opportunity of keeping the film's theatrical composition intact. How-
ever, the central image is smaller, a result that has adverse effects on
small screen televisions leading some critics to contend that "you end up
seeing less."5 7 Of course, it is less of a problem on large screens. Broad-
casters oppose it based on a belief that it is "unattractive to viewers."5"
For the same reason, many of the motion picture companies59 and the
54. The trend toward vertical integration in the entertainment industry has created a situa-
tion where cable systems are assisting in the financing of theatrical motion pictures, which are
then shot with the cable market in mind.
55. Since it is the projected aspect ratio of television that matters, the need for adaptation
is the same for cable and videocassettes as for broadcast.
56. A demonstration of the letterboxing of this film was given at the Copyright Office's
Sept. 8, 1988 hearing.
57. See Belton, The Shape of Money, supra note 53, at 46-47.
58. See Comment No. 15, statement of National Broadcasting Company at 2.
59. See Comment No. 5, statement of the Motion Picture Association of America, Tab C
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video retailers' oppose it.
George Stevens, Jr. of the American Film Institute, however, sub-
mitted a statement in this inquiry in which he asserted "[a]udiences will,
particularly as the resolution of television sets improve, quickly adjust to
the dark spaces on the top and bottom of the screen and appreciate the
preferred experience of seeing scenes as they were composed by the direc-
tor and his cameraman."
6 '
From demonstrations of letterboxing given at our September 8, 1988
hearing, certain aesthetic advantages are apparent. These advantages
must be weighed against the tendency of some consumers to object to the
presence of dark bands on the screen. The various benefits of letterbox-
ing can, perhaps, best be understood by contrasting the technique with its
alternative: panning and scanning.6 2
C. Panning and Scanning
"Panning and scanning" was introduced in approximately 1961 as a
result of network television's refusal to show the equivalent of let-
terboxed films, based on a belief that viewers prefer a picture that fills the
entire television screen. The goal of panning and scanning is "to try and
preserve what the director did with the original film and try and make it
look best."' 63 At its simplest, panning and scanning involves a process
"whereby the widescreen image is successively recomposed by a camera
which scans the width of the image possessing full height but missing the
sides (which have been chopped off)." Comment # 1, statement of Soci-
ety for Cinema Studies at 6. The "rule of thumb for panners and scan-
ners is to follow the action, which simply translates into holding on
whoever is speaking or following the movements of the central charac-
ter." Id. at 20-21.
at 2: "Panning and scanning is generally the option of choice. Consumers prefer an image
that fills the entire screen over the 'wide and short' image, with broad black top and bottom
borders, that appear on a 'letterboxed' image."
60. See testimony of Vans Stevenson of Erol's Inc. at Copyright Office Sept. 8, 1988 hear-
ing, Transcript at 248-49 (although Erol's has not had negative reaction to the few films let-
terboxed, a belief was stated that letterboxing "would have a tremendously adverse impact on
our business, because. . ., when people watch television, they are used to watching it full frame
. . . .").
61. Comment No. 14 at 6.
62. The introduction of High-Definition Television (HDTV) may make letterboxing a
more attractive alternative to panning and scanning. HDTV will bring vastly superior contrast
and larger screens. Additionally, the expected use of a larger aspect ratio than the 1:33.1
currently used in television will result in less of the image being cropped.
63. Statement of Ralph Martin, supervisor of panning and scanning for Warner Bros.,
quoted in Belton, Shape of Money, supra note 53, at 45.
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A technical and somewhat more optimistic description of panning
and scanning is provided in the following comments of the Motion Pic-
ture Association of America:
[First,] [f]ilm transfer is undertaken on a "telecine machine,"
manufactured by such companies as Rank Cintel, Bosch Fern-
seh and Marconi. A reel of film is threaded through an appara-
tus that looks like a film projector and onto a take-up reel. A
cathode ray tube (CRT) is used as a light source, and projects
through the passing film frames. The focal point of the light
source which moves across the film frame is called the "raster."
The "projected" image then passes through a series of mirrors
which divide the pictures' red, green and blue components.
These color components are picked up by photoelectric cells
which transform the photographic image into electronic infor-
mation, which is then manipulated through computer-con-
trolled electronics.
The "telecine operator" (also known in the trade as a "color-
ists") sits before a sophisticated bank of electronic equipment.
The operator views the image fed from the telecine machine on
a high-quality video monitor. In order to determine how the
picture should be panned-and-scanned, the telecine operator
moves the "raster" across the film image, deciding which por-
tions of each frame should be transferred to video.
In layman's terms, it is possible to think of the moving "raster"
as a "camera" that is moved around the film image to capture
and accentuate those parts of the image that will be most effec-
tive in the video version of the film. The increased sophistica-
tion of computer electronics now permits the telecine operator
to make both linear and non-linear moves across the film im-
age. Thus, the telecine operator can vary the speed with which
the "camera" pans across the image in virtually any direction.
Moreover, by using a device called an "x-y zoom," the telecine
operator can zero in on and accentuate them in the video ver-
sion. Comment # 5 at Tab C pp. 3-4.
D. Effects of Panning and Scanning on the Aesthetics
of Theatrical Motion Pictures
Early panning and scanning sometimes involved single, fixed posi-
tion scanning whereby the center portion of the original image was
rephotographed, a "technique" that occasionally led to bizarre recom-
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posed scenes. For example, in a commercial airliner cockpit scene in
"The High and The Mighty," John Wayne and Robert Stack are having
a conversation, but in the panned and scanned version one cannot see
them, only a view of the instrument panel and the cockpit console be-
tween them.64
Improvements in panning and scanning were made later in the
1960s, with the introduction of telecine devices, which permitted up to
twelve different positions of rephotographing the original image. One foe
of panning and scanning concedes that "[t]oday, there are virtually an
infinite number of possible positions as well as new technologies which
make optically introduced panning movements virtually indistinguish-
able from actual camera pans.",
6 5
The aesthetic effort of panning and scanning will ultimately depend
upon the degree to which the aspect ratios have to be reconciled and the
original shots recomposed, the skill of the telecine operator, the care with
which the panning and scanning is done, and the amount of time the
operator is given to complete the job. Even the best telecine operator
cannot compensate for the loss of visual image of a wide screen exhibi-
tion of motion pictures shot in 'Scope.
Some motion picture companies do panning and scanning in-house,
while others contract it out. Under the Directors' Guild of America Ba-
sic Agreement, directors have a right to be consulted about and to be
present during the panning and scanning process.
66
The right of consultation is not, of course, the same as the right to
prohibit panning and scanning, nor even to have the final say over how a
film is panned and scanned. Perhaps in light of these limits (and in order
to retain the financial benefit of exploitation on television), directors and
cinematographers have attempted to minimize the negative effects of
panning and scanning by shooting the original theatrical version of the
film in an aspect ratio roughly equivalent to that of television. This pro-
cess began in the early 1960s, when the American Society of Cinematog-
raphers issued a series of recommendations to its members
advising them to compose their widescreen images for televi-
sion's "safe action area." Camera manufacturers began to pro-
duce viewfinders which indicate this area with a dotted line,
and cinematographers began to protect their composition for
64. See generally, Belton, Pan and Scan Scandals, 3 THE PERFECT VERSION 40 (1987),
and testimony of Rob Word at Copyright Office Sept. 8, 1988 hearing, Transcript at 13-14.
(Tieing problem, in part, to widescreen composition).
65. Belton, The Shape ofMoney, supra note 53, at 45.
66. See DGA Basic Agreement at § 7-513.
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television by keeping essential narrative and/or aesthetic ele-
ments within this frame-within-a-frame. By keeping all crucial
story information within the safe action area, cameramen
adapted their art to satisfy the demands of television screen and
the needs of panning and scanning. The extreme widescreen
compositions of the 1950s which exploited the full width of the
frame and often placed figures at either edge of it gave way to
conservative compositions characterized by "dead" space on
either side of the central area of interest in the frame .... In
effect, the threat of panning and scanning for television has
taken its toll on widescreen aesthetics.67
Since many directors and cinematographers have, for over a quarter
of a century, been shooting within the "safe area" in order to both pre-
serve, as much as possible, the integrity of their composition and not
foreclose the profitable television market, they have somewhat weakened
their claim that legislation is required to permit them to prohibit panning
and scanning.6" Notwithstanding the sometimes regrettable effects of
poor panning and scanning, adequate technical and marketplace solu-
tions to the problem appear to exist.
E. Lexiconning
Cable services such as HBO and Showtime, as well as videocassettes
and videodiscs are generally not subject to time limitations, and thus, "it
is rarely necessary to modify [the] running time of a film for these me-
dia."69 This is not the case for television broadcasts and airlines. "Air-
lines must show motion pictures that fit conveniently into the travel time
not allocated for meal and beverage service and other amenities" while
"[t]elevision broadcasters need motion pictures that will fit into desig-
nated time slots (usually measured in 30-minute increments) with time
67. Comment No. 1, Society for Cinema Studies at 9-10. Importantly, in 1960 the Direc-
tors Guild of America, Writers Guild of America, Screen Actors Guild, and the American
Federation of Musicians signed collective bargaining agreements with the producers waiving
the guilds' rights to revenues for free television broadcasts of theatrical motion pictures before
1960, in exchange for a cash settlement to be applied for pension plans to be established under
the agreement. For theatrical motion pictures made since 1960 and broadcast on free televi-
sion, the guild divided up a total of 12.5% of the gross revenues for those pictures in the
following proportions: 1.2% each for the DGA and WGA, 3.6% for the SAG, 1% for the
AFM, and 5.4% for the International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees.
68. In addition, credible (but not necessarily dispositive) testimony was received sug-
gesting that imposition of letterboxing would adversely affect the broadcast industry and meet
with at least some consumer opposition.
69. Comment No. 5, statement of Motion Picture Association of America at 4.
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allotted for the carriage of commercial announcements." 70
A "lexicon" machine - which either compresses or expands the
running time of a film - alters the motion picture in order to fit into a
specific time slot. Technically, lexiconning may be described as follows:
Compression or expansion is accomplished by changing the
rate at which the film frame runs past the "raster." Today's
telecine equipment permits speed changes that are measured in
hundredths of a frame per second, permitting precise changes
in timing of the motion picture. Compression and expansion
are accomplished so that no change is discernible to the naked
eye.
By ascertaining the running time needed for the video version
of a feature film and applying a mathematical formula, the
telecine operator can determine whether an entire motion pic-
ture or selected portions should be expanded or compressed.
Motion pictures can be compressed or expanded by up to 6 or 7
percent with no effect on the viewer perception of the work,
although a 2 to 3 percent change in speed would be the average.
Time-base correction devices are used to interpolate picture in-
formation, thereby avoiding "jerking" or other defects in the
video image.
A 1-to-2 percent change in the speed of the film has no noticea-
ble effect in the pitch of the audio. If the speed change is
greater, it becomes necessary to adjust the pitch of the sound to
eliminate the "chipmunk effect" or "slo-mo effect." This is ac-
complished by running the sound levels through an audio pitch
changer (manufactured by companies such as Lexicon and
Evertime) which makes the necessary adjustments automati-
cally when it is instructed what the original film rate is (in
frames per second) and what the new film rate is. 7 1
Lexiconning is generally performed by independent television sta-
tions, although some film packaging firms may supply already lexiconned
films to these stations. Lexiconning has been the subject of collective
bargaining, through which the directors have gained some measure of
control over the practice.
70. Id.
71. Comment No. 5, statement of Motion Pictures Association of America, Tab C at 5.
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F The Effects of Lexiconning on the Aesthetics
of Theatrical Motion Pictures
The adverse effects of lexiconning are best appreciated when time is
compressed. One particular example from "Casablanca" was shown at
the Copyright Office's September 8th hearing. Based on this and other
examples, we concluded lexiconning can adversely affect the director's,
cinematographer's, editor's, and actors'/actresses' contributions. And,
unlike panning/scanning, there is nothing these individuals can do dur-
ing the shooting of the theatrical version of the film to protect it from
such subsequent alteration. Section 7-513 of the DGA Basic Agreement
gives directors the right to be consulted about lexiconning, however,
given that lexiconning generally takes place at independent stations, it is
hard to see how this consultation could effectively take place.
Little information was provided about the extent of lexiconning, and
outside of a few egregious examples, not much is known about how often
lexiconning results in noticeably adverse effects. For films that do not fit
within the regular broadcast time slots, some adjustment must be made
either in the work itself or in the matter in which motion pictures are
scheduled for broadcast.
G. Computer Color Encoding
In our prior proceeding to determine whether to register claims to
computer color encoded versions of black and white motion pictures, we
received considerable technical commentary on the "colorization" pro-
cess." Additionally, Copyright Office staff spent a day each at Coloriza-
tion, Inc. and Color Systems Technologies studying, in-depth, how their
respective processes work. Because the encoding companies each use dif-
ferent processes, no single description of computer color encoding can be
accurate.7 3  Accordingly, the following description is, of necessity,
general.
The process begins with a decision by a commissioning party74 to
72. See comments submitted in connection with Registration of Claims to Copyright Notice
of Inquiry." Colorization of Motion Pictures, Docket RM 86-1. We solicited and received addi-
tional descriptions in connection with this report. See Comment No. 3 (Color Systems Tech-
nology) and Comment No. 4 (Turner Broadcasting Systems).
73. A good discussion of the three principal processes is found in IEEE Spectrum, Aug.
1987, reproduced in Comment No. 18 (American Film Technologies). See also Comment No.
3 (Color Systems Technology), Exhibits E & F.
74. Most computer color encoding is done by an encoding company on behalf of a client,
although this is not the case for Quintex, which has its encoding done by an affiliated company,




"colorize" a particular motion picture for which it either owns the copy-
right, or which is in the public domain, e.g., It's a Wonderful Life. The
commissioning party of the encoding company obtains the best quality
(black and white) print(s) of the work, which is then cleaned up by re-
moving defacing marks and scratches and which is then copied intact
onto a videotape.7" Black and white video signal information on the
videotape is digitized and entered into a computer. Software first divides
the black and white video frame into a grid consisting of 1,024 horizontal
and 512 vertical pixels and then establishes the luminance (brightness)
and chrominance (color) values for each such pixel.7 6
Next, the black and white videotape is viewed in its entirety by an
art director. The film is then categorized into individual scenes in which
the basic visual elements are constant. The scenes are numbered chrono-
logically and described in detail, including the type of movement and the
presence of special effects. A reference file with specific information
about and descriptions of each character is made, along with layouts of
the sets.77 For each scene, research is gathered such as historical infor-
mation (uniforms, flags, etc.), and publicity photographs or other infor-
mation about the original cinematography. Typically, this information
fills in a very small proportion of the color selection process. The vast
majority of color selection is based on the art director's (and client's)
interpretation of the script, the personality of the characters, and the
overall mood of the picture. Once these decisions are made, the scenes
are broken down into a number of key frames. A key frame typically
"include[s] the first frame of a scene, and usually several succeeding
frames that require a change or introduction of color, because a change
in lighting casts a different tone on all colors."7 8  Each key frame is
"handpainted;" i.e., the color is determined in its entirety by the art di-
rector. This color information is then stored in the computer, which pro-
ceeds to automatically encode the color from the key frame to
subsequent frames until the next key frame occurs, whereupon the pro-
cess is repeated until the film has been completely encoded.
After completion of the initial encoding, the art director reviews
75. Encoding companies have emphasized that the original print is left untouched by this
process.
76. A television signal is comprised of four signals: (1) a chrominance signal, which gener-
ates red, green, and blue; (2) a luminance signal, which controls brightness and intensity; (3)
vertical blanking interval signals; and (4) horizontal blanking signals.
77. Colorization, Inc. actually creates a "storyboard," a comprehensive series of three ring
binders containing details of all the scenes in the film. One such storyboard, for a Laurel and
Hardy short, and provided to us for this study, filled six three ring binders.
78. IEEE Spectrum, Aug. 1987 at 51.
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each frame in the equivalent of a cutting room in order to make neces-
sary adjustments in color and to hand paint objects which did not appear
in the key frames. The frames are then organized in the proper sequence
and transferred onto a master tape. The entire process takes approxi-
mately one month, with an average cost of $3,000 per minute, or
$300,000 for a 100 minute motion picture.
The oldest of the encoding companies is Colorization, Inc., of To-
ronto, Canada, formed in 1981 and affiliated with Quintex Corporation,
which owns a substantial portion of its stock. Colorization's first release
- a color-encoded version of Laurel and Hardy's The Music Box - was
broadcast in 1983. Its first full length colorized motion picture was Top-
per, released in 1985. It has recently decided to focus almost exclusively
on encoding black and white television series.
Color Systems Technology of Marina Del Rey, California was
founded in 1983 and has colored encoded a number of films for 20th
Century Fox and Turner Entertainment (out of its MGM, Warner Bros.,
and RKO libraries). It recently signed a contract with French director
Jean-Luc Goddard to color encode his film Breathless.
Tintoretto, Inc. of Toronto was formed in 1986 by former employees
of Colorization, Inc. and uses a process similar to Colorization, Inc.
The most recent encoding company is American Film Technologies,
of San Diego, California, formed in 1987. It has encoded a number of
films for Turner Entertainment Company and others.
Less than one hundred black and white films have been color en-
coded to date. 79 Color encoding has also been used with television pro-
grams, newsreels, and cartoons. It is used almost exclusively for
videocassettes, and for cable and television broadcasts. Technically,
colorized video tapes may be transferred to a print format and exhibited
in theatres. However, as one comment letter noted:
This is more of a function of the commercial marketplace
rather than one of technology. The relative growth of home
video, television, and pay cable distribution, has led to this
practice. Moreover, theatrical distribution, in most cases, is
commercially viable only for entirely new mass appeal movies,
and not for derivative works based on the classic motion
pictures.
Comment of Hal Roach Studios, Inc., in Copyright Office
Docket No. 86-1, at p. 17.
79. See Comment No. 4, statement of Turner Broadcasting System, Exhibit A, for a par-
tial list of these films.
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The underlying rationale for computer color encoding black and
white motion pictures is not complex: to broaden the number of people
who view the pictures and to make a profit by doing so. Judged by these
standards, colorization has been successful.8 0 The effect of computer
color encoding on the aesthetics of motion pictures, is of course, a sepa-
rate issue, and one we will now address.
H. Effect of Colorization on the Aesthetics of Black and
White Motion Pictures
Unquestionably, "colorizing" a black and white motion picture
changes that film's aesthetics.8'
Indeed, the basis for the Copyright Office's June 12, 1987 Notice of
Registration Decision with respect to claims to copyright in color en-
coded motion pictures, was the Office's finding that the color selection
represented new authorship apart from that found in the underlying
black and white film. It is not, therefore, an adverse reflection on com-
puter colorizing to describe the process as altering the aesthetics of the
black and white film it is based upon. Nor, hyperbole aside, is the issue
the quality 2 of the encoding. The issue is simply, given that colorization
undeniably alters the aesthetics of the black and white work, should Con-
80. See Comment No. 4, Turner Broadcasting System at 7-19; Comment No. 3, Color
Systems Technology at 4-6, 12-13, 23-25.
8 1. See statement of N.Y. Times film critic Vincent Canby, submitted to the Subcommittee
for its June 21, 1988 hearing on H.R. 2400, at 1-2:
Black-and-white films are made according to their own aesthetics. Some things can
be done in color photography that cannot be done in black-and-white. Black-and-
white offers opportunities to the film maker not available in color. Because of this, we
respond to black-and-white films in one way, and to color films in another. Black-
and-white films are neither better nor worse than color. They are a different aspect of
cinema art.
See also Senate Colorization Hearings at 11 (testimony of Elliot Silverstein: ("Black and
white photography is not color photography with the color removed. It involves a completely
different technique ...."); 18 (testimony of Sydney Pollack); 47 (taped testimony of John
Huston); and 55 (testimony of Woody Allen).
On November 23, 1988, the First Chamber of the Grand Instance of Paris, France, up-
held a moral rights claim asserted by director John Huston's heirs against the proposed broad-
cast of a colorized version of the director's film, The Asphalt Jungle.
In a statement submitted in connection with this report, scholars at the Max Planck Insti-
tute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, concluded that
colorization would, absent consent, violate the moral rights of those who contributed to the
creation of a black and white motion picture. Comment No. 2 at 11-12.
In 1964, an Italian appeals court is reported to have issued an injunction on moral rights
grounds against the Italian publisher Loganesi restraining it from distributing copies of a book
with drawings by artist Ben Shahn that had been created in black and white but colored with-
out his approval.
82. See Senate Colorization Hearings at 17, testimony of director Sydney Pollack: "You
have seen a demonstration of the new technology that is quite good and, like all technologies,
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gress grant directors (and others) the right to prohibit it, notwithstanding
the "universal acknowledg[ment] that [in the United States] owners or
licensees of the copyright have the legal right to decide whether these old
movies should be colored," 3 a question properly reviewed in the context
of moral rights, a topic we cover in Chapter 5, below.
I Future Technologies
The Copyright Office has received information about two future
technologies that may effect the aesthetics of motion pictures shown on
television. The first of these is High-Definition Television (HDTV). 4
When finally introduced, HDTV will provide a television picture with
sharply improved color and clarity. This sharper picture is the result of a
more than doubling in the number of lines per frame currently used (525)
and use of the latest digital processing techniques. The Federal Commu-
nications Commission has not yet adopted an aspect ratio for HDTV,
although most proposals are for aspect ratios higher than the current
1:33.1 ratio used on standard television sets. Thus, HDTV could further
reduce the need for panning and scanning. Moreover, since broadcasters
and cable systems are expected to use film prints for HDTV transmis-
sions instead of tapes, HDTV may affect the manner in which producers
shoot motion pictures intended for television viewing.
Congress and the Copyright Office also received evidence on com-
puter generation of life-like representations of people, through which
"[w]e may be able to recreate stars of the past, Clark Gable and Rita
Hayworth, cast them in new roles, bring them forward into time in new
settings... ,,81 We have seen a demonstration of this technology, which
appears to be in its infancy. We do not, therefore, see any urgent need to
study issues raised by this technology in this report.
CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL
BARGAINING ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND DISTRIBUTION
OF MOTION PICTURES
We noted in the last chapter that only 10 percent or so of a theatri-
cal motion picture's total audience comes from theatrical exhibition; the
is going to get better. But the fundamental issue is not how good it is .... [It is] that it is not in
any sense the same as black and white ......
83. Statement of Roger Mayer, Turner Entertainment Company, submitted to the Sub-
committee for its June 21, 1988 hearing on H.R. 2400, at 5.
84. See generally, statements and testimony submitted to the House Subcommittee on Tele-
communications and Finance in Connection with its March 8 and 9, 1989 hearings on HDTV
85. Senate Colorization Hearings at 46.
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remaining 90 percent comes from videocassette and cable (20 percent)
and free broadcast television (70 percent). We also noted that roughly
two-thirds of all MPAA member company films do not recoup their
costs. Given these statistics, it is hardly surprising that virtually all the-
atrical motion pictures are made with the understanding that they will
subsequently be viewed on television screens. We further noted that the
different technical requirements of television viewing will, at least under
industry preferred approaches, lead to certain alterations in the motion
picture for these post-exhibition markets.
In this chapter, we examine how collective and individual bargain-
ing in the motion picture industry affects the development and distribu-
tion of motion pictures.
A. Copyright Ownership and Preparation of the
Motion Pictures for Exhibition
Perhaps more than any other form of authorship, motion pictures
are the result of collaborative effort and a great deal of money. Those
who participate in the film's creation generally all share in the twin objec-
tives of artistic and financial success. The manner and amount in which
directors, screenplay writers, actors, and others are compensated varies
considerably, and is outside the scope of this study.8 6 Compensation
aside, all of these creative participants will be typically employed under
work made for hire or transfer of rights agreements, under which the
employer - be that a producer, studio, or financing corporation 7 - is
considered the author and copyright owner.
86. The two principal methods of compensation are payment of a flat fee under a service
contract and net profit participation. See generally, SQUIRE, THE MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK
(1983); RUDELL, BEHIND THE SCENES: PRACTICAL ENTERTAINMENT LAW (1984); VOGEL,
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS: A GUIDE FOR FINANCIAL ANALYSIS (1986).
87. For simplicity's sake, we will refer to this individual or corporation as the "producer"
since most of the testimony in the recent congressional hearings have been couched in director
versus producer terms. A "producer" will, we understand, most often be a company, perhaps
established solely or principally for purposes of producing motion pictures and television pro-
grams.
Whether the producer, studio, or financial corporation backing the picture owns the copy-
right is generally dependent upon how large a role the producer plays in bringing the various
elements together, and how much financial risk he or she takes. If, for example, the producer
packages a deal and then signs a contract with a studio under which the studio bears the
ultimate responsibility for completion of the picture, it is expected the studio will usually own
the copyright. If, however, the producer obtains independent financing, hires the director,
screenplay writer, actors, and clears rights, he or she may own the copyright. For purposes of
this report, the significant point is that the copyright is typically owned under a work made for
hire agreement by someone other than the director. See 1988 Senate Berne Hearings at 408,
438-40, 519. Of course, on occasion, directors have also assumed the role of producer, in
which case they are also the copyright owner.
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The extent to which the producer may exercise these rights is, how-
ever, circumscribed by a number of factors, the most important of which
are: (1) the economics of the motion picture industry, which require
post-theatrical exhibition marketing of films on cable, videocassettes, and
free television; and, (2) the Guild"8 and individual creative artists'
agreements.
B. The Directors Guild of America's Basic Agreement
Section 7 of the Directors Guild of America's (DGA) Basic Agree-
ment 9 contains a detailed set of minimum conditions for the prepara-
tion, the production, and the post-production, and post-theatrical release
editing of motion pictures. Under Section 7-101 of the Agreement, the
director "participat[es] in all creative phases of the film-making process,
including but not limited to all creative aspects of sound and picture;"
"[t]he Director's function is to contribute to all of the creative elements
of a film and to participate in molding and integrating them into one
cohesive dramatic and aesthetic whole."
After the director completes shooting of the principal photography,
he or she is responsible for the presentation to the producer (or represen-
tative thereof) of his or her cut of the film, known as the "Director's
Cut." Sections 7-501, 505. This responsibility is described as an "abso-
lute right," Section 7-508, and "[n]o one shall be allowed to interfere
with the Director of the film during the period of the Director's Cut."
Section 7-504.
Following presentation of the Director's Cut, the producer, in col-
laboration with the director,90 prepares the "Final Cut." While the Final
Cut may be identical to the director's version, it may not be: the decision
is the producer's. One example of the give and take that occurs at this
stage was given by director Sydney Pollack before the Subcommittee at
its September 30, 1987 hearings on the Berne Convention:
[A] studio might say, we can only run a certain number of
88. The principal guilds and unions are the Directors Guild of America ("DGA"), Writers
Guild of America ("WGA"), Screen Actors Guild ("SAG"), International Alliance of Theat-
rical and Stage Employees ("IATSE"), and the American Federation of Musicians ("AFM").
89. The Basic Agreement is negotiated with the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television
Producers ("AMPTP"), which represents a variety of producers of motion pictures and televi-
sion programs. See Comment No. 5, Statement of Motion Picture Association of America,
Tab B at n.2. Many non-AMPTP members are also signatories to the Basic Agreement. It is
estimated that upwards of 90% of the production companies in the United States are signato-
ries to the Agreement. Id. at 2. Approximately 95% of the directors of motion pictures pro-
duced in the United States are represented by the DGA. Id.
90. DGA Basic Agreement, § 7-506.
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showings per day. This is an economic decision. If the movie
is under two hours, and we have 10 minutes to turn an audi-
ence around, we can get in an extra show.
If you make this movie 2 hours and 10 minutes, we can't get
that extra show in. It is now my job [as director] to try as hard
as I can to make it to their time limit.
Here is what does happen sometimes. Sometimes you go to
them and you say, look, guys, it is now 2 hours and 10 minutes.
You look at it. If you agree that I can get it down to no less
than that, I will cut it.
The studio will look at it - forgive me for being personal - I
signed a contract on "Out of Africa" that said I would deliver a
2 hour and 15 minute movie. That movie went out at 2 hours
and 41 minutes so I violated that contract by half an hour.
When I got the movie to 2 hours and 41 minutes, I called the
studio and said, I am going to show you the movie. I owe you a
cut of 2 hours and 15 minutes.
Here is what I have so far; I am a little bit stuck here. They
looked at the movie and said, do the best you can do. If you
can't get it any shorter, you can't.
They would have been totally within their rights, to make me
cut it, and I wouldn't have argued with them - it was their $30
million. I am not going to tell them what length they have to
release the movie at.
House Berne Hearings at 528. 9"
Following agreement upon and release of the "Final Cut" version of
the film for theatrical exhibition, the post exhibition release editing be-
gins. Editing may be required for foreign exhibition (e.g., dubbing, com-
pliance with censorship laws), and, of course, for domestic viewing on
cable, videocassettes, and later, airlines, and television broadcast. Sec-
tions 7-509 through 7-513 of the DGA Basic Agreement have a number
of provisions giving directors the right to be present while editing is ac-
complished. Of particular relevance is Section 7-513:
The Employer shall consult with the Director with respect to
coloring, time compression and expansion, changes in the exhi-
bition of the aspect ratio (e.g., "panning and scanning") and
91. In some instances, however, directors, in their individual contracts, have been able to
obtain "final cut" authority, and to prohibit exhibition alteration to the work. See 1988 Senate
Berne Hearings at 366, 529, 532; Senate Colorization Hearings at 44.
1990]
LOYOLA ENTER TAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
changes to allow exhibition in three dimensions made to a the-
atrical motion picture after delivery of the answer print. The
Director's services in connection with such consultation shall
be provided at no cost to the network or Employer or
distributor.
Section 7-509 recognizes the director's role in preserving the basic
integrity of the motion picture as theatrically released by affording the
director the first opportunity to edit the film in non-theatrical markets,
including network television (Section 7-509(b)); syndication (Section 7-
509(d));92 and, domestic home video (Section 7-509(g)). Additionally,
the director has the right to do the shooting if new footage is added to the
theatrical version (Section 7-509(e)).
These provisions were the result of protracted negotiations. As di-
rector Elliot Silverstein testified in 1988 Senate hearings on U.S. adher-
ence to the Berne Convention:
[I]n the last negotiation the specific areas that we are discussing
here were proposed at the bargaining table.
What we did gain was the right to consult on all of these things,
and we said to the CEOs of the companies who face us: "That
is not good enough. The consultation doesn't mean anything
because if we disagree, we lose." The answer came back,
"That's right. If we disagree, you lose," so that this is a pro
forma consideration. This is not a moral right. It is a right of
consultation. 93
This testimony was disputed by Roger Mayer of the Turner En-
tertainment Company at the Copyright Office's September 9, 1988 hear-
ing: "When somebody says you can consult, that is not an idle thing.
That involves time. It involves money. I think it is a concession, and I
think it is something they earned." 94
It is a fair question to ask why the directors' failure to obtain the
desired rights through the collective bargaining process necessarily indi-
cates a breakdown in that system, and one requiring federal legislation to
92. But cf Senate Colorization Hearings at 14-15 for testimony by the directors noting
difficulties in enforcing certain of these provisions.
93. 1988 Senate Berne Hearings at 533. See also draft proposals reproduced in Comment
No. 3, statement of Color Systems Technology, Exhibit BB; House Berne Hearings at 519.
94. Transcript at 84. See also Comment No. 5, statement of Motion Picture Association of
America, Tab C at 5-6, and id. at 6 (noting establishment of a "creative rights" standing
committee, requested by the directors, composed of an equal number of directors and produ-
cers, to provide a forum for discussing creative rights issues).
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repair.95 In any labor setting, the parties arrange their priorities, includ-
ing those they are willing to strike over 9 6 and those they are willing to
trade off to obtain other benefits without having to strike. 97
Certainly, the directors receive substantial compensation in ex-
change for granting their employers broad rights to exploit their films."8
Moreover, labor relations in the motion picture industry have a long his-
tory and do not present a situation where the economic leverage of the
employers dwarfs that of the employees.
C The Adequacy of Reliance on Collective and Individual
Bargaining for Creative Rights
Additionally, the DGA Basic Agreement represents only minimum
rights; individual directors have frequently negotiated above these re-
quirements, 99 although the number who are able to gain substantial con-
trol over the final product and its post exhibition form is estimated to be
only 5 percent. ' If one cannot bargain for the desired rights, the option
still exists for the director to seek independent financing of his or her
film, a task which may be difficult, but which is certainly not impossible.
For European directors, that practice is standard.
One rebuttal to reliance on collective or individual bargaining was
given by director Arthur Hiller before the Subcommittee at its June 21,
1988 hearings on H.R. 2400:
What we are talking about is a social issue, and that is the pres-
ervation of an art form. And that talks about our society as it is
today and the society of the future, and I think that is beyond
collective bargaining.
Unofficial transcript at 88.
Assuming such a public interest does exist "beyond collective bar-
gaining," the question is raised whether the entire collective bargaining
95. See questioning of director Sydney Pollack by Chairman Kastenmeier in House Berne
Hearings at 519.
96. The directors have expressed doubts that the issues covered in this report are
mandatory subjects of bargaining. The producers claim that they are.
97. See comments by Rep. Berman at the Subcommittee's June 21, 1988 hearing on H.R.
2400, unofficial transcript at 87-88.
98. See statement of Roger Mayer, Turner Entertainment Company, submitted to the Sub-
committee for its June 21, 1988 hearing on H.R. 2400, at 6-7.
99. Of particular interest in this respect is the Turner Entertainment Company's February
14, 1989 announcement that it would not colorize Citizen Kane because of concern that the
contract between RKO Pictures, Orson Welles, and Welles' production company arguably
prohibited such alteration.
100. See testimony of Steven Spielberg, 1988 Senate Berne Hearings at 529.
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agreement should then be renegotiated. Congress might conclude it
could be unfair to alter that agreement by legislatively granting directors
rights they are not able to obtain through collective bargaining, while
leaving the agreement intact for those provisions favorable to the
directors.
A second reason given by directors for not relying on collective or
individual bargaining is based on alleged restrictions in the labor laws
regarding subjects of bargaining. This issue was raised by director Syd-
ney Pollack during the Subcommittee's September 30, 1987 Berne
hearings.
We are prevented from negotiating to the point of that kind of
control [i.e., on a moral rights clause] by our collective bargain-
ing agreement. We are still working for hire, and we are still
employees. We cannot negotiate for total control over the
product legally.'" 1
Elliot Silverstein, Chairman of the President's Committee of the
DGA elaborated on this point:
It is very clear that we are governed as a labor union by the
labor law which gives the right to control to the employer, and
we don't seek in any way to allow our position to come into
collision with that requirement of labor law.
If moral rights began at an earlier point than we suggest [post
exhibition release], it would be a collision there, so that what
we are looking for is that point after the employer, employee
relationship has completed its defined role and something exists
that can be protected. We, as a matter of fact, I can tell you in
our recent negotiations completed this last summer, we were
told specifically that the things we were asking for pushed right
up against the so-called final cut, that is the final creative au-
thority and we could not go any further.
It was no longer a mandatory subject of bargaining and we
were in danger of stepping out from under the protection of the
anti-trust laws, and becoming independent contractors, if we
didn't submit to the right to control definition. So we can only
go so far in negotiations.
Id. at 535.
In hearings before the Senate on March 3, 1988, the directors again
101. House Berne Hearings at 519.
[Vol. 10
REPORT
raised this issue. 102 The producers contest this interpretation of the labor
laws, and note that they have bargained with the DGA for almost a half
century on a wide variety of issues.
In any event, since the DGA's concern about its status as a labor
organization seems to apply only to efforts to control the pre-theatrical
release form of the film, and the DGA seeks from Congress only rights to
control the post-theatrical release form of the film, it appears there is no
restriction in the labor laws, even under the DGA's interpretation of
them, on the DGA's ability to collectively bargain for precisely the rights
they have sought from Congress. The fact that they have not obtained
these rights may, perhaps, be ascribed to nothing more than the ordinary
give and take of labor negotiations. Nor is it out of the question that
directors may obtain the desired rights in the future, as the following
colloquy at the Copyright Office's September 8, 1988 hearing suggests:
MR. PATRY [Copyright Office]: Would you agree that the
most that directors are going to get from collective bargaining
is the right of consultation, and not the right of final say over
colorization and editing?
MR. MAYER [Turner Entertainment]: Not necessarily,
although I would hope that that's the result. I do not think it's
an idle possibility that they could get these rights; because I
would say to you that many of the creative rights that they
have obtained in the past, such as the right to a first cut, the
right to preview, the right to edit for television. I've sat around
many, many meetings where the producers said, "No way we
will ever give anything like that. It will ruin business. There is
just no way," and in some way they figured out a way.
... Is it possible in collective bargaining they could obtain the
right to veto? Yes, it is possible. Is it likely? Probably not.
Transcript at 83-84.
The reasons producers give for not wanting to accord the directors
the desired rights appear to be economic, not aesthetic." °3 The Motion
102. See testimony of Steven Spielberg, 1988 Senate Berne Hearings at 528 ("[b]ecause we
work for hire and our union, our labor union, can't really negotiate into th[e] area [of pre-
release alterations] without affecting our definition as a labor union."); id. at 584, (testimony of
Elliot Silverstein).
103. One down-to-earth way of making this point was given by Bernard Weitzman of
American Film Technologies at our Sept. 8, 1988 hearing:
Now one of the things that we can't do with the director . . . is give the director
absolute final control. Some directors will never let a picture go. They will work on
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Picture Association of America has stated:
In order to improve the odds of financial success, the copyright
owners must have the freedom to adapt their productions to the
differing needs of the various markets. If legislation were en-
acted that called into question the copyright owner's ability to
do that, the widespread performance of their products so essen-
tial to recoupment of these huge investments would be seriously
jeopardized. "
The National Association of Broadcasters stated:
An inability by the broadcasters to insert commercials into the
program or to compress the program to conform to the limits
of television technology, absent some agreement with the artist,
would make it commercially unprofitable to show such pro-
grams not supported by advertising. The effect would be the
end of commercial television as we know it.'0°
These dire projections, however, assume that directors (and other
creative participants) would on occasion exercise their rights irresponsi-
bly. The directors credibly testified that they have sound economic rea-
sons for exercising rights in a reasonable manner. See House Berne
Hearings at 532; 1988 Senate Berne Hearings at 504 (testimony of Steven
Spielberg: "If a director or a writer does not agree to an alteration of a
finished film which is desired by the financier, it is highly likely he or she
will not be employed by the financier.... ."); testimony of Roger Mayer at
Copyright Office September 8, 1988 hearing, Transcript at 84-86.
The directors do not, however, seek changes in the labor laws to
help them achieve their goals. Instead they seek amendment of the
Copyright Act to provide for a high level of moral rights, a topic to
which we now turn.
CHAPTER 5: MORAL RIGHTS
Before addressing the details and merits of the directors' demands
it interminably, because they feel it could always be improved, and if anybody else
touches it, it's bad. Well, we can't run a business if somebody says we are going to do
it as long as we want to do it. We can never meet air dates. We can never meet
budgets. We can never meet cost control. We can't do anything if the director has
the absolute right to decide what's good or bad.
Transcript at 53.
104. Comment No. 5 at 6. In cases where the director has net profit participation in the
film, he or she has an obvious stake in the financial success of the work as well. Additionally,
financial failure can harm a director's future ability to obtain employment.
105. Comment No. 16 at 15.
[Vol. 10
REPORT
for new moral rights legislation, it will be helpful to review the nature
and history of those rights.
A. The Nature of Moral Rights
The term "moral rights" conjures up a variety of associations, some
of which concern themselves with copyright law.' 6 Professor Ricketson
writes:
Authors' rights have long been recognized as having a non-eco-
nomic dimension [which] .. .can be seen as an emanation or
manifestation of [the author's] personality. . . . Any author,
whether he writes, paints or composes, embodies some part of
himself - his thoughts, ideas, sentiments and feelings - in his
work, and this gives rise to an interest as deserving of protec-
tion as any of the other personal interests protected in the insti-
tutions of positive law, such as reputation, bodily integrity and
confidences. The interest in question relates to the way in
which the author presents his work to the world, and the way
in which his identification with the work is maintained....
In European legal doctrine, the interest protected has usually
been called the author's "moral interest" and the rights which
protect this interest are referred to as the author's "moral
rights." The adjective "moral" has no precise English
equivalent, although "spiritual," "non-economic" and "per-
sonal" convey something of the intended meaning. 107
The Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Con-
vention identified four general categories of moral rights: (1) right of
publication; (2) rights of recall; (3) right to claim authorship; and, (4)
right to protect the integrity of the work.'
B. Moral Rights Under the Berne Convention
The Paris text of the Berne Convention, to which the United States
adhered on March 1, 1988, refers in Article 6bis to only two of several
106. Cf Comment No. 17, Sept. 28, 1988 letter from Morality in Media, Inc., for a some-
what different interpretaion of the term.
107. RICKETSON, supra note 26, at 456.
108. Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on US. Adherence to the Berne Convention
("Ad Hoc Working Group Report"), reproduced in US. Adherence to the Berne Convention,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 460 (1986) ("1986 Senate Hearings"). For a comprehen-
sive listing of rights under copyright which are denominated "moral rights" under the laws of
one or more Berne Union member states, see WIPO GLOSSARY OF TERMS OF THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHT & NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 158 (1980).
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rights that might be regarded as "moral rights": the right to claim au-
thorship, and the right to protect the integrity of the work. °9
Regarding the first of these, the W.I.P.O. Guide to the Berne Con-
vention summarizes:
This right ... may be exercised by the author as he wishes; it
can even be used in a negative way i.e., by publishing his work
under a pseudonym or by keeping it anonymous, and he can, at
any time, change his mind and reject his pseudonym or aban-
don his anonymity. Under it, an author may refuse to have his
name applied to a work that is not his; nor can anyone filch the
name of another by adding it to a work the latter never created.
The right ... is exercisable even against those permitted by the
Convention to reproduce the work or to take extracts from it;
109. Article 6bis(l) reads: "Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after
the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work
and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action
in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation."
See also id., par. 2 and commentary thereon in W.I.P.O. GUIDE at 44 for discussion on the
required term of moral rights.
The Ad Hoc Working Group Report concluded that Article 6bis does not "explicitly
grant a right of recall, and the absence of the provision from the laws of several members
indicates that 'recall' cannot be considered a right granted by Article 6bis." Final Report,
reproduced in 1986 Senate Hearings at 461.
United States law provides the exclusive right to first publication in 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)
(1978). See generally discussion of this right in Harper & Row, Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471
U.S. 539 (1985). But cf comments of Professor John M. Kernochan, 1986 Senate Hearings at
170. For an interesting conflict between an exclusive licensee's right of publication and the
author's moral right not to have an unfinished manuscript published, see Society of the Survi-
vors of the Riga Ghetto, Inc., 188 Misc. Lexis (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (No. 29972186, as amended Dec.
1988).
The issue of whether moral rights are waivable was the subject of some controversy dur-
ing the hearings on the Berne Implementation Act legislation. See e.g., 1986 Senate Hearings
at 94; The Berne Implementation Act of 1987: Hearings of N.R. 1623 before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and The Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Comm., 100th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 40, 367-69, 1168 (1987 & 1988) ("House Berne Hearings"); The Berne
Convention: Hearings on S. 1301 and S. 1971 before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 289-300 (1988) ("1988 Sen-
ate Hearings"). Cf Comment No. 2 submitted to the Copyright Office in this inquiry, State-
ment of the Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright, and
Competition at 6-7:
[t]he courts in most European countries do accept that the author may either transfer
or waive the power to exercise his moral rights. However, each moral right has what
is called a "positive nucleus," which is regarded as being so vital to the expression of
the respective personality that any waiver in this respect would be null and void.
See also id. at 12 ("any 'gross distortion' [sic] or other 'gross injuries,' . .. certainly form part
of this 'positive nucleus.' ").
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the author's name must be mentioned. I" 0
The so-called "right of integrity" concerns the ability of the author
to defend against or seek redress for unauthorized changes to or uses of
his or her work which are mutilating, distorting, or otherwise prejudicial
to the artist's honor or reputation.
C. Moral Rights Under the Copyright Act
While the Copyright Act contains provisions respecting pseudo-
nonymous and anonymous works, II it does not provide a cause of action
for violations of the author's wish to use a pseudonym or to remain anon-
ymous. Such protection may be available, however, under various state
law theories. "
2
The Copyright Act similarly does not provide for the right to pro-
tect the integrity of the work. Although the right to prepare derivative
works granted in Section 106(2) is frequently cited as a component of the
right of integrity, Article 6bis refers to moral rights as being independent
of economic rights, and thus it is hard to see how Section 106(2) would
permit an author to protect the integrity of his or her work if he or she
had previously transferred all Section 106(2) rights."'I
D. Moral Rights in the Case Law
U.S. case law on moral rights claims has been extensively discussed
in law review articles." 4 We will therefore, only summarize those deci-
110. W.I.P.O. GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY
AND ARTISTIC WORKS 41 (1978).
The Universal Copyright Convention, to which the United States also adheres, does not
require moral rights. In the Report of the Rapporteur-General on the Universal Copyright
Convention it is stated that the text of the Preamble to the Convention reflected the desire of
some delegations to "avoid reference to 'droit moral, "' Records of the Intergovernmental Copy-
right Conference 73 UNESCO (1952) and that a proposal by Greece to include a reference in
Article I of the Convention to the "droit moral" of the author was defeated. Id. at 74. See also
Minutes of the Conference, id. at paras. 1, 58, 100, 107, 112, 116, 118, 126, 141, 148, 378, 380,
391, 393, 403-05, 408-10, 417, 535, 873-76, 879, 880, 882, 883, 904, 932, 1453, 2002-03, 2006,
2008, 2010, 2013, 2014, 2019, 2024-26, 2032, 2035, 2042, 2067, 2087, 2590-94, 2598, and
working Documents DA/I, 2, 5, 6, 69, 77, 101, 107, 122, 123, 143, 162, 173, 182, 206. But, cf
BOGSCH, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION 65-
66 (3d ed. 1968); Dietz, Elements of Moral Right Protection in the Universal Copyright Con ven-
tion, 21 UNESCO 17 (1987).
111. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1986) (definitions of the terms); § 302(c) (term of protection for
such works).
112. See Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 122 N.Y. Supp. 206 (1910); Ellis v. Hurst, 121
N.Y. Supp. 438 (1910).
113. See generally, Kerever, The Insertion of Advertising in Films Screened on Television, 32
COPYRIGHT 10 (1988).
114. See, e.g., Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Rights: A Study in the Law of Artists and
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sions as they relate to the two rights specified in Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention and, where possible, as they relate to motion pictures.
1. Right to Claim Authorship
There are two aspects to the right to claim authorship: (1) the right
to insist upon or disclaim authorship; and, (2) the right to prevent misat-
tribution of authorship.
Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1940); Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and American
Copyright Law - A Proposal, 24 So. CAL. L. REV. 375 (1951); Stevenson, Moral Right and the
Common Law. A Proposal, 6 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 89 (1955); Strauss, The Moral
Right of the Author, COPYRIGHT OFFICE STUDY No. 4, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 109 (1959)
(Comm. Print); Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author's "Moral Right," 16 AM. J.
COMP. LAW 487 (1968); Grant, The Doctrine of Droit Moral: Its Place in American Copyright
Law, 16 How. L.J. 53 (1971); Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right
Through Extension of Existing American Legal Doctrine, 60 GEO. L. J. 1539 (1972); Valentine,
Copyright: Moral Right - A Proposal, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 793 (1975); Comment, Protection
of Artistic Integrity: Gilliam v. ABC, 90 HARV. L. REV. 473 (1976); Goldberg, "Moral Right"
in American Law, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1043 (1977); Comment, The Monty Python Litiga-
tion - Of Moral Right and the Lanham Act, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 611 (1977); Diamond, Legal
Protection for the "Moral Rights": of Authors and Other Creators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 224
(1978); Comment, An Author's Artistic Recognition Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 1490 (1979); Maslow, Droit Moral and Sections 43(a) and 44(i) of the Lanham Act. A
Judicial Shell Game?, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 377 (1980); De Silva, Droit Moral and the
Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL.
COPR. SOC'Y 1 (1981); Rosen, Artists' Moral Rights: A European Evolution: An American
Revolution, 2 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 155 (1981); Amarnich, Recognition of the Moral
Right: Issues and Options, 29 COPYRIGHT L. SYMp. (ASCAP) 31 (1983); Hathaway, Ameri-
can Law Analogues to the Paternity Element of the Doctrine of Moral Rights: Is the Creative
Artist in America Really Protected?, 30 COPYRIGHT L. SyMP. (ASCAP) 121 (1983); Note,
Moral Rights and the Realistic Limits of Artistic Control, 14 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 447
(1984); Davis, State Moral Rights and the Federal Copyright System, 4 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 233 (1985); Kwakk, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possi-
ble?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985); Ginsberg, The Right of Integrity in Audiovisual Works in the
United States, 135 R.I.D.A. 2 (1988). For a sampling of articles on moral rights in foreign
countries, see RICKETSON, supra, note 26, at 456 n.435.
For articles on colorization, see, e.g., Bader, A Film of a Different Color. Copyright and
the Colorization of Black and White Films, 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 497 (1986); Koha,
Paint Your Wagon Please! Colorization, Copyright and the Search for Moral Rights, 40 FED.
COMM. L.J. 1 (1987); Note, Black and White and Brilliant: Protecting Black and White Films
from Color Recoding, 9 HASTINGS CoMM/ENT. L.J. 522 (1987); Gilbaldi, Artists' Moral
Rights and Film Colorization: Federal Legislative Efforts to Provide Visual Artists with Moral
Rights and Resale Royalties, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 965, 968-69 (1987); Note, Artists' Rights in
the United States: Toward Federal Legislation, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153 (1988); Note, The
Colorization of Black and White Films: An Example of the Lack of Substantive Protection for
Art in the United States, 63 NOTRE DAME LAW. 309 (1988); Note, Moral Rights Protections in
the United States in the Colorization of Black & White Motion Pictures: A Black & White Issue,
26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 503 (1988); Beyer, Internationalisms, Art, and the Suppression of Innoca-
tion: Film Colorization and the Philosophy of Moral Rights, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 1011 (1988);
Ginsburg, Colors in Conflict: Moral Rights and the Foreign Exploitation of Colorized U.S.
Motion Pictures, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 81 (1988).
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In general, the mere failure to credit an author has not constituted
copyright infringement."' It may, however, constitute "reverse palming
off" under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act." 
6
As discussed further below, certain states provide a right of attribu-
tion or disclaimer for specific classes of works, such as works of the fine
arts. For example, California has made it a violation of its law to fail to
give proper credit, including screen credit to actors.'
7
The importance of the right to receive credit in the motion picture
industry has long been noted: "It can be fairly said that in the entertain-
ment industry the credit clauses of an agreement are often considered of
greater importance than the provisions for monetary compensation.""'1
Crediting (attribution) is, in a real sense, one's resume. The failure to
achieve proper attribution could have an adverse impact on one's ability
to earn a livelihood, or to market freely one's creative labor. For this
reason, the guilds, including the Directors Guild of America and the
Screen Actors Guild, have long engaged in collective bargaining on the
issue. ' 19
Guild agreements represent minimum standards. Individual direc-
tor's and actor's contracts may, and almost always do, contain further
requirements. 2 ° Disputes have arisen both over the meaning of such
contractual provisions, and in circumstances where the artist's individual
contract is silent on the nature of the proper attribution. And, although
cases such as Harris v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp.
115. Locke v. Times Mirror Magazine, Inc., Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 25,750
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Wolfe v. United Artists Corp., 742 F.2d 1439 (2d Cir. 1983) (Wolfe 1); Wolfe
v. United Artists Corp., 583 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (Wolfe II); Suid v. Newsweek, Inc.,
503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980). Cf Peckarsky v. ABC, 603 F. Supp. 688, 697-98 (D.D.C.
1984) (decision unclear).
116. Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Co., 847 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1988); Smith v. Montoro,
648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) (one actor's name substituted for another's).
117. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17203; Meta-Films Assoc. v. MCA, Inc., 568
F. Supp. 1346, 1364 (C.D. Cal. 1984) and, generally, Note, Giving the Devil Its Due: Actors'
and Performers' Right to Receive Attribution for Cinematic Roles, 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 299 (1985) ("1985 CARDOZO NOTE"); Berman & Rosenthal, Screen Credit and the Law, 9
UCLA L. REV. 156 (1962) ("Berman & Rosenthal").
118. Berman & Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 156. See also SELZ & SIMENSKY, EN-
TERTAINMENT LAW (1983), Chs. 8-16, for an exhaustive treatment of the subject.
119. See DGA Basic Agreement § 8-102 (form of credit); § 201 (screen credit); § 202 (visi-
bility of director's name); § 203 (credits on paid advertising, including "size and location of
credit, title of motion picture, 'one sheets,' outdoor-type advertising, trade paper advertising,
advertising in newspapers, magazines and their periodicals"); § 203 (phonorecords, books and
tapes); § 207 (theatrical and souvenir programs); § 208 (videodisc/videocassette containers);
and, generally, § 300 (credit for directors of television films).
120. See DGA Basic Agreement § 8-104 ("any Director shall have the right to negotiate for
any credit in excess of minimum").
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119 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) and Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir.
1947) have been cited for the proposition that an author cannot require
his or her name to be applied to a work unless the contract expressly
requires it, these cases have involved express transfers of "all rights." By
contrast, another case, in dictum, stated: "Courts will protect against...
the omission of the author's name unless, by contract, the right is given
to the publisher to do so ....
The differences in the approaches taken by courts reflect different
approaches to construction of contracts. One court may find that an au-
thor who enters into a contract has thereby transferred away all rights
not specifically reserved, while another may find that the author retains
everything not specifically granted.
22
The rule where there is no written contract is uncertain. One com-
mentator has concluded there is no clear U.S. authority for a right to
claim authorship. 123 But, in a recent case, Edison v. Viva Int'l, Ltd., 209
U.S.P.Q. 345, 347 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) it was broadly held "[w]here
... the parties have entered into a contract of publication, plaintiff's so-
called 'moral right' is controlled by the law of contract.... " Where the
contract is silent on particular issues, the court indicated custom and
usage are to be examined.
24
2. Misattribution of Authorship
Most cases involving failure to credit, however, arise under facts
where there is also misattribution of authorship. It is quite rare that a
work is published without any statement of authorship at all.' 25 It ap-
121. Harms, Inc. v. Tops Music Enter., 160 F. Supp. 77 (S.D. Cal. 1958). See also Clemens
v. Press Pub. Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206 (1910) ("The purchaser [of a literary work] cannot garble it,
or put it out under another name than the author's; nor can he omit altogether the name of the
author, unless his contract with the latter permits him so to do.").
122. See review of the cases in 1985 CARDOZO NOTE, supra note 117, at 312-15. But cf
Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 22 (2d Cir. 1976) ("omission of any terms [in contract] concern-
ing alterations in the program after recording must be read as reserving.., exclusive authority
for such revisions"); Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954) (charac-
ter rights in novel reserved unless specifically granted.).
123. See statement of Professor Edward J. Damich before the House of Representatives, in
House Berne Hearings at 545.
124. The decision in Edison was based on similar language in Seroff v. Simon & Schuster,
Inc., 162 N.Y.S.2d 770 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957), which in turn was based on a law review article,
Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 719, 729 (1945).
125. But cf FEL Publications v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q. 409 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 131 (1982) (omission of compiler's name from collection of
hymnals may state cause of action under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act); Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498-99 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. granted on other
grounds, - U.S. - (Nov. 8, 1988; to be argued March 29, 1989) ("Independent of Reid's
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pears well established that a misattribution of the actual authorship of a
work constitutes a violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
126
However, this sort of a misattribution of an author's contribution to
the creation of a work differs from situations where a work is subse-
quently altered in a manner which a credited author believes to be so
changed as to no longer represent his or her vision. Since the reproduc-
tion of substantial portions of a copyrighted work, in either its original
form or in a distorted form, will constitute copyright infringement absent
a contractual right to reproduce the work, most disputes have involved
interpretations of the scope of a transfer or assignment of reproduction of
performance rights in the work, with the licensee claiming it has the right
to make the disputed alterations.
In Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 27 (2d Cir. 1976), a leading case on
the issue, Judge Gurfein, in a concurring opinion, wrote:
If the licensee may, by contract, distort the recorded work, the
Lanham Act does not come into play. If the licensee has no
such right by contract, there will be a violation in breach of
contract. The Lanham Act can hardly apply literally when the
credit line correctly states the work to be that of the plaintiffs
which, indeed it is, as far as it goes. The vice complained of is
that the truncated version is not what the plaintiffs wrote. But
the Lanham Act does not deal with artistic integrity. It only
goes to misdescription of origin and the like.
Significantly, this view does not appear to have been shared by the major-
ity, which indicated that such actions could violate the Lanham Act. Id.
24-25.
Similar revisions on contract rights was placed by the court in Granz
v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952), in which it was held: "[a]n obliga-
tion to mention the name of the author carries the implied duty, how-
ever, as a matter of contract, not to make such changes in the work as
ownership of the copyright, CCNV might be obliged to credit Reid as an author of the
sculpture").
126. See Lamothe v. Atlantic Record Co., 847 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1988); Smith v.
Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) (removal of actor's name from film credits and substi-
tution of another's name); Dodd v. Fort Smith Special School Dist. No. 100, 666 F. Supp. 1278
(W.D. Ark. 1987) (substitution of teachers' and students' names); Marling v. Ellison, 218
U.S.P.Q. 702 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (infringing work); Wildlife Int., Inc. v. Clements, 591 F. Supp.
1542 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (advertising brochures falsely stated they represented "the artistic stan-
dards now associated with [the artist] and that [the artist] approves the quality"); Follett v.
Arbor House, 497 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (misstatement of author's contribution); Gei-
sel v. Poynter Products, 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (false representation of sponsor-
ship). Relief has also been provided under a theory of libel. See Ben-Oliel v. Press Pub. Co.,
251 N.Y. 250, 256 (1929).
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would render the credit line a false attribution of authorship." A more
expansive view of the situation was offered by Judge Frank in his concur-
ring opinion in Granz:
An artist sells one of his works to the defendant who substan-
tially changes it and represents the altered matter to the public
as that artist's product. Whether the work is copyrighted or
not, the established rule is that, even if the contract with the
artist expressly authorizes reasonable modifications (e.g., where
a novel or stage play is sold for adaptation as a movie), it is an
actionable wrong to hold out the artist as author of a version
which substantially departs from the original.
12 7
The right to claim or disclaim authorship may have application to
alterations of motion pictures in a number of circumstances. For exam-
ple, a film, originally shot in black and white, is, without the consent of
the director (but pursuant to a transfer of "all rights") color encoded and
marketed as, "Jane Smith's Godzilla 1950: The Colorized Version." It
may be argued that, under these circumstances, a false impression of as-
sociation with the color encoded work is created. Of course, the inclu-
sion of statements or labelling disclosing the director's non-association
with the color encoded version, considerably, if not completely dimin-
ished the cause of action.'
28
A more difficult case arises with panning/scanning and lexiconning,
done without the director or other creative participants' authorization
but pursuant to a transfer of "all rights." A claim that such actions con-
stitute a false attribution of authorship demonstrates interaction between
127. But cf Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(stating that Granz "differ[s] substantially from ... a large-scale collaborative work like a
movie.").
Older state cases provided relief under various state theories. See e.g., Chesler v. Avon
Book Div., 352 N.Y.S.2d 552 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) ("Although the authorities are sparse, it is
clear that even after a transfer or assignment of an author's work, the author has a property
right that it shall not be used for a purpose not intended or in a manner which does not fairly
represent the creation of the author."). But cf Edison v. Viva Int'l, 421 N.Y.S.2d 203 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1979) ("To publish in the name of a well-known author any literary work, the author-
ship of which would tend to injure an author holding his position in the world of letters, has
been held to be libel .... In the third cause of action, the plaintiff avers that the defendant
published an article different in form and content from his original work. To state that the
published work was different from the original is not to state that the plaintiff was libeled.").
128. Cf Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 25 n.13 (majority); id. at 27 n.1 (concurring opin-
ion). See also Consumers Union v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir. 1983)
("disclaimers are a favored way of alleviating consumer confusion ...."); National Film Pres-
ervation Act of 1988, contained in Interior Appropriations Act for fiscal 1989, P.L. 100-466




the right of attribution and the right of integrity. We assume most cases
would arise under circumstances where changes to a work for which an
author is credited would involve distortions or mutilations of the work.
These cases are, thus, derivative of the right of integrity.
3. The Right of Integrity
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention does not bar any modification
to a work; it only prohibits those that are "prejudicial to the [author's]
honor or reputation." 129 The W.I.P.O. Guide to the Convention con-
tains this discussion on the right:
The formula is very elastic and leaves a good deal of latitude to
the courts. Generally speaking, a person permitted to make use
of a work ... may not change it either by deletion or by making
additions. A producer may not, on his own authority, delete
several scenes from a play nor a publisher strike out chapters
from a narrative. The problem becomes more delicate when it
is a case of adaptation; for example when writing a play or
making a film from a novel, one cannot insist that the adaptor
sticks [sic] strictly to the text. Means of expression differ and
the change to stage or screen calls for modifications. But the
adaptor's freedom is not absolute; this "right of respect" allows
the author to demand, for example, the preservation of his plot
and the main features of his characters from changes which will
alter the nature of the work or the author's basic message. The
Convention speaks of prejudice to honor or reputation. The
formula is very general. The author must decide whether the
fact that the text was, during its adaptation to the theatre or
screen, given a slightly pornographic twist to meet the taste of
some of the audience, ruined his reputation as a serious author
or, on the contrary, gave his work a flavour more suitable to a
later age.
W.I.P.O. Guide at 42.
Among the examples of distortions, mutilations, or other modifica-
129. But cf contrary views of certain Belgian and French commentators, discussed in Rick-
etson, supra note 107, at 472-73. See also Kerever, The Insertion of Advertising in Films
Screened on Television, 32 COPYRIGHT 10, 12 (1988), in which the wording of Article 6bis is
interpreted as "reflect[ing] a choice between two conceptions of the application of moral rights:
a subjective conception, whereby the author has the discretionary power to consider that the
modification harms his reputation, and an objective conception requiring that the reality of the
prejudice to his reputation be established by society, and hence by the judge in the event of
litigation. Article 6bis adopted this latter approach."
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tions offered by Ricketson are "imperfections in reproduction techniques
(including poor or wrong colours in the case of artistic works)" and alter-
ations of "location, period or 'atmosphere' of a [dramatic] piece" by a
cinematographic director. Ricketson at 468-69. These changes would,
however, still have to be prejudicial to the author's honor or reputation
in order to constitute a violation of the right of integrity.
There have been only a very few U.S. cases providing relief (or have
indicated relief would be available) under the Copyright Act for acts en-
compassed by the right of integrity.' In Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498-99 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. granted
on other grounds, - U.S. - (Nov. 8, 1988; to be argued March 29,
1989), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals indicated that an au-
thor has a right against the copyright owner if the owner "should publish
an excessively mutilated or altered version" of the work, citing among
other authorities, the Ad Hoc Working Group report's conclusions that
existing common law doctrines and statutes are sufficient to meet the
requirements of Article 6bis of the Berne Convention.
The more typical comment, however, is that found in Gilliam v.
ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976): "American copyright law.., does
not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation,
since the law does seek to vindicate economic, rather than personal,
rights of authors." Gilliam, like almost all of the integrity claims, also
involved issues of contract interpretation.' 3' Where a contract gives a
130. See National Bank of Commerce v. Shakles Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980)
(unauthorized addition of advertising materials in book held infringement); WGN Continental
Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 1982) ("if the publisher of
a book leaves the inside covers blank, the book seller [cannot] inscribe the Lord's Prayer on
them in order to broaden the book's appeal"); Gee v. CBS, 471 F. Supp. 14, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(indicating that infringement would lie where alterations were done to "intentionally ridicule
or humiliate" the author).
131. But see Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1966),
aff'd, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966), aff'd mem., 273 N.Y.S.2d 80 (N.Y. 1966)
("the law is not so rigid, even in the absence of a contract, as to leave a party without protec-
tion against publication of a garbled version of his work.").
A related question is whether the terms of the contract conveying rights include particular
technologies, especially those not in existence at the time of the contract. See generally, Cohen
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (1988) (composer who had licensed right to
record work "on television" had not conveyed right to record work on videocassettes primarily
because VCR's "were not invented or known in 1969, when the license was executed"); Goodis
v. United Artists Television, 425 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1970); Bartsch v. MGM, Inc., 391 F.2d 150
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968); Autry v. Republic Productions, Inc., 213
F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 858 (1954); Cinema Corp. of America v. De
Mille, 267 N.Y.S. 327 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 267 N.Y.S. 959 (1933); Ettore v. Philco Televi-
sion Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956).
Recently, an issue of contractual interpretation perhaps somewhat along the lines sug-
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licensee certain rights, the licensee is bound by the terms of the contract.
In Gilliam, the court found that ABC's substantial editing went beyond
the rights it had contractually been granted. The court also found, how-
ever, that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on a claim ABC had violated
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act'32 by "broadcasting a program properly
designated as having been written and performed by [plaintiffs], but
which has been edited, without their consent, into a form that departs
substantially from the original work." 538 F.2d at 24. This action "im-
paired the integrity of appellants' work and represented to the public as
the product of appellants what was actually a mere caricature of their
talents," Id. at 25; "in such a case, it is the writer or performer, rather
than the network, who suffers the consequences of the mutilation, for the
public will have only the final product by which to evaluate the work."
Id. at 24.133
gested here received attention by some of the parties involved in this inquiry. On February 14,
1989, the Turner Entertainment Company announced that it had discontinued preparation for
the colorization of Citizen Kane, based upon a review of the contract between RKO Pictures,
Inc., Orson Welles, and his production company Mercury Productions. It was the Turner
Company's conclusion that "[w]hile a court test might uphold our legal right to colorize the
film, provisions of the contract could be read to prohibit colorization without permission of the
Welles' Estate." It is unknown how many other directors have similar contractual provisions.
The laws of certain foreign countries make the distinction along the lines discussed above,
but with an emphasis on whether the new technology represents a new economic market. As
one witness commented, the test in West Germany is whether there is "a new and technically
as well as economically distinct and separable way of exploitation." Statement of the Max-
Planck-Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright, and Competition Law,
Comment No. 2, at 9. See West German statute at §§ 31(4) and 89(1). The purpose of this
distinction is to let authors "participate in any further exploitation, the economic impact of
which [they] couldn't have judged and foreseen at the time when bargaining for renumera-
tion." Id.
132. This provision, as amended by Pub. Law 100-67, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.; 102 Stat. 3935
(1988), reads:
(a) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any work, term, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading de-
scription of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which -
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commer-
cial activities by another person, or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, charac-
teristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods,
services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be
damaged by such act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
133. See also Autry v. Republic Productions, Inc., 213 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 858 (1954) (although court found that defendant had the contractual right to
show edited versions of film on television with commercials, it disapproved of the lower court's
finding that the defendant possessed the right to "so alter or emasculate the motion pictures as
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The Gilliam court, however, rejected plaintiff's claim that, absent a
contractual right to edit a work, no changes could be made, holding
"[c]ourts have recognized that licensees are entitled to some small degree
of latitude in arranging the licensed work for presentation to the public
in a manner consistent with the licensee's style or standards." 538 F.2d
at 23.
Of particular interest is the exclusion from the labelling require-
ments contained in the National Film Preservation Act of 1988, of
changes made as part of "customary practices and standards and reason-
able requirements of preparing a work for distribution or broadcast." In
a colloquy on this provision, Representative Mzarek stated that it was
the House-Senate conferee's belief that this provision excludes editing for
television, time compression, and colorization, but not panning and
scanning. '34
One effect of these exclusions might be unintended: if a label is not
affixed stating the film has been "materially altered," arguably, a Section
43(a) violation might lie. If such a label is affixed, one would probably
not. 135
to render them substantially different from the product which the artist created"); Preminger
v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913
(1st App. Div. 1966), aff'd mem., 273 N.Y.S.2d 80 (N.Y. 1966) (while minor editing for televi-
sion permitted in the absence of a contractual provision to the contrary and where director
knew of industry practice, the editing of 53 minutes from a 161 minute film would constitute
an actionable mutilation); Stevens v. NBC, 148 U.S.P.Q. 572 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1966) (contempt
proceeding) (court has the right to protect the artistic integrity of a product; while contract
read to give network right to insert commercials into broadcast of motion picture "the com-
mercials must not be inserted so as to alter or adversely affect or emascualte the artistic or
pictorial quality of the film, or destroy or distort materially or substantially the mood, the
effect or the continuity of the film"); 76 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969).
Authors have fared less well in suits against motion pictures or television broadcasts that
have allegedly violated their moral rights in the adaptation to the screen. See Prouty v. NBC,
26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939); Shostokovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80
N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949) (but cf Societe Le Chant du
Monde v. Societe Fox Europe et Societe Fox Americaine Twentieth Century, [1954], D. Jur.
16, 80 (Cour Appel, Paris) (injunction granted against inclusion of composer's works in film
granted)); Dreiser v. Paramount Publix Corp., 22 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1938).
134. 134 CONG. REC. H7246 (Sept. 8, 1988). Rep. Fazio disagreed. Id. at 7246-47. Sen.
DeConcini, with Sen. Johnston's concurrence, stated that panning and scanning was included.
135. See comments of the Directors Guild of America before the Patent and Trademark
Office, Docket No. 80743-8143 at 3-4, and Id. at 5-6 (proposed legislative changes); House




Nine states have passed legislation granting limited moral rights to
limited classes of works, principally works of the fine arts.
1. California
California was the first state to enact specific moral rights legisla-
tion, doing so in 1979. This Act, the California Art Preservation Act,
codified in Cal. Civ. Code § 987, is limited to works of "fine art," defined
as "an original painting, sculpture, or drawing, or an original work of art
in glass, of recognized quality, but ... not [a] work prepared under con-
tract for commercial use by its purchaser." Architectural works are not
within this protected class.' 36
Two principal acts are covered: (1) attribution (or disclaiming au-
thorship for a just and valid reason); and, (2) mutilation, destruction, or
alteration of a work, and grossly negligent framing, conservation, or res-
toration of a work. An exclusion is provided for fine art created under a
work made for hire arrangement for use in "advertising, magazines, or
other print and electronic media." There is, though, no provision on
waiver, because it was thought that waiver would undercut the rights
granted artists under the statute.
In 1982, the Act was amended to include a provision on removal of
works of fine art from buildings.' 37
2. Connecticut
Passed in 1988, the Connecticut law extends protection to an incred-
ibly detailed class of "works of fine arts." Public Act No. 88-284. Signif-
icantly, the definition does not include (or exclude) motion pictures:
any drawing, painting, sculpture, mosaic, photograph, work of
calligraphy, work of graphic art including any etching, litho-
graph, offset print, silkscreen or other work of graphic art;
craft-work in clay, textile, fiber, metal, plastic or other material;
art work in mixed media, including any collage, assemblage or
136. Robert H. Jacobs, Inc. v. Westoaks Realtors, Inc., 205 Cal. Rptr. 620 (Div. 1984).
137. See generally, Gantz, Protecting Artists' Moral Rights: A Critique of the California Art
Preservation Act as a Model for Statutory Reform, 49 GEO. L.J. 873 (1981); Karlen, Moral
Rights in California, 19 S.D.L. REV. 675 (1982); Petrovich, Artists' Statutory Droit Moral in
California: A CriticalAppraisal, 15 Loy. L. REV. 29 (1984); Note, California Art Preservation
Act: A Safe Hamlet for "Moral Rights" in the U.S., 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 975 (1981);
Francione, California Art Preservation and Federal Preemption by the 1976 Copyright Act -
Equivalence and Actual Conflict, 18 CAL. W.L. REV. 189 (1982); Note, The Americanization of
Droit Moral in the California Art Preservation Act, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL., 244 (1983).
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other work combining any of said media with other media; or a
master from which copies of an artistic work can be made, such
as a mold or photographic negative, with a market value of at
least two thousand five hundred dollars; provided work of fine
art shall not include (A) commissioned work prepared under
contract for trade or advertising usage, provided the artist,
prior to creating the work, has signed an agreement stating that
said work shall be a commissioned work which may be altered
without consent; (B) work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his employment duties.
The artist is granted the right to claim authorship and, by negative
implication, to prevent the intentional physical defacement or alteration
of a work of fine art. These rights may not be waived "except by an
instrument in writing expressly so providing which is signed by the art-
ist." The term exists "until the fiftieth anniversary of the death of [the]
artist."
3. Louisiana
In 1986, the Louisiana legislature enacted moral rights for works of
"fine art," defined as "any original work of visual or graphic art of recog-
nized quality in any medium which includes, but is not limited to, the
following: painting, drawing, print, photographic print, or sculpture of a
limited edition of no more than three hundred copies; however, 'work of
fine art' shall not include sequential imagery such as motion pictures."
La. Rev. Stat. 51:2152(7).
The specific rights granted are the right to claim or disclaim author-
ship and of the right of integrity (with respect to the public display and
reproduction of works of fine art that have been "altered, defaced, muti-
lated, or modified."). Id. at § 2153.
Exceptions are made for alterations that are the result of the passage
of time, the inherent nature of the materials, or conservation that is not
negligent, and "work prepared under contract for advertising or trade
use unless the contract so provides. Id. at § 2155. The author may ex-
pressly agree to having his or her name omitted, Id. at § 2154, and ap-
pears to be able to "consent to" a public display of a defaced, mutilated
or modified version of the work. Id. at § 2153 (Preamble).
4. Maine
The Maine legislature granted limited moral rights of attribution
(and disclaimer) and integrity in 1985, extending them to "any original
work of visual or graphic medium which includes, but is not limited to,
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painting, drawing, print, photographic print or sculpture of a limited edi-
tion of no more than 300 copies. 'Work of fine art' does not include
sequential imagery, such as that in motion pictures." Title 27, Libraries,
History, and Culture, ch. 303.1.D.
Covered works are protected against public display, publication, and
reproduction in an altered, defaced, mutilated or modified form when
this "would reasonably be regarded as being the work of the artists, and
damage to the artists' reputation is reasonably likely to result. . . ." An
exclusion is made for conservation that is not the result of gross negli-
gence, and for works, "prepared under contract for advertising use, un-
less the contract so provides."
5. Massachusetts
The Massachusetts legislature was also active in 1985, providing
protection to "any original work of visual or graphic art of any media
which shall include, but not be limited to, any painting, print, drawing,
sculpture, craft object, photograph, audio or video tape, film, hologram,
or any combination thereof, of recognized quality." Mass. Gen. Laws.
ch. 110, § 231-85S(b).
Some commentators contend that the Act encompasses motion pic-
tures. 138 Massachusetts has a broad exclusion, though, for works "cre-
ated by an employee within the scope of his employment," Id. at
§ 85S(b), a category that would seemingly eliminate most of the creative
participants in motion pictures.
6. New Jersey
New Jersey enacted protection in 1986. Title 2A, Administration of
Civil and Criminal Justice, ch. 42A, Artists' rights. The definition of
"work of fine art" is copied verbatim from that of the Maine statute,
supra, and thus excludes motion pictures.
7. New York
In 1983, New York passed the Artists' Authorship Rights Act, now
codified in N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. §§ 14.01-14.03. The definition is the
same as that adopted two years later by Maine, supra, and therefore ex-
cludes motion pictures.
At least one decision has been adjudicated under the Act, Newman
138. See Koven, Observations on the Massachusetts Art Preservation Act, 71 MASS. L. REV.
101, 106 (1986) ("By including film in the definition of fine art, the Massachusetts legislature
may have bitten off more than the legal system can chew.").
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v. Delmar Realty, New York Law Journal, June 11, 1984, in which an
artist successfully prevented destruction of his mural.1 3 9 Two claims
under the New York statute, arising out of unauthorized reproductions
of works of fine art have, however, been held preempted by the Copy-
right Act. "
8. Pennsylvania
In 1986, Pennsylvania passed a rather broadly phrased moral rights
provision protecting "[a]n original work of visual or graphic art of recog-
nized qualities created using any medium. The term shall include, but
not to be limited to, a painting, drawing, or sculpture." Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110. It is unclear whether this extends to motion
pictures. '
9. Rhode Island
Also in 1987, Rhode Island passed moral rights legislation, defining
the term "work of fine art" identically to that in the Maine, New Jersey,
and New York statutes, i.e., excluding motion pictures. R.I. Bus. &
Prof. ch. 62 §§ 5-62-2 through 5-62-6.
F Federal Legislative Efforts
1. Early Efforts to Adhere to the Berne Convention
Discussion of moral rights in the United States has been inextricably
intertwined with the question of adherence to the Berne Convention,
which was ratified in 1886, in Berne, Switzerland. The United States
attended the final pre-ratification conference in that year as an observer.
When the Convention was opened for revision in Paris in 1896, the
139. For a discussion of this case, see MERRYMAN & ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VIS-
UAL ARTS 169 (1987) ("MERRYMAN & ELSEN").
140. Tracy v. Skate Key, Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Ronald Litoff, Ltd. v.
American Express Co., 621 F. Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). A pendent claim for violation of
the statute was presented in Serra v. United States Gen. Services Admin., 667 F. Supp. 1042,
1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, F.2d (2d Cir. 1988), but was not heard when the court dismissed
the federal claims. See also Update Art, Inc. v. Charnin, 110 F.R.D. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(claim presented). For a decision under prior New York Law, see Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyte-
rian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949) (destruction of mural allowed). For dis-
cussions of the New York statute, see Damich, The New York Artists'Authorship Rights Act: A
Comparative Critique, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1733 (1984); Scott & Cohen, An Introduction to the
New York Artists'Authorship Rights Act, 8 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 369 (1984); Note, The New
York Artists' Authorship Rights Acts: Increased Protection and Enhanced Status for Visual
Artists, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 158 (1984).




U.S. again attended as an observer and again did not adhere. This same
pattern repeated itself in the 1908 Berlin revision. The 1909 general revi-
sion of the United States copyright law did little to move the U.S. toward
compatibility with the Berne standards, even though those standards did
not, at that time, include moral rights.
Moral rights were included as minimum rights under the Berne
Convention at the Rome revision of 1928. The 1908 Berlin text of Berne
remained open, however, for adherence until August 31, 1931, and, on
January 13, 1931, H.R. 12549, legislation to permit Berne adherence
passed the House of Representatives. Eight days later, on January 13,
1931, President Hoover transmitted the Berne treaty to the Senate for
ratification, but Congress adjourned before the Senate acted on either the
treaty or H.R. 12549.
On February 14, 1934, President Roosevelt sent the Rome text of
the Convention to the Senate, which at that time was considering S.
1928, implementing legislation introduced by Senator Cutter. During
hearings in 1934 on possible U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention,
representatives of the motion picture companies raised objections to ad-
herence, based in part on the Convention's moral rights provisions. 142 On
Friday, April 19, 1935, the Senate, by a unanimous vote, ratified the
Berne Convention. The following Monday, the Senate unanimously
moved to reconsider the vote and returned the treaty to the Executive
Calendar to await action on implementing legislation, action which did
not occur until 1988.
In 1940, Senator Albert introduced a bill to revise the Copyright
Act, Section 5 of which provided:
(1) Nothing in this Act, nor any election to have copyright
under this Act, shall be deemed to alter or in any manner im-
pair any legal or equitable right or remedy of an author under
common law or statutory law other than this Act, to claim the
paternity of his work as well as the right to object to every def-
ormation, mutilation, or other modification of the said work
which may be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
(2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to limit or otherwise
affect any present or future valid contract or waiver in respect
to the subject matter of subdivision (1) of this section.
142. See statement of Edwin P. Kilroe in International Copyright Union: Hearings on S.
1298 before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 69-70 (1934) ("A limita-
tion on the right to change the plot, scenes, sequence, and descriptions of the characters in
literary works would bring havoc to the film industry.").
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The bill was not favorably acted upon.
Moral rights were touched upon briefly during the Senate's consid-
eration of the Universal Copyright Convention. See Universal Copyright
Convention: Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, S.
Exec. Rep. No. 5, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954) (describing Beme's moral
rights provisions as at variance with U.S. law).
2. The General Revision of the 1909 Copyright Act
In preparation for a complete revision of the outdated 1909 Copy-
right Act, the Copyright Office commissioned a number of studies on
issues that might have to be addressed in such a revision. Study No. 4,
by William Strauss, completed in 1959,143 reviewed moral rights. Unlike
most of the other revision studies, the Strauss moral rights study did not
list possible future legislative proposals. The Register of Copyrights'
1961 report on the general revision very briefly reviewed the concept of
moral rights, concluding:
In the United States the moral rights of authors have never
been treated as aspects of copyright. But authors have been
given much the same protection of personal rights under
general principles of common law such as those relating to
implied contracts, unfair competition, misrepresentation, and
defamation.
1961 Report at 4.
No recommendation on inclusion of moral rights in the revision leg-
islation was made, and the subject does not appear to have been dis-
cussed much, if at all, thereafter.
3. Post 1976 Copyright Act W.I.P.O. Consultations
In 1978, the general effective date for the 1976 Revision Act, the
World Intellectual Property Organization (W.I.P.O.) convened a Group
of Consultants to review recent copyright legislation in, among other
countries, the U.S., with a view to analyzing compatibility with the Beme
Convention.
In the Group of Consultants meeting, the topic of moral rights was
discussed. Representatives of the Copyright Office explained that while
the United States did not have moral rights as part of its statutory copy-
right law, moral rights type protection was available under Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act and various state causes of action. The Group of
143. STRAUSS, THE MORAL RIGHT OF THE AUTHOR, COPYRIGHT OFFICE STUDY No. 4,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 109 (1959) (Comm. Print).
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Consultants' position was that if the Copyright Office was comfortable in
stating that this common law as it was developing was sufficient to per-
mit the U.S. to join Berne, they would not second-guess that
judgment.44
4. Visual Artist Bills
Following passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, bills were introduced
to extend to authors and artists, under the Copyright Act, rights of pater-
nity and integrity. The first of these bills, H.R. 288, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.,
was introduced by Representative Drinan on January 15, 1979. This bill,
the "Visual Artists Moral Rights Amendment of 1979," would have
amended Section 113 of the Act to include for pictorial, graphic and
sculptural works, the rights to "claim authorship of such work[s] and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other alteration thereof, and to
enforce any other limitation recorded in the Copyright Office that would
prevent prejudice to the author's honor and reputation."' 45 No action
was taken on H.R. 2908.
In the first session of the 97th Congress, Representative Frank intro-
duced H.R. 2908, identical to Representative Drinan's bill H.R. 288.146
In the first session of the 99th Congress, Representative Markey
took over from Representative Frank as the House advocate of moral
rights for visual artists, introducing H.R. 5772, a bill identical to that
introduced by Senator Kennedy, S. 2796.'47 These bills were broader in
scope than the previous Frank and Drinan efforts, although somewhat
narrower in subject matter, since they borrowed from certain of the state
statutes by limiting protection to pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
of "recognized stature." Sec. 2(3). The bills covered both the right to
claim authorship and the right of integrity, as well as introducing a pro-
vision for a droit de suite allowing artists to share in the increasing value
of their works in subsequent sales. A "field hearing" on S. 2796 was held
in New York City on November 18, 1986.148
In 1987, during the 100th Congress, the Kennedy and Markey bills
were reintroduced as S. 1619 and H.R. 3221. Hearings on S. 1619 were
144. Report of June 7, 1978 Group of Consultants' Meeting, Transcript of talk to Copy-
right Office Staff given by General Counsel Jon Baumgarten, at 10-11.
145. See also Congressman Dornan's introductory floor statement. 125 CONG. REC. 164
(1979).
146. See 127 CONG. REC. H217 (daily ed. March 30, 1981).
147. See 132 CONG. REC. S12, 185 (Sept. 9, 1986).
148. See Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986, Hearing on S. 2796 Before the Subcomm.
on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986).
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held on December 3, 1987.149 At the conclusion of the 100th Congress,
these bills came close to being passed. S. 1619 was favorably reported
out by the Senate Judiciary Committee, but failed to make it to the floor.
H.R. 3221 was reported out by the Subcommittee, but was not reported
out by the full Judiciary Committee.
5. The Berne Implementing Legislation
In 1983, efforts to obtain adequate and effective protection for U.S.
works overseas were aided, for the first time, by tying preferential treat-
ment for imports into the United States to the foreign country's protec-
tion of U.S. intellectual property. 5°
Delegations of the U.S. government officials visited countries af-
fected by this legislation and were, on a number of occasions, met with
remarks to the effect that before the United States could insist on other
countries reforming their laws, the United States should join the Berne
Convention. This argument had particular force in countries that were
members of Berne and with which the United States had no multi- or bi-
lateral relations.' 5 ' As a result of these discussions with representatives
of foreign countries, initiatives were begun to study ways to amend our
copyright law to permit Berne adherence.
One important initiative was taken by a group of private sector at-
torneys formed at the request of the State Department and under the
chairmanship of Irwin Karp, counsel for the Authors League of
America. This group, called the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Ad-
herence to the Berne Convention, provided preliminary and final reports
on issues raised by possible U.S. adherence to Berne. Chapter VI of the
final report concerned moral rights and stated a conclusion that:
Given the substantial protection now available for the real
equivalent of moral rights under statutory and common law in
the U.S., the lack of uniformity in protection of other Berne
nations, the absence of moral rights provisions in some of their
copyright laws, and the reservation of control over remedies to
each Berne country, the protection of moral rights in the
149. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987, Hearings on S. 1619 before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987), and on H.R. 3221 on June 9, 1988.
150. See Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Act of Aug. 5, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-67,
97 Stat. 384. In 1984, similar provisions were inserted into the International Trade and Invest-
ment Act of 1984. Act of Oct. 30, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 3018.
151. See 1986 Senate Hearings at 10 (Arpad Bogsch, Director of the World Intellectual




United States is compatible with the Berne Convention. 152
The Ad Hoc report acknowledged that there are no explicit moral
rights provisions in U.S. copyright law, but pointed to Sections 106(a)(2)
and 115(a)(2) of the Copyright Act, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
state statutes, and state and federal decisions "protecting various rights
equivalent to those granted in Article 6bis under state common law prin-
ciples," including contract, unfair competition, tort, libel, and right of
privacy/publicity. 53 The Ad Hoc Committee's conclusions were criti-
cized by some commentators, 5 4 and, perhaps surprisingly, by both those
seeking to preclude federal moral rights protection,' 55 and, by those seek-
ing greater moral rights protection.
5 6
a. Hearings on Berne Implementing Legislation in the Senate
On May 16, 1985, under the chairmanship of Senator Charles Ma-
thias, Jr. of Maryland, the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks began hearings on possible Berne adherence by receiving tes-
timony principally from government witnesses, but without introduction
of a bill to implement legislation necessary to change U.S. law in ways to
make it compatible with the Berne Convention standards.
The purpose of the hearings was to discover which provisions of
U.S. law would need to be revised if adherence was felt desirable. The
question of moral rights was only briefly raised.
1 57
In preparation for a second day of hearings scheduled for April 15,
1986, the Copyright Office and the Senate subcommittee staff prepared a
draft discussion bill and commentary.' Regarding moral rights, the
draft proposed two alternatives:
Alternative A:
152. 1986 Senate Berne Hearings at 458.
153. 1986 Senate Berne Hearings at 459, 462-66.
154. See Damich, Moral Rights in the United States and Article 6bis of the Berne Conven-
tion: A Comment on the Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on US. Adherence
to the Berne Convention, COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 655 (1986).
155. See statement of CPACT, 1988 Senate Berne Hearings at 401-02.
156. See statement of Directors Guild of America, 1988 Senate Hearings at 518-21.
157. See testimony of former Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer, 1986 Senate Hearings
at 44 ("We do [not] need a moral rights statute in order to adhere .... ); statement of Copy-
right Office, id. at 70-71 (noting Article 6bis, 92-95) (describing moral rights and concluding
issue deserved further study).
158. The 1986 Senate Hearings reproduce an earlier version of this discussion bill and com-
mentary at pages 657-72. A longer version, not reproduced, was the version sent out to the
interested parties. This version contains two alternatives on moral rights, as compared to the
single proposal found on page 667 of the Senate Hearings. Because the witnesses were re-
sponding to this more complete version, we have referred to it, rather than to the earlier one.
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This title does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work
greater or lesser moral rights than those afforded to works
under the law, whether Title 17 or the common law or statutes
of a state, in effect [insert date], as held applicable and con-
strued by a court in an action brought under this title.
Alternative B:
The author of a copyrighted work, even after the transfer of one
or all of the exclusive rights, shall have the right to claim au-
thorship of his or her work during the work's term of
copyright.
The commentary on these proposals stated:
We have proposed only a freezing of the law under T[itle] 17,
intending to leave the further development, if any, of moral
rights to state jurisprudence and to future legislation. Com-
bined with the declaration concerning the non-self execution of
the Convention, this provision would preclude the injection of
Convention rules into federal copyright law, without Congres-
sional enactment.
Alternative A attempts to establish a rule that moral rights are
unavailable under U.S. copyright law, beyond what the copy-
right law itself specifically provides. Alternative B (which is,
strictly speaking, a complement to Alternative A) is intended to
deal with the possibility that, in light of acknowledgment that
the right of paternity is not recognized at common law if the
parties to a contract so provide, Congress might choose to en-
act the most direct element of moral rights: the right of
paternity.
We note, too, recent Congressional proposals for introduction
of moral rights into Title 17. Our recommendations in this ex-
ercise should not be taken as hostility toward moral rights in
general. To the extent that implementing legislation for Berne
adherence and consideration of moral rights legislation are
roughly parallel tracks, further options may reveal themselves.
The Subcommittee hearing on April 16, 1986 received testimony
from representatives of the private sector, some of whom criticized the
draft moral rights proposal as confusing and needlessly foreclosing judi-
cial developments that might have occurred without reference to Berne
adherence. 159
159. See 1986 Senate Hearings at 155-57, 163 (Irwin Karp); 168-71, 180-81 (Professor John
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After the hearings, on June 18, 1986, President Reagan transmitted
the Berne treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent."6 On October
1, 1986, Senator Mathias introduced the first Berne implementation bill,
S. 2904.161 In his floor statement introducing the bill, Senator Mathias
tied together self-execution of the Convention and moral rights, an asso-
ciation that became significant as the Berne implementing legislation
worked its way through the 99th and 100th Congresses. See 123 Cong.
Rec. at S2909. In reviewing moral rights, Senator Mathias stated: "The
record of our hearings and the views of most specialists in copyright is
that moral rights are substantially available under U.S. law, although not
integrated in the Copyright Act." Id. The bill's provision on non self-
execution of the treaty (Sec.2(a)(2)) was intended to "preclude resort to
article 6bis as a basis for asserting entitlement to moral rights in any
litigation, based upon any statute or rule of common law, to the extent
that it is claimed that Berne Convention confers greater rights than the
statute or rule of law involved." Id. While not containing a freeze on
moral rights (or indeed any reference to the subject at all), Senator Ma-
thias urged the Congress to reexamine the issue once the U.S. had joined
the Berne Convention. Id.
The next hearings in the Senate raising moral rights issues con-
cerned not Berne, but complaints by directors and others over the com-
puter encoding ("colorization") of black and white motion pictures. On
May 12, 1987, the Subcommittee on Technology and the Law of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, chaired by Senator J. Leahy of Vermont, ex-
amined these complaints.
1 62
Part of the background to the hearings involved the Copyright Of-
fice's August 20, 1986 Notice of Inquiry regarding claims to copyright in
computer color encoded motion pictures and other audiovisual works.
51 Fed. Reg. 32665. The decision to accept, on a class basis, such claims,
was not, however, issued until June 22, 1987, some six weeks after the
Senate hearing. 52 Fed. Reg. 23443.
The witnesses at the May 12th Senate hearing consisted of two op-
M. Kernochan); 222-23, 351 (Association of American Publishers). Cf id. at 230 (Motion
Picture Association of America, indicating either alternative would be acceptable); 324-25
(United States Council for International Business, supporting adoption of a provision similar
to Alternative B); 374-75, 400 (National Cable Television Association, objecting to any moral
rights); 400-01 (CBS, expressing preference that existing law be unchanged); 418, 422-25
(Graphic Artists Guild of America, American Society of Magazine Photographers, supporting
adherence based on existing law); 715 (Professor Paul Goldstein (same)).
160. S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 20, 1986).
161. 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); 132 CONG. REC. S14508 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1986).
162. Legal Issues that Arise when Color is Added to Films Originally Produced, Sold, and
Distributed in Black and White, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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posing panels on color encoding, as well as Professor Paul Goldstein of
Stanford University. The first panel included four directors: Elliot Sil-
verstein, Sydney Pollack, Woody Allen, and Milos Forman, and one ac-
tress, Ginger Rogers. The second panel included representatives of
companies involved in the actual color encoding: Roger L. Mayer (Presi-
dent, Turner Entertainment Co.), Rob Word (Senior Vice President for
Creative Affairs, Hal Roach Studios), and Buddy Young (President,
Color Systems Technology, Inc.). A film tape of director John Huston
advocating opposition to color encoding was played. Correspondence in
opposition to color encoding was received from the National Society of
Film Critics, American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, In-
ternational Photographers Guild, Make-Up Artists and Hair Stylists Lo-
cal 706, Screen Actors Guild, French movie authors and directors, the
Costume Designers Guild, and a professor of law.
While the witnesses were passionate in their opposition to or sup-
port of colorization, the specific question of moral rights and their rela-
tionship to Berne adherence was not raised, nor did the directors propose
a particular legislative solution to prevent colorization. Instead, the di-
rectors made a general request for Congressional "guidelines" to prohibit
colorization and other alterations to motion pictures, arguing that copy-
right owners of motion pictures have a "custodial responsibility to pass
on the works they hold for the next generation, unchanged and
undistorted." 
63
The next day, Representative Gephardt introduced the "Film Integ-
rity Act of 1987," H.R. 2400, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. In his floor state-
ment introducing the bill, Mr. Gephardt explained that the intent of the
legislation was to "give the screenwriter and director of a film the right of
consent for any alteration of their work. It leaves these artists with the
right to decide whether the artistic integrity of their film is being vio-
lated." 133 Cong. Rec. E1922 (daily ed. May 13, 1987). Mr. Gephardt
stated a "deep concern over the potential impact of technologies like
colorization on America's film treasury," but asserted that the legislation
"does not stand in the way of new advancements in film technology. It
does not ban these changes. But it does restrain film editors and com-
puter technicians who would distort the original intent of our films." Id.
H.R. 2400 sought to amend Title 17 by providing for a new Section
119, pursuant to which no published motion picture could be "materially
altered" - including color encoded - without the written consent of the
163. Hearings at 10 (statement of Elliot Silverstein). See also id. at 12: "We hope that we
can persuade the Congress to draw a guideline in order to restrain some citizens who perceive
moral responsibilities rather narrowly and solely in terms of their own economic interests."
[Vol. 10
REPORT
"artistic authors" of the work. "Artistic authors" were defined as the
principal director and screenplay writer. The right to consent to material
alterations was assignable, but only to other "qualified authors." Finally,
the new version of films materially altered without the consent of the
artistic authors would be ineligible for copyright protection. The term of
the right was perpetual, in violation of Article I, sec. 8, cl. 8 of the
Constitution.
No companion bill to H.R. 2400 was ever introduced in the Senate;
however, on May 29, 1987, approximately two weeks after the Senate's
"colorization" hearing, Senator Leahy introduced S. 1301, a bill to im-
plement the Berne Convention. The approach to moral rights in S. 1301
was the same as that taken by Senator Mathias in the 99th Congress with
S. 2942; i.e., no express reference to moral rights, coupled with clear lan-
guage on the non self-execution of Berne.
In his floor statement introducing the bill, Senator Leahy indicated
his agreement with those arguing that current U.S. law provided suffi-
cient moral rights to comply with Article 6bis of Berne, and his belief
that a moral rights provision would present a "contentious distraction
from the effort to bring the United States into the Berne Convention.""
On December 18, 1987, Senators Hatch and Thurmond introduced
the Administration's Berne Implementation bill, S. 1971. Unlike S.
1301, S. 1971 contained express references to moral rights. Section
2(a)(4) of S. 1971 declared "Title 17 of the United States Code does not
provide an author with the right to be named as a work's author or to
object to uses or changes to the work that would prejudice the author's
reputation of honor." Section 2(b)(1) stated an intent of Congress that:
any obligation of the United States to provide the author with
the right to be named as a work's author or to object to uses or
changes to the work as a consequence of adherence to the
Berne Convention will be satisfied by United States law as it
exists on the effective date of this Act whether such rights are
recognized under any relevant provision of federal or state stat-
utes or the common law and such rights shall be neither en-
larged nor diminished by this Act.
Section 3 stated that no provision of Berne (e.g., Article 6bis) would
be directly enforceable and that, in essence, all actions for infringement
were to be governed by Title 17.
In his floor statement introducing S. 1971, Senator Hatch, like Sena-
tor Leahy, took note of legal scholarship finding the totality of existing
164. 133 CONG. REC. S7371 (daily ed. May 29, 1987).
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U.S. law sufficient to comply with Article 6bis, ' 65 and added that he
hoped adherence without alteration of existing law would hopefully "en-
sure that concerns about moral rights provisions of the treaty be ren-
dered fully unfounded." 
66
The Senate resumed hearings on Berne adherence two months later,
on February 18, 1988, under the auspices of the Subcommittee on Pat-
ents, Copyrights and Trademarks, chaired by Senator Dennis DeConcini
of Arizona. Testifying were Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier; the
new Secretary of Commerce C. William Verity; Clayton Yeutter, the
United States Trade Representative; Register of Copyrights Ralph
Oman; and Irwin Karp, Esq.
In opening remarks at the hearing, Senator Hatch indicated that
"[t]he major question to be answered before the United States ratifies the
Berne Convention... deals with the moral rights required by article VI
[sic] of the 1971 [Paris] text."' 6 7 Senator Hatch noted that "the Reagan
administration and a growing body of international legal scholarship find
current federal and state law perfectly adequate for protection of an au-
thor's right to be acknowledged and for an author's right to object to a
modification of artistic works.'
168
In his opening remarks, Senator Leahy noted the controversy on
moral rights, Id. at 43, as did Representative Kastenmeier, the first wit-
ness. Recalling his floor statement in introducing H.R. 1623, Mr. Kas-
tenmeier commented that after hearing from creators, producing
employers, directors, artists, and others, he had:
come to respect the view that the best course of action is to
avoid statutory treatment of moral rights in the context of
Berne. This conclusion rests in part on the political reality that
legislation with a moral rights provision simply will not pass
and, further, amendments to the Copyright Act are not man-
dated in order to secure U.S. adherence to Berne. This opinion
is not based on any hostility to moral rights of authors.
Id. at 46. See also Id. at 65-67, Statement of Representative
Moorhead.
The next witness was Secretary of Commerce C. William Verity.
Apparently aware of claims that corporate copyright owners were seek-
ing adherence to Berne to combat international piracy while simultane-
165. 133 CONG. REC. S18408 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1988).
166. Id. at S1 8410. See also "Sectional Analysis" of the bill, and the statement of Secretary
of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige, id. at S18412.




ously attempting to evade perceived domestic disadvantages such as
moral rights, '6 9 Secretary Verity stated business's concern that adherence
to Berne with moral rights:
could affect not only their commercial practices but their abil-
ity to insure that the product truly reflects their viewpoint....
Executives can not ignore a perceived threat to established
business practices that go to the heart of their enterprises. That
is not "selfishness" in the usual sense. Id. at 75.
Secretary Verity also indicated that the Administration would op-
pose future attempts to incorporate moral rights into the Copyright Act,
Id. at 77, 116, 125-26, 128-29, although it must be noted that he could
bind only the now-departed Reagan Administration.
Moral rights were also addressed by Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks Donald Quigg, who echoed the Administration's view that
the "totality of current U.S. law, including federal statutes, certain com-
mon law tort and contract rights, and some state statutes, provides suffi-
cient protection for the rights of paternity and integrity to comply with
the Convention."'
' 70
Register of Copyrights Ralph Oman testified that the proposed bills
"would not necessarily freeze moral rights, but they would state that
U.S. law on the subject would not be changed, either by express language
or by implication." The courts, the Register stated "would not go behind
the language of the implementing legislation and current U.S. law in de-
ciding what the rights of authors were under the copyright laws."' 7'
In questioning Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Allen
Wallis, Senator Hatch raised the question whether moral rights legisla-
tion would be unconstitutional as allegedly contrary to the goal of pro-
moting the public good. After review by State Department legal
advisors, the State Department concluded that the argument had little
merit. 1
72
The final, and only nongovernmental, witness was attorney Irwin
Karp, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Mr. Karp spoke out
against the possibility of freezing moral rights at their then current level
in the United States. 173 Of particular interest was Mr. Karp's inclusion
169. See the directors' testimony at the 1988 Senate Hearings at 368, describing this posi-
tion as "more outlandish or blatant than any film fantasy" and as a "massive act of self-
service."
170. Id. at 87. Cf testimony of USTR Yeutter, id. at 116-17, 131.
171. Id. at 160-62. See also the Register's further discussion of the issue, id. at 138, 154,
168-77, 186-89, 203-04, 205-08.
172. Id. at 112-13.
173. Id. at 209, 221-25.
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of a June 12, 1987 letter from W.I.P.O. Director General Arpad Bogsch:
In my view, it is not necessary for the United States of America
to enact statutory provisions on moral rights in order to comply
with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. The requirements
under this Article can be fulfilled not only by statutory provi-
sions in a copyright statute, but also by common law and other
statutes. I believe that in the United States the common law
and such statutes (Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act) contain
the necessary law to fulfill any obligation for the United States
under Article 6bis.
There are several countries of the common law system, and
among them the United Kingdom (that joined the Convention
exactly 100 years ago) that are bound by the Berne Convention,
including its Article 6bis, which have never had and do not
have at the present time statutory provisions on moral rights.
Id. at 223.174 But cf. U.K. Copyright Act.'75
On March 1, 1988, Senator Hatch placed in the Congressional Rec-
ord a proposed amendment to the Administration's Berne Implementa-
tion bill (S. 1971). 176 Senator Hatch explained that while he had
previously believed provisions maintaining the status quo were adequate,
to take care of concerns about moral rights, certain scholars "continue to
harbor concerns that these provisions are not adequate to do the job.
These scholars make excellent arguments that the door could be left ajar
for pressure at the federal level to create an actual body of moral rights
laws." Id. at S. 1670. Senator Hatch's amendment was intended to "re-
state in stronger, sharper language, the provisions of S. 1971 ... to make
clear that there is, in fact, a distinction between the substantial analogs of
moral rights under current American law and the European body of
moral rights."'
177
The proposed language was confusing, however. One section would
have declared that the U.S.'s obligations under Article 6bis of Berne are
satisfied by relevant provisions of federal or state statutes or the common
law," while another provided that independent of an author's economic
174. This same letter had earlier been presented to the House. See House Berne Hearings at
205.
175. See Ch. IV, cls. 73-85 of the U.K. Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act of 1988 (Royal
Assent received on Nov. 15, 1988, effective Spring 1989) which contain extensive provisions on
moral rights. Section 43 of the 1956 U.K. Copyright Act did, moreover, have an express
provision protecting against false attribution of authorship.




rights, he or she would not be entitled "on or after the effective date of
this Act to any moral rights under any federal or state statutes or the
common law," and yet a third section stated that rights equivalent to
moral rights "shall not, on or after the effective date of this Act, be ex-
panded or enlarged either by federal or state statute or by judicial
construction."
The final day of Senate hearings on Berne adherence was held on
March 3, 1988, and was devoted to private sector witnesses, five of whom
were from the motion picture industry: David Brown, representing the
Motion Picture Association of America and the Zanuck/Brown Com-
pany; George Lucas, chairman of Lucasfilm Ltd.; Bo Goldman, on be-
half of the Writers Guild of America; and, Steven Spielberg and Elliot
Silverstein, on behalf of the Directors Guild of America.
The remaining witnesses also referred to moral rights in their testi-
mony.'7 8 For this report, we will, understandably, focus on the testi-
mony concerning the motion picture industry.
David Brown, representing the MPAA and his own production
company, did not testify about moral rights, but did subsequently ad-
dress the issue in answers to written questions posed by Senator DeCon-
cini. The first question asked for a reply to the directors' criticism of
motion picture companies for the "practice of requiring artistic authors
to give up any moral rights or copyrights to the financing corpora-
tion." 179 In response, Mr. Brown noted that "given the strength and
status of their powerful union, the directors have gained through collec-
tive bargaining myriad moral rights type protection in their DGA agree-
ment." Id. These rights include the right to have the director's name
prominently displayed in performances, distributions and advertisements
of the work. Mr. Brown added that the DGA agreement represents only
the minimum level of rights:
Many directors have individual contracts with studios that give
them "moral rights" type protections that go well beyond those
contained in the guild agreements. These rights include
whether or not the film should be shown on commercial TV or
released on videocassette. In some instances, these rights even
178. See testimony of Kenneth W. Dam, Vice President Law and External Relations, IBM
Corporation, and, especially, for rather strong statements in opposition to moral rights, the
testimony of John Mack Carter on behalf of the American Society of Magazine Editors, Don-
ald F. Kummerfeld, President of the Magazine Publishers of America, and the extensive testi-
mony of the Coalition to Preserve the American Copyright Tradition.
179. 1988 Senate Berne Hearings at 367.
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include final "cut" - the determination of the version to be
released.
These numerous provisions in the DGA agreement and myriad
employment contracts belie any assertion that the directors are
somehow routinely forced by the producers to give up any
"moral rights" type protections. Id.
Mr. Brown also referred to the huge financial risks at stake in the
motion picture industry, noting that "[tlhe cost of producing a film to an
MPAA member company is now $20 million dollars... [with an addi-
tional] $9 million for advertising and print costs," and that two thirds of
these films never recover their production costs. In light of this, he con-
cluded that "it is entirely reasonable for those who expend such enor-
mous sums, with such a limited prospect of recovery, to have 'some say
in how that project comes out.'" Id.
The directors testified in support of the principle of adherence to
Berne, but bitterly complained about adherence without express provi-
sion of moral rights, challenging the view that the totality of existing law
was sufficient to comply with the Convention's obligations. 80 The direc-
tors pointed out that:
countries where national legislation provide [sic] for artists
rights have not had their court dockets inundated with moral
rights cases, or their intellectual property industries collapse, as
our opponents contend would happen. France, a country
known for the most developed national legislation regarding
the protection of artists, has maintained high artistic quality
without sacrifice of its business system. Id. at 521.
The directors did, however, recognize that the producing companies
have legitimate interests in ensuring that the film be released in a com-
mercially successful form. They accordingly agreed to limit the protec-
tion sought to the following:
(1) "Moral rights" would entail no changes whatsoever in the
production phase of moviemaking. To insure this, we recom-
mend that statutory language be crafted to clarify that moral
rights would obtain only after theatrical release, the first paid,
public exhibitions of a film following previews, trial runs, and
festivals, all of which provide input leading to the final release
version of the film.
(2) "Moral rights" would be alienable. This is in accord with
180. See statement of George Lucas, id. at 487-88; testimony and statement of Steven
Spielberg, id. at 502-03, 507-08; statement of DGA, id. at 516-24.
[Vol. 10
REPORT
traditional American contract law. Some of my colleagues,
who have made film in black and white, have stated they would
have no objection to their work being colored by a computer.
The choice should rest with the film's creative authors - the
principal director and screenwriter.
(3) The Guild seeks no alteration of the traditional employer-
employee relationship that is characteristic of relations between
producers and directors. As far as copyright ownership, the
work-for-hire doctrine should remain expressly intact. Moral
rights, not economic rights, would be provided the principal
director and principal screenwriter.
(4) To emphasize that our concern is for the integrity of the
artist's work and not for any economic reward offered for
granting permission to alter a film after release, we propose that
the Congress limit any compensation for such permission to $1.
1988 Senate Hearings at 522-23.18'
Reliance on contract law was believed to be inadequate because
moral rights "will be given [only] to the privileged and the powerful....
That is like saying freedom of speech should be a contract, that it should
be contract law." Testimony of George Lucas, Id. at 532. In a related
vein, the directors disputed the claim that they could obtain more than
the right of consultation through collective bargaining, and questioned
whether "as a labor union the DGA could seek to effect its contract
rights which exceed the employer/employee period."
' 18 2
On April 13, 1988, the Subcommittee marked up S. 1301 and favor-
ably reported it, as amended, to the full Judiciary Committee. One of the
amendments to S. 1301 was the addition of the following language in
Section 3:
(b) CERTAIN RIGHTS NOT AFFECTED. Any right of an
author of a work, whether claimed under federal, state, or com-
mon law, to claim authorship of the work, or to object to any
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derog-
atory action in relation to, the work, that would prejudice the
author's honor or reputation, shall not be expanded or reduced
by virtue of, or reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne Con-
vention, the adherence of the United States thereto, or the satis-
181. Cf statement of David Brown, disputing the "compromise" nature of these proposals,
Comment No. 4, Motion Picture Association of America, at 10.
182. Testimony of Elliot Silverstein, id. at 533-34, which unfortunately concluded the hear-
ing and didn't allow sufficient time for follow-up questions.
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faction of the United States obligations hereunder.'83
On April 14th the Committee on the Judiciary, by voice vote, unani-
mously ordered S. 1031, as amended, to be favorably reported. 8 4 In dis-
cussing moral rights, the report states that the bill "together with the law
as it exists on the date of enactment .. .satisfy U.S. obligations under
Article 6bis and that no further rights or interests shall be recognized or
created for that purpose."185 The amended Section 3, cited above, was
"intended to preserve the status quo" with respect to the rights of au-
thors to claim authorship or his or her right to object to distortion. Id.
Rejecting the "freeze" approach sought by the Hatch amendment, the
Committee stated:
The provisions are intended neither to reduce nor expand any
rights that may not exist, nor to create any new rights under
federal or state statutes or the common law. Consequently,
neither the interpretation of, nor the decisions in, prior cases
should be changed or affected in any way because of the provi-
sions of this Act, the action of our adherence to the Berne Con-
vention, or our obligations under Berne. Courts should be as
free to apply common law principles and to interpret statutory
provisions, with respect to claims of paternity and the right of
integrity as they would be in the absence of U.S. adherence to
Berne. Id.
S. 1301 was not taken up on the floor of the Senate until October 5,
1988. Between April 14th and October 5, 1988, members and staff of the
House and Senate subcommittees worked out a compromise implementa-
tion bill and were, therefore, able to avoid a conference. We shall return
to the final version of the moral rights provisions in what became Public
Law No. 100-568 after we review the hearings in the House.
b. Hearings in the House
Early in 1987, the Subcommittee formally began its deliberations on
Berne adherence, with the introduction, on March 16th, by Chairman
Kastenmeier of H.R. 1623. Representative Moorhead, the ranking mi-
nority member of the Subcommittee, co-sponsored the bill. Section 7 of
H.R. 1623 would have amended Section 106 of the Copyright Act to
provide a new Section 106, with language tracking that found in Article
6bis of the Berne Convention. A special provision limiting moral rights
183. S. 1301 as amended on April 13, 1988, is reproduced in S. REP. No. 100-352, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1988).
184. S. REP. No. 100-352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
185. S. REP. No. 100-352 at 310.
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for works of architecture was included in a proposed Section 119. In his
floor statement of H.R. 1623, the Chairman prefaced his discussion of
moral rights by noting that "[t]here is no doubt that the Berne Conven-
tion requires recognition of these rights." The question, then, was
"whether such rights exist with the degree of national uniformity and
predictability which should be provided in order to fairly comply with
Berne requirements." In remarks that were prescient, the Chairman
concluded:
While statesmanship and the spirit of political compromise
may, in the final reckoning, work a different solution to the
moral rights question, I am reluctant to reject at the outset the
necessity of recognition of moral rights which may be a great
interest to authors and artists, if not to those who deal with
their works. 
186
On July 6, 1987, Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige trans-
mitted proposed Berne implementation language to Speaker of the House
Jim Wright. In a letter accompanying the proposal, Secretary Baldrige
explained that no provision was made for moral rights, because the Ad-
ministration was "proceed[ing] on the principle that the totality of our
law, including the common law of torts, provides protection at a level
sufficient to comply with the convention's requirements.'
' 87
On July 15, 1987, Representative Moorhead, on behalf of the Ad-
ministration, introduced the proposed implementing legislation as H.R.
2962. Unlike H.R. 1623, but in accordance with Secretary Baldrige's
July 6 letter, H.R. 2962 contained no provision on moral rights. In his
statement on introducing the bill, Mr. Moorhead indicated that "[t]he
Administration bill proceeds from the assumption that the totality of
U.S. law, including the right to prepare derivative works under the Copy-
right law, the Lanham Act's proscription of false designation or origin -
section 43(a) - and common law rights of contract and tort - espe-
cially defamation and invasion of privacy - provide protection for the
rights of paternity and integrity sufficient to comply with the Berne
Convention."' 88
During the 100th Congress, six days of hearings were held in the
Subcommittee on the question of U.S. adherence to Berne. Two of these
days - September 16 and 30, 1987 - were devoted to the specific issue
of moral rights.
186. 133 CONG. REC. S. 1293, 1294 (daily ed. March 16, 1987).
187. See House Berne Hearings at 1230.
188. 133 CONG. REC. E2897 (daily ed. July 15, 1987).
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In his opening remarks at the September 16th hearing, Chairman
Kastenmeier reviewed the differences in approach to moral rights taken
in H.R. 1623 and H.R. 2962, and stated that he "welcome[d] . . . some
diversity of statutory language so that we may fully explore this."189 Mr.
Moorhead stated both a belief that the differences could be worked out
and a concern that if they were not, most likely, Berne adherence would
not occur. 190
The first witness was Peter Nolan, Vice President-Counsel, Walt
Disney Productions, who appeared on behalf of the Motion Picture As-
sociation of America. After reviewing the benefits of Berne adherence,
Mr. Nolan discussed moral rights, testifying that "[t]he members of the
Motion Picture Association oppose in principle the establishment of any
so-called moral rights laws. House Berne Hearings at 233. The MPAA
agreed, however, that current law satisfied the minimal requirements of
Article 6bis, but wanted it made clear that any Berne adherence legisla-
tion "should include, as an absolutely critical element, provisions similar
to those found in Congressman Moorhead's bill . I." d. at 233. See
also Id. at 234, 241-42, 283-88, 308-11.
The specific claims of the directors were not addressed, however,
either by Mr. Nolan or the other witnesses. See testimony of Kenneth
W. Dam of the IBM Corporation, who noted that "in IBM's views,
moral rights have not posed any serious problems for its business opera-
tions in foreign countries." Id. at 283.191
The witnesses on September 30th included representatives of the Di-
rectors' Guild of America and the Writers' Guild of America, who testi-
fied at some length on their position that federal legislation providing for
moral rights was necessary to protect against post-production alterations
to motion pictures, including by colorization, time compression, and
panning/scanning.1 92 The specific proposals made for legislation were
identical in substance to those presented to the Senate in March 1988,
with the exception that the directors agreed Berne was not self-execut-
ing. 1 93 Representatives of companies doing computer color encoding and
other alterations to motion pictures did not testify.
During a congressional recess in November 1987, a delegation of
189. House Berne Hearings at 228.
190. Id. at 228-29.
191. See also id. at 308-31, and earlier remarks at 243-44, 249, 259-72, 283, as well as testi-
mony of David Ladd, Esq. on behalf of the Coalition to Preserve the American Tradition and
John Mack Carter (Magazine Publishers Association), id. at 331-71, 385-403 (opposing Berne
adherence principally on moral rights issue).
192. See 1987 Hearings at 405-538, 1243-64.
193. See House Berne Hearings at 422.
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five members of the Subcommittee as well as staff travelled to Geneva,
Switzerland and Paris, France for consultations with foreign copyright
experts to receive their views on "whether the United States should join
the Berne Convention, and if so what changes would be necessary in our
current law."1 94 In Paris, the members and staff met with, among others,
international film producers and directors. Predictably, the two groups
had opposing views on the desirability of moral rights in the motion pic-
ture industry. Id.
A transcript of Geneva consultations is reproduced in the House
Berne Hearings at 1135-217. The question of moral rights was raised
and addressed by experts from Austria, England, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Hungary, Israel, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden.
See House Berne Hearings at 1146-47, 1151-75.
The first commentator on the issue was Margaret Moeller, Ministe-
rial Counselor in the Federal Ministry of Justice, Federal Republic of
Germany. Madame Moeller dismissed claims that moral rights would
lead to decreased access to works, noting the "lively and vivid cultural
industry" in Europe and the small number of moral rights cases that
have been brought. In the motion picture field, there had, as of 1987,
been only three moral rights cases in the preceding forty years involving
the motion picture industry, "two of which were settled by agreement of
the parties and, in the last case, the [novelist] lost and the film industry
won." House Berne Hearings at 1152.
Madame Moeller also cited a provision of German law that limited
moral rights in cinematographic works to situations where there are
"gross distortions" or other "gross injuries," and even then, the owners
of the moral rights "must take into account the respective legitimate in-
terests of the other persons accorded this right as well as the legitimate
interest of the producer of the cinematographic work." Id. at 1153. She
stated a belief that this provision was of "great help" in protecting the
producer's economic interests. Id.
Mr. J.A. Ziegler of France spoke next and submitted a written state-
ment. Id. at 1156-58. In his statement, Mr. Ziegler addressed the ques-
tion of moral rights and work made for hire:
[W]ith regard to the United States in particular, my major con-
cern is for the situation applicable to works made for hire, a
highly important category of works in which authors are cur-
rently deprived of any moral right entitlement. This is doubt-
less a legal position which is incompatible with the protection
194. H.R. REP. No. 100-609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1988).
19901
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
provided under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. Id. at
1157.
Dr. D.W. Feer Verkade of the Netherlands also spoke and submit-
ted a written statement. Id. at 1160-63. Professor Verkade primarily
addressed the arguments against moral rights made by former Register of
Copyright David Ladd on behalf of certain magazine publishers, re-
jecting the claim that moral rights have interfered with publishing, and
criticizing Mr. Ladd for "ask[ing] too much from any legislature and...
not grant[ing] the trust that should be granted to competent courts." Id.
at 1160.
c. Hearings on H.R. 2400
On June 21, 1988, the Subcommittee held hearings on H.R. 2400,
"The Film Integrity Act of 1987," introduced by Representative
Gephardt. The witnesses were the Register of Copyrights Ralph Oman,
director Arthur Hiller, New York Times film critic Vincent Canby,
Monroe Price (Dean, Cardozo Law School), producer David Brown, and
Roger Mayer (President and Chief Operating Officer Turner Entertain-
ment Company).
Mr. Oman was the first witness. In his oral remarks, he focused on
the proposals for a National Film Preservation Board, which at that time
was proceeding, in a controversial manner, through the Interior Subcom-
mittee. Mr. Oman noted that "[w]hatever title or characterization all of
the bills and ideas may have, they are fundamentally about copyright or
fundamentally affect the rights of authors and copyright owners, and it is
this subcommittee that must subject them to careful scrutiny. No other
forum has the accumulated experience in crafting balanced
legislation." 195
Turning to the specifics of those proposals, Mr. Oman stated that if
there was to be a labelling requirement for motion pictures that have
been altered subsequent to their theatrical exhibition, it was preferable
for all such films to be labelled, and not just designated "classics." In
reviewing the bill's limitation on the exercise of rights to the principal
director and screenplay writers, Mr. Oman noted that while material al-
terations "affect the contribution of directors and screenwriters," such
alterations "very often have a profound impact on the work of cinema-
tographers, editors, art directors, and even performers, to name just a
few.'
196




In his written remarks, Mr. Oman elaborated on the Copyright Of-
fice's position on H.R. 2400. Due to the controversial nature of moral
rights, and the importance of joining the Berne Convention under the
"minimalist" approach, Mr. Oman stated the Copyright Office's opposi-
tion to any bill that explicitly accorded a high level of moral rights. The
Register did, however, support further consideration of moral rights leg-
islation after passage of the Berne implementing legislation.
Considering the provisions of H.R. 2400 independently of Berne ad-
herence, Mr. Oman stated the Copyright Office's opposition to H.R.
2400 on technical grounds:
The bill fails to establish a well-defined moral right of integrity,
it may run afoul of the copyright clause in the United States
Constitution, and its provisions regarding ownership, transfer,
and other aspects of the right created are incomplete and raise
interpretive questions.197
Unlike Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, which limits the au-
thor's right to object to changes that are prejudicial to his or her honor
or reputation, H.R. 2400 prohibited any unauthorized material altera-
tion, regardless of whether it had a negative consequence for the integrity
of the work. In a detailed passage, Mr. Oman reviewed the effect of such
a broad approach:
The overly broad prohibition would surely raise the marketing
problems regarding the distribution of a motion picture in the
United States and abroad. Traditionally, United States copy-
right law has afforded the copyright owner of a motion picture
the following right regarding alteration of the work: the right
of authorizing the cutting or editing of the film for theatrical
exhibition, broadcast exhibition, airline use, home video distri-
bution, and preparation of noncommercial educational study
materials; the right of authorizing the addition of subtitles,
dubbing, or the addition of music for foreign distribution; the
right of authorizing an adaptation of the work (the creation of a
derivative work in another medium), a remake of the work, or a
historic reconstruction of the work (i.e., to add footage or other
material which the screenwriter or director arguably might
have wanted in their version as published but which was ex-
cised by the producer prior to first release.) However, H.R.
2400 would require all these alterations of the motion picture,
no matter how well intentioned and well done, to be cleared
197. [sic].
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with the artistic authors of the work in addition to the copy-
right owners.
In addition to this interference with the ordinary marketing
and distribution of motion pictures, the "material alteration"
prohibition would interfere with, or perhaps eliminate com-
pletely, the exclusive rights of the copyright owner - such as
novelizations - based on the copyrighted work. A more nar-
rowly drafted definition of the right of the artistic authors of a
motion picture that focuses on the material alterations that mu-
tilate, distort or otherwise prejudice the integrity of the artistic
authors would avoid this problem and would delineate the eco-
nomic rights of copyright owners from the moral rights of the
artistic authors. 198
The next witnesses, comprising a panel supporting H.R. 2400 (or
legislation supporting labelling of materially altered films), were director
Arthur Hiller, representing the Directors' Guild of America, Vincent
Canby, film critic for The New York Times, and Monroe Price, Dean of
the Cardozo School of Law.
Mr. Hiller testified first, stating that H.R. 2400 represented a "mod-
est and restrained approach that balances the interests of the copyright
holders with the interests of the creative artists and the larger societal
interest of protecting our country's social heritage."' 99
In the question period, Chairman Kastenmeier asked Mr. Hiller
about the proposed limitations on rights to only the principal director
and screenwriter. Mr. Hiller's response was that the "writer provides the
basis from which ... the rest of us work ... and the director ... is the
only one who has the entire picture in his or her head. ' '2° Mr. Lungren
of California asked a series of questions about the need to introduce
younger audiences to classic movies through colorized versions, given
that most of them, he believed, will not watch the black and white ver-
sion. In reply, Hiller expressed a concern that if "you keep the black and
white and you show the colorized version, that becomes psychologically
in everyone's mind the version and the black and white doesn't exist even
though it is somewhere away.
' 20 1
Mrs. Schroeder of Colorado raised two concerns: (1) the utility of
the proposed film commission; and, (2) whether producers and other fin-
198. Statement at 26.
199. Unofficial Transcript at 44.
200. Id. at 67.
201. Id. at 70. Cf David Brown's response to the same line of questioning. Id. at 132.
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anciers would put up the necessary capital for new films if the directors
could prohibit exhibition on airlines and television.2"2 Mr. Hiller testi-
fied that the directors regarded the film commission as only one step to-
ward their goal, and that they understood the need to insert commercials
and to edit for obscenity.
20 3
Mr. Hyde of Illinois returned to the issues of editing for airlines and
whether only the principal director and screenwriter should be the bene-
ficiaries of the bill.2" Mr. Berman of California then inquired into three
critical areas: (1) whether reliance should be made on the collective bar-
gaining process; (2) what constitutes a "material alteration"; and, (3) the
rights of novelists and other authors of preexisting works to object to
perceived material alteration of their works in motion pictures.20 5 In re-
sponse to the first inquiry, Mr. Hiller testified that he did not know
whether any of the issues regarding material alteration had been brought
up in collective bargaining, but that regardless of this, "we are talking
about... a social issue... preservation of an art form. And that talks
about our society as it is today and the society of the future, and I think
that is beyond collective bargaining.
20 6
Regarding the definition of "material alteration," it was established
that cutting for commercials, dubbing in a foreign language, and in-
serting subtitles were not, but that colorization was.20 7 Finally, on the
question of the rights of novelists and others whose works are used in
motion pictures, Mr. Hiller stated, in essence, that they had been paid
and accordingly had no further rights. Mr. Berman followed up by ask-
ing why that same process shouldn't be applied to directors. Mr. Hiller
did not directly respond, but merely noted that the directors sought to
bifurcate economic and moral rights.208
Mr. Cardin of Maryland then inquired whether labelling require-
ments, including a right of a director to insist upon removal of his or her
name from a colorized motion picture, would satisfy the directors' con-
cerns.20 9 Mr. Hiller replied they would not.210
The next witness was Vincent Canby, who, in a brief opening state-
202. Id. at 75-81.
203. Id. at 81.
204. Id. at 82-86.
205. Id. at 87-92.
206. Id. at 88. In earlier hearings, the Directors' Guild had testified that these issues had
been the subject of protracted negotiations. See 1988 Senate Berne Hearings at 533.
207. Id. at 90.
208. Id. at 91-92.
209. Id. at 93-97. See also Mr. Lundgren's follow-up questions on this issue. Id. at 98-99.
210. Id. at 95.
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ment, testified in favor of H.R. 2400 and against colorization.21'
The final witness on the panel was Dean Monroe Price, who, while
not expressly endorsing H.R. 2400, did testify in favor of all the films
labelling approach raised by the Register of Copyrights in his testimony.
The final panel was comprised of David Brown, a film producer, and
Roger Mayer, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Turner En-
tertainment Company. Mr. Brown began his testimony by emphasizing
the role of the producer,212 and others, including creators of special ef-
fects, cinematographers, musicians, composers, lyricists, and anima-
tors.2 13 In Mr. Brown's opinion, the marketplace, combined with
collective bargaining, was the proper forum for resolving the directors'




Mr. Mayer, concluding the panel, began by testifying that "today's
audiences are conditioned to look at movies in color. They simply can-
not be cajoled or bullied into watching them in black and white, and we
have tried. ' 215 By colorizing black and white movies, Mr. Mayer stated
that Turner had "revitalized interest and found an audience for them,
and we can show that.
2 16
In any event, Mr. Mayer noted that the black and white version of
the film remains available for purchase or rental. 2 7 Rejecting the direc-
tors' approach to motion pictures as "pure art," Mr. Mayer asserted that:
This [is] really [not] a contest between art and commerce.
These movies were made as entertainment in commercial ven-
tures by production companies who assumed all the risk.
Those who helped them took no financial risk and were paid,
often handsomely. They did not return their salaries with an
apology if the movie flopped.218
In his questioning of the witnesses, Chairman Kastenmeier inquired
principally about possible objections to labelling requirements, and the
possibility that directors and screen writers could, if they wished, disas-
sociate themselves from an altered version of the film. 21 9 Mr. Mayer re-
plied that his company did not object to reinforcing credits, but opposed
211. Id. at 49-52.
212. See Ch. 1, supra text accompanying notes 4-18.
213. Id. at 106-07.
214. Id. at 108-09.
215. Id. at 112.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 113. See also id. at 116-17, for Mr. Mayer's testimony regarding Turner's pres-
ervation efforts and the use of profits from sales of colorized movies to fund these efforts.
218. Id. at 113-14.
219. Id. at 120-26, 141-46.
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permitting directors, and screenwriters from disassociating themselves
from a colorized film given the value of name associations to the exploita-
tion of the film.22°
Mr. Lungren then reviewed Turner's marketplace need for preserva-
tion and asked whether Turner had an objection to being required to
retain a black and white copy of a colorized film. Noting the Copyright
Office's then proposed deposit regulation to such an effect where a claim
to copyright in a colorized motion picture is submitted, Mr. Mayer re-
plied that Turner had no objection.22'
Mr. Berman began his questioning by asking the panel whether
there were any recent changes in the film industry that might be motivat-
ing the directors' complaints. Mr. Brown replied that motion picture
production begins today "the way it did in the ... first days of the mo-
tion picture industry. It begins with an idea and a story.... So it begins
with a producer who has a vision of what he wants to make, and he takes
that to a company which may well be owned by a conglomerate and sells
that idea. But the creative process is unaffected." '222 Mr. Brown ex-
pressed the belief that the directors' motivations were sincere, but that
they were misinformed about the issues, noting, "there has always been a
kind of class warfare among directors and producers, and writers and
directors themselves. I don't know why this internecine struggle goes on.
It is very bizarre." '23
The hearing concluded with a series of questions by Mr. Berman
and Chairman Kastenmeier on labelling.224
d. Initial House Passage of Berne Implementing Legislation
On March 9, 1988, the Subcommitte marked up H.R. 1623. Fol-
lowing the approach outlined by Chairman Kastenmeier in his testimony
before the Senate on February 18th, as marked up H.R. 1623 deleted
express provision for moral rights. Berne was declared to be not self-
executing. All of the United States' obligations under Berne were de-
clared to be satisfied by and only enforceable pursuant to domestic law.
On March 28, 1988, a clean bill - H.R. 4262 - was introduced by
Chairman Kastenmeier with twelve co-sponsors. On April 28, 1988, the
Committee on the Judiciary debated and then reported out H.R. 4262
220. Id. at 125. See also Mr. Berman's questioning at 140-41.
221. Id. at 129.
222. Id. at 135-36.
223. Id. at 136.
224. Id. at 139-48.
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with two amendments, one of which related to moral rights. As reported
out H.R. 4262 contained the following provision on moral rights:
The adherence of the United States to the Berne Convention,
and satisfaction of United States obligations thereunder, do not
expand or reduce any right of an author of a work - (1) to
claim authorship of the work; or (2) to object to any distortion,
mutilation, or, other modification of, or other derogatory action
in relation to, the work, that would prejudice the author's
honor or reputation.
The Committee's report, H.R. Rep. No. 100-609, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988), contains an extensive (and invaluable) review of the moral
rights issue. Id. at 32-40, concluding that current U.S. law satisfies the
requirements of Article 6bis. Id. at 38.
On May 10, 1988, the House, by a vote of 420-0, passed H.R. 4262
as reported out by the Judiciary Committee. In floor comments on the
bill, Chairman Kastenmeier noted his decision that:
The best course was to avoid statutory treatment of moral
rights in the context of Berne. This conclusion rested in part
on the political reality that legislation with a moral rights pro-
vision simply would not pass. Furthermore, amendments to
the Copyright Act relating to moral rights are not required in
order to secure U.S. adherence to Berne.225
This view was shared by Mr. Moorhead in his remarks, who noted
that he was "aware that the directors of motion pictures feel strongly
that the use of colorization, panning and scanning, and time compression
have impaired the integrity of the art of film making." Id. at H3083.
Mr. Berman, however, stated a concern with the bill's approach to moral
rights:
I am troubled, however, that we may not be intellectually hon-
est when we conclude that we can join Berne by deeming U.S.
laws to be in compliance, but assuming none of the responsibili-
ties under the Convention to enhance the rights of authors.
With regard to protecting films in particular from material al-
teration, the approaches to the issue which have been broached
thus far by directors and screenwriters strike me as unwork-
able. We are not really solving any perceived problem if
225. 134 CONG. REC. H3082-3083 (daily ed. May 10, 1988).
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screenwriters and directors can effectively be coerced into waiv-
ing the rights afforded by statute.
Those directors and screenwriters who are sufficiently promi-
nent can achieve the rights in question through the vehicle of
their contracts, and those who are not strong enough in their
respective fields can easily be coerced into relinquishing those
rights as a condition of being hired. I continue to have con-
cerns on this point, and have not seen a statutory approach that
addresses my concerns.
At the same time, I am convinced that it is essential that those
who put up the money and take the financial risk in making
motion pictures be able to exploit those films in many markets.
Getting American films made is in the interest of the entire cre-
ative community, and equally important, in the interest of the
filmviewing public around the world.22 6
Mr. Fish of New York spoke next in favor of the approach to moral
rights taken in the bill,22 as did Chairman Rodino of New Jersey.22
Mr. Lungren noted the complexity of the issue and expressed a hope that
it would be revisited.229
The Senate did not pass Berne implementing legislation until Octo-
ber 5, 1988; however, this legislation represented a compromise bill,
worked out in advance by Members of both Houses and their staff. The
provisions on moral rights were contained in Section 3(b) of the bill,
which did not amend the Copyright Act, but instead represented "notes"
to Title 17.230
The provisions of the Berne Convention, the adherence of the
United States thereto, and satisfaction of United States obliga-
tions thereunder, do not expand or reduce any right of an au-
thor of a work, whether claimed under Federal, State, or the
common law -
(1) to claim authorship of the work; or
(2) to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other derogatory
action in relation to, the work, that would prejudice the au-
thor's honor or reputation.
Section 2 contains Congress' declarations that Berne is not self-exe-
226. Id. at H3084.
227. Id.
228. Id. at H3085.
229. Id.
230. This is also true of the implementing legislation. See §§ 2 and 3 of P.L. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
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cuting and that the United States' obligations under Berne are satisfied
and may be performed only under domestic law. In his floor statement
on S. 1301,231 Senator Leahy noted his conviction that under the mini-
malist approach "no change in our law on artists' rights is needed to
meet Berne standards." '232 Senator Leahy inserted into the Congres-
sional Record a "Joint Explanatory Statement on Amendment to S.
1301," explaining the amendments made to S. 1301 since its April 14,
1988, reporting out by the Committee on the Judiciary. Moral rights
were "redrafted to conform to the language adopted by the House with-
out substantive change. "233
Senator Hatch inserted an extended statement on moral rights en-
dorsing the compromise, but adding:
In the future there will no doubt be substantial efforts to ex-
pand moral rights in the United States. You can already see
that beginning to happen with hearings that will be held in the
other body later this month on colorization and moral rights
for fine artists. While I continue to entertain some significant
reservations about the concept of moral rights, the discussion
will be wholly on the merits of this difficult policy question. 34
On October 12, 1988, the House took up H.R. 4262 as passed by the
Senate. Chairman Kastenmeier and Representative Moorhead inserted
into the Congressional Record their "Joint Explanatory Statement on
House-Senate Compromise Incorporated in Senate Amendment to H.R.
4262" (Berne Implementation Act of 1988).235 This statement merely
noted the previous drafting differences between the House and Senate
approaches. No other references to moral rights were made.
On October 31, 1988, in Beverly Hills, California, President Reagan
signed H.R. 1462 into law as P.L. 100-568. It became effective on March
1, 1989, with United States adherence to the Berne Convention.
6. The Directors' Claims for Moral Rights
In their testimony before Congress, and in submissions to the Copy-
right Office and the Patent and Trademark Office, the Directors' Guild of
America (DGA) has argued that federal moral rights legislation is neces-
231. In a parliamentary move, H.R. 4262 was immediately passed as an amendment to S.
1301 in order to give the implementing legislation a House bill number. 134 CONG. REC.
S14567.
232. Id. at S14551.
233. Id. at S14555.
234. Id. at S14557.
235. 134 CONG. REC. H1009-10097.
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sary to control certain "material alterations" to theatrical motion pic-
tures. The purpose of these rights is twofold: (1) to prohibit alteration of
directors' work without their permission; and, (2) to make possible, for
the benefit of society, the preservation of our nation's theatrical film heri-
tage. Because only approximately 5 percent of the directors have suffi-
cient bargaining power to contractually obtain such power, and their
conviction that larger societal interests were at stake, the Directors re-
jected collective and individual bargaining as a realistic means of protect-
ing artists' rights and those of the public.
While the point at which these rights would attach is fairly clear,23 6
the form and scope of those rights is not. In his opening remarks to the
Copyright Office at its September 8, 1988, hearing, Arnold Lutzker, Esq.,
representing the DGA, testified "[i]n the simple statement of Article 6bis
[of the Berne Convention] lies the potential for protection," '2 3 7 adding:
The National Film Preservation Board ... is but a modest be-
ginning [but] [i]t in no way satisfies the concern of the directors
of the films. Only the clearest statement that faithful adherence
to the Berne principles of moral rights, and the entitlement of
the principal director and principal screenwriter to prevent ma-
terial alteration of the film without their consent will suffi-
ciently answer their plea.2 38
Later, during questioning, Mr. Lutzker testified that either Repre-
sentative Gephardt's H.R. 2400 or Chairman Kastenmeier's initial Berne
Implementation bill, H.R. 1623:
express [ ] as far as the film community - film director is con-
cerned - the parameters of the type of legislation they would
like to see. There can be changes in that. That would be the
general framework.
239
Beyond prohibiting colorization, the scope of these moral rights is
unclear, perhaps necessarily so. In response to a question from Copy-
right Office General Counsel Dorothy Schrader, Mr. Lutzker testified
that:
236. Although formulated in slightly different ways, the point at which the directors wish
the rights to attach is after the "theatrical release." See Transcript of Copyright Office Hear-
ing at 125126; DGA submission to the Patent and Trademark Office, Doc. No. 80743-8143 at
6 ("the theatrical release or the first paid exhibition of the film following previews, trial runs,
and festivals ... ;" House Berne Hearings at 422; 1988 Senate Hearings at 522-23).
237. Transcript at 107.
238. Id. at lll.
239. Transcript at 135. In its submission to the Patent and Trademark Office, the DGA
also called for amendments to section 43 and 45 of the Lanham Act to prohibit defined "mate-
rial alterations."
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[P]anning and scanning . . . also has some problems. Time
compression . . . -the example with the closing scene from
"Casablanca." The changes that are made in the pauses and
the like, constitute things that they feel are materially-poten-
tially materially-changing the integrity of the film. 2"
Ms. Schrader then followed up by asking:
Are you saying then that every colorized film is objectionable-
that every act of panning and scanning is objectionable? You
are not really saying the alteration has to be material?
MR. LUTZKER: No. Material is a word which the courts do
grapple with in various degrees. The incidental use of panning
and scanning may not be material. Colorization is something
which is done to the entire work of art, and that's a little
different.
MS. SCHRADER: You are using "material" in the sense of
the quantity of the film that has changed?
MR. LUTZKER: I mean there are examples-yes ... [Y]ou
can quantify materiality in some respects. There may be other
standards that may need to be-a simple pan and scan may not
necessarily be material with respect to a particular film.24" '
Mr. Lutzker also agreed, however, that directors have contractually
permitted panning and scanning to go on for over 20 years and that
"would obviously be a factor that would have to be dealt with." 242
The duration of the proposed moral rights is also unclear. H.R.
2400 had a perpetual term, in violation of Article I sec. 8 clause 8 of the
U.S. Constitution. Mr. Lutzker testified before the Copyright Office that
the directors "would like as long a period as would be legally appropri-
ate. To say forever less a day might satisfy them, might be subject to go
on forever .... I think they are certainly looking to some distance in the
future, minimally the term of copyright which is 75 years. '243
Directors clearly wish these rights to apply to existing works, in-
240. Id. at 133-34.
241. Id. at 134-35.
242. Id. at 130. Nevertheless, in their submission to the Patent and Trademark Office, the
DGA proposed that "any change in a motion picture by virtue of ... process, including but
not limited to colorization, panning and scanning, time compression and extensive editing for
noncontinuity acceptance purposes" would be prohibited under the Lanham Act. Statement
at 5 (emphasis added).
243. Id. at 132.
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cluding those in the public domain, 24 4 and that they are to be vested only
in the principal director and principal screenwriter 24 without regard to
the employer's status in respect to all other rights.246 Authors of preex-
isting works used in motion pictures, such as novels and musical compo-
sitions, would not be accorded moral rights with respect to material
alterations of their works in the motion picture, but would instead have
to rely on contractual provisions.247
7. The Producers' Response
The producers' 248 response to the directors' claims rests on the as-
sertion that their activities are consistent with the purposes of the Copy-
right Act and the rights they have fairly obtained through collective and
individual bargaining. Additionally, they argue that imposition of re-
strictions on existing works would violate the "takings" clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The producers rejected the directors' attempts to in-
voke a societal interest, arguing that "the only interests [being] advanced
[are] private, not public - the arbitrary aesthetic desires of a handful of
individuals who in most cases had no hand in the making of the [particu-
lar] films [at issue]....
Specifically, the producers assert that colorization performs a valua-
ble public service by bringing before the public works that would not
otherwise have an opportunity to be viewed. They note that 96 percent
of the programs on television are in color, leading to great resistance in
black and white programming on the networks and the public:
[I]t's not that there are no black and white programs available.
It's just that the stations refuse to buy them; because as I said,
it's a very commercial enterprise. They have their viewers, and
they want as many of them as they can. They just don't get
them in black and white.25°
244. DGA Statement to the Patent and Trademark Office at 6-7; Transcript of Copyright
Office Hearing at 130.
245. See H.R. 2400; Transcript of Copyright Office hearing at 121-22.
246. DGA Statement to Copyright Office in connection with this inquiry, Comment No. 8
at Tab I.
247. Id. at 121-22.
248. For simplicity's sake, the term "producer" is being applied here loosely to include not
only those who produced the original theatrical form of the motion picture, but also to studios,
distributors, those who, like the Turner Entertainment Company, who have purchased rights
from producers, and to the computer color encoding companies. See discussion in the Appen-
dix to this report, written by Mr. Schwartz, entitled "The Financing of Motion Pictures."
249. Comment No. 4, Statement of the Turner Entertainment Company at 31.
250. Testimony of Rob Word, Quintex Corporation before the Copyright Office, Sept. 8,
1988, Transcript at 15. See also testimony of Roger Mayer before the Subcommittee at its June
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The producers further argue that by restoring the black and white
version of motion pictures and making them available in videocassette
form along with the colorized version, they are furthering the purposes of
the Copyright Act by providing the public access to works of author-
ship.25 The increased revenues derived from colorization provides nec-
essary funds for preservation. The Turner Company notes that from
1976 to 1986, it spent approximately $30 million to "maintain the film
elements in its library and to transfer to safety film those materials pro-
duced before 1950. 
1252
Due to the fact that almost two thirds of the motion pictures made
by Motion Picture Association members lose money,253 motion pictures
must be delivered to the public in a wide variety of nontheatrical mar-
kets, and must be "adapted to meet the particular needs of each of these
delivery systems. ' 254 The form of these adaptations has been the subject
of intense, protracted collective bargaining,255 through which the DGA
has achieved some of its goals. Moreover, individual directors with
proven track records and bargaining leverage have obtained some of
these goals - in particular, significant control over the form of post-
theatrical distribution of their works. Legislation mandating such con-
trol for all directors will, the producers assert, result in a reduction in
opportunities for young directors.
In short, the producers argue that the marketplace is the best forum
to resolve the issues.
21, 1988, hearing on H.R. 2400, Unofficial Transcript at 112: "[tioday's audiences are condi-
tioned to look at movies in color. They simply cannot be persuaded, cajoled or bullied into
watching them in black and white, and we have tried." Id. at 69-70 (remarks of Rep. Lun-
gren) and Comment No. 4, Statement of Turner Broadcasting Company at 7-8 (noting audi-
ence support for colorized versions).
251. See Comment No. 4, Statement of Turner Broadcasting Company at 9. The producers
also argue that those members of the public who do not wish to view a colorized version of a
work may simply turn off the color on their television set. Not all television sets have such
knobs, however. Furthermore, contradictory evidence was presented regarding whether the
black and white "version" of the motion picture resulting from turning the color off in this
manner is the same as from a noncolorized black and white copy, due to a difference in the
grey scale contrast. Of course, even black and white copies that have never been colorized
vary greatly in the quality of this contrast.
252. Comment No. 4 at 13.
253. We noted in Chapter Two that it has been estimated that only 10% of a film's total
audience views the work in the theatre: of the remaining 90%, 20% see it on videocassette or
cable television, while 70% view it on free broadcast television.
254. Comment No. 5, Statement of Motion Picture Association of America at 2-3.
255. See Chapter Four, supra.
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8. Copyright Office Analysis
In a 1985 article on the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984,
Chairman Kastenmeier and Subcommittee Chief Counsel Michael Rem-
ington wrote that "the proponents of change should have the burden of
showing that a meritorious public purpose is served by the proposed con-
gressional action." '2 56 If that showing is made, Congress is then faced
with "the delicate job of bartering between what are often contrary
interests.,
251
The directors premise their arguments in satisfaction of the first
threshold - a meritorious public purpose - on the assertion that pro-
moting enduring works of art for society's benefit is best achieved by
giving to artists rights to prevent, without consent, the alterations of their
works in a manner that injures the artist's reputation; and that society
has a special interest in ensuring that motion pictures are preserved in
their original, unaltered form. Colorization, and at least certain types of
panning/scanning, and time compression or expansion, they argue, in-
jure the creators' reputations, give the public a distorted view of their
work, and may displace the ready availability of the original works upon
which they are based.
In Chapter 3, we analyzed these technologies, how they are applied
to theatrically released motion pictures, and how they affect the aesthet-
ics of the work. We concluded that colorization does adversely affect the
aesthetics of black and white motion pictures. With regards to panning/
scanning, we noted that there has been considerable improvement in the
technique and that directors and cinematographers have avoided the
need for intrusive panning/scanning by shooting within the "safe areas";
viz., an area that roughly corresponds to the available composition space
on a television screen. Regarding lexiconning (time compression or ex-
pansion), given the presence of some egregious examples, we concluded
that it can adversely affect the aesthetics of theatrical motion pictures,
and that the creative participants of the theatrical version cannot, at the
time that version is shot, protect the film against subsequent lexiconning.
We also stated, however, that no information was presented about the
extent of lexiconning, nor do we have any idea how often it results in
noticeably adverse effects.
In Chapter 4, we reviewed the impact of collective and individual
bargaining on the development and distribution of motion pictures. We
noted that the technologies at issue have been the subject of protracted
256. 70 MINN. L. REV. 417, 440 (1985).
257. Id. at 467.
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collective bargaining through which the DGA has achieved some, but
certainly not all, of its goals, including, importantly, the absolute right to
control the material alteration of theatrically released motion pictures for
non-theatrical markets. It has been estimated that only approximately 5
percent of the directors can achieve such rights in individual bargaining.
We also observed that in 1960 the DGA and three other principal motion
picture industry guilds gave up the collective right to compensation for
pre-1960 theatrical motion pictures shown on network television in re-
turn for a cash settlement to be applied to a newly established pension.
With U.S. adherence to the Berne Union, we have accepted the
existence of moral rights.25 Accordingly, to the extent that the particu-
lar technologies at issue here alter the aesthetics of motion pictures in a
manner that injures the honor or reputation of directors and other crea-
tive participants in the motion picture,25 9 the prevention of such injury
serves, at least abstractly, a recognized "meritorious public purpose."
The directors' invocation of the public interest may, however, re-
quire more careful thought. The root of such confusion is, perhaps, best
revealed in the following colloquy that occurred at the Copyright Office's
September 8, 1988, hearing:
MR. PATRY [COPYRIGHT OFFICE]: The DGA wants to
have final say in alterations - material alterations - because
its members believe they are in the best position to protect the
aesthetic value of the film; is that correct?
MR. LUTZKER [DGA COUNSEL]: Yes.
MR. PATRY: But the DGA doesn't mind if individual direc-
tors permit their films to be materially altered: Is that correct?
MR. LUTZKER: Yes.
MR. PATRY:... Now, my question is this: Since that's true,
the desire that we are really talking about - of preserving the
original aesthetic value of the film - is not for the public, at
all. If the public objects - let's say that an individual director
permitted his or her film to be mutilated, and the public ob-
jected and said, "We wanted to see this film in its original
form," then the DGA would basically say tough luck?
MR. LUTZKER: ... The bottom line answer is yes. If a film
director agrees that this is the way the film should be, that is
258. Whether such rights, in whatever form, should be codified in a unified federal statute is
a different question, and is addressed in Chapter Six below.
259. See Article 6bis of the Paris text of the Berne Convention.
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the way the film should be. It is to an extent the dictatorship of
the creator.2"
Given this attitude, Congress may well ask whether the interest for
which protection is sought is, in fact, purely personal. If so, it may then
be asked why the directors should not rely exclusively upon collective
and individual bargaining.
An additional significant factor in analyzing the public interest (at
least with respect to videocassettes of colorized films and videocassettes
issued in letterboxed form) is that the public is provided with both the
original form of the work and the altered version, and is thereby afforded
the opportunity to choose between them. Under the approach advocated
by the directors, the public would be deprived of this choice. Contrary to
the directors' claim, under such circumstances, Congress may well doubt
that a dictatorship of the directors serves a meritorious public purpose.
Assuming the directors can satisfy the first threshold test set forth
by Chairman Kastenmeier and Chief Counsel Remington, a "delicate job
of bartering between contrary interests" is then necessary. Moreover,
any legislation would have to pass constitutional muster. A new federal
moral right affecting preexisting works, the copyright26" ' of which is
owned by individuals other than the beneficiary of the new right, raises
serious constitutional issues under the takings clause of the Constitution.
For this reason, if new federal moral rights are granted in the motion
picture industry, Congress may find it advisable to draw a clear distinc-
tion between works in which copyright subsists prior to enactment, and
those works created on or after enactment, with the rights granted only
to the latter category of works.
The elimination of new federal moral rights for pre-enactment
works may have the result of calling into question the need for any legis-
lation, since very few motion pictures are now created in black and
white, and those that are will probably be created by directors with suffi-
cient individual bargaining leverage to prohibit colorization. Addition-
ally, since most theatrical motion pictures in the last twenty-five years
have been shot in the television "safe area" to avoid extensive panning
and scanning, legislation may be unnecessary for this technology.
If Congress concludes legislation is desirable to protect future mo-
260. Transcript at 119-20. See also testimony of Steven Spielberg, 1988 Senate Berne Hear-
ings at 503 ("[tlhe public has no right to vote on whether a black-and-white film is to be
colored .. "); cf statement of George Lucas, id. at 488 ("[tlhe public's interest is ultimately
dominant over all other interests.").
261. With respect to works in the public domain, no fifth amendment rights are raised;
however, an entire set of new constitutional issues are raised.
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tion pictures from material alterations, there is a wide array of interests
that must also be protected, or at least considered. These interests
include:
(1) Producers, studios, and others financing motion pictures.
Any new right should not inhibit the creation of new motion
pictures;
(2) Broadcasters, cable systems and video retailers. Since the
vast majority of the public views theatrical motion pictures on
television screens, those who deliver motion pictures to this
market serve a critical public purpose that must be protected;
(3) Other creative collaborators. This group includes cinema-
tographers, art directors, editors, and actors.262 We appreciate
the directors' role as the single unifying force in the actual
shooting of theatrical motion pictures; however, in insisting
that only the principal director and principal screenwriter be
accorded moral rights, we conclude that these other creators'
contributions are being unfairly disregarded, in what is quintes-
sentially a collaborative effort. It is one thing to be in charge; it
is quite another thing to say that because you are in charge you
are the only person entitled to any rights;
263
(4) Authors of preexisting works. This group includes novel-
ists, short story writers, composers, and others whose existing
works are later incorporated in motion pictures. Directors
have argued that these authors should have to rely on contrac-
tual protections for material alterations to their works in mo-
tion pictures. This position is fundamentally at odds with the
directors' argument that they should not have to rely on con-
tractual protections in their dealings with producers. The as-
sertion that motion pictures represent a different medium
misses the whole point of moral rights: All artists should have
the right to protect the integrity of their works. We fail to see
how a material alteration in a different medium that injures the
author's reputation is less worthy of protection. We find sup-
port for this proposition in the way many Berne member coun-
tries, including France2  and Italy,265 assimilate authors of
262. The copyright status of actors' contributions is a difficult one that needs to be carefully
examined.
263. We are aware that actors have expressed a willingness to place their rights in the
"trust" of the directors. This is a fact Congress should consider should it find legislation
desirable.
264. See Article 14 of the French Copyright Act.
265. See Article 44 of the Italian Copyright Law.
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preexisting works as co-authors of the motion picture, for eco-
nomic and moral rights purposes. We also note a certain irony
in the directors' reliance on France's and Italy's treatment of
unauthorized colorization as a violation of the author's moral
rights, but their apparent unwillingness to accept the full conse-
quences of those laws - the grant of moral rights to authors of
preexisting works used in motion pictures.
9. Conclusion
Any congressional decision to accord a new federal moral right in
the motion picture industry should take into account the strong interests
of producers, studios, distributors, authors of preexisting works, and con-
sumers. The directors' claim for such a moral right is not without merit,
but, as currently proposed, it is subject to criticism on a number of
grounds.
First, except as applied to the works of other directors from
Hollywood's "Golden Era," invocation of the public interest by some of
the directors gives rise to a degree of ambiguity, since they do not strictly
speaking seek to preserve the original version of motion pictures, but in-
stead seek to obtain rights for individual directors to decide whether the
theatrical version should be materially altered.
Second, by proposing to vest the proposed higher levels of moral
rights only in the principal director and principal screenwriter, the direc-
tors are unfairly disregarding the contributions of other artists, including
cinematographers, art directors, editors, and actors and actresses.
Finally, the directors' argument that authors of preexisting works
used in motion pictures should rely on contractual protections for mate-
rial alterations of their works, is fundamentally at odds with their asser-
tion that they should not have to rely on contractual protections in their
dealings with producers.
CHAPTER 6: FILM PRESERVATION
Film preservation is not directly related to copyright, nor is the fed-
eral government generally required to preserve works of authorship or
art in its custody. Likewise, copyright owners are under no duty to pre-
serve works they own. The fact that responsible individuals as well as
corporations and archives, in particular the Library of Congress, strive to
preserve motion pictures is noteworthy, especially given ever increasing
costs. Issues of preservation are important because of the decreasing
number of original unaltered works.
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Film preservation 266 and restoration is extremely expensive and
time-consuming. It is, however, an important undertaking, for only half
of the more than 21,000 feature-length films produced in the United
States before 1951 exist today.267 The remainder have either been lost,
destroyed or allowed to deteriorate beyond repair. Most of the deteriora-
tion is the result of the use, until 1950, of unstable nitrate-based film
stock.
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. provided us with a description of
the methods they employ to save old films and the problems they
encounter:
Before 1950, almost all professional motion pictures were pro-
duced and duplicated on film that used a mixture of cellulose
nitrate and camphor. Although this type of film is very durable
in heavy use and easy to splice, it is also highly flammable and
has a limited life span. Once ignited, a roll of nitrate film is
impossible to extinguish, even by submersion in water.
A nitrate-based film passes through five stages of deterioration.
These stages include fading and discoloration, stickiness, ap-
pearance of bubbles, spread of bubbles and brown froth, and
finally deterioration into brown powder. During the deteriora-
tion process, the film itself releases gases with nitrogen and oxy-
gen compounds which attack the film's image and base.
Restoring discolored black and white films is possible if the dis-
coloration is not too far advanced. The silver image may be
bleached in an oxidizing bath of potassium hexacyanoferrate
(III) and the image may be brought out through use of a fast
developer. Films at a more advanced stage of discoloration,
however, cannot be completely restored. Images will contain a
reddish or brownish tint after the restoration process is com-
pleted. Film material that has been irreparably damaged is
worthless and must be destroyed immediately. Nitrate-based
films can be restored through the first three stages of deteriora-
266. Film archivists regard "preservation" as activities needed to retain, and properly store
the original negative, and a fine grain master positive or interpositive. These "preprint" mater-
ials are different from the print materials retained by private companies.
267. Report of the American Film Institute: Twenty Years of Preserving, Nurturing and
Celebrating America's Art Form, at 18 (1987). For newsreels, documentaries and television
programs, the AFI estimates that the "survival rate" is less than half.
It is also estimated that there is a total of 16,000 black and white (monochrome) feature
films and 22,000 hours of black and white television tape in the vaults of the studios in
Hollywood. The Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 1984, at 37, col. 3.
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tion, but during the last two stages the film can no longer be
repaired.
Acetate films are much more stable than nitrate-based film,
since the acetic acid is not flammable. The process of preparing
a nitrate film for copying onto an acetate-based film, however,
is slow and expensive. First, to preserve a nitrate-based film
until it may be transferred to an acetate safety film, the process
of deterioration must be retarded. The films must be stored at
temperatures that do not exceed 6 degrees Centigrade or 42.8
degrees Fahrenheit. The humidity level must be carefully
monitored since excessive moisture stimulates the production
of damaging nitrate gases and accelerates the disintegration
process. If the atmosphere is too dry, however, the film will
shrink and become brittle. It is difficult to create storage condi-
tions that retard deterioration yet do not produce shrinkage or
brittleness. Because of the possibility of explosion, nitrate films
cannot be stored in buildings that are used for living or working
quarters.
Transferring the film from nitrate to acetate is time-consuming.
The films must first be examined foot by foot on a rewind table.
If there are any splices or defects in the film, it must be
respliced and repaired so that the nitrate film can run smoothly
through the printer. The film is copied at a speed slow enough
to make a clear image on the acetate copy. It may require
printing at speeds as low as ten or twenty feet per minute.
Although acetate-based films are much safer than nitrate films,
they too require extensive care in storage. If the storage area is
too dry, the plasticizer will escape and eventually cause the film
to shrink and crack. At that point, it is no longer possible to
project the film. Excessive humidity, on the other hand, will
also damage the film.
2 68
The cost of restoring a single black and white film typically exceeds
$12,000; the cost of restoring a color film print more than $30,000. The
costs can, however, exceed $100,000, as the recent restoration of "Law-
rence of Arabia" demonstrates. Private sector restoration efforts are gen-
erally undertaken with the hope that the cost may be recouped through
exploitation of the restored work. Some of the most extensive private
sector restoration efforts have been those of the Turner Entertainment
268. Comment No. 4 at 11-12.
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Company. Turner is the owner of one of the largest private film libraries,
consisting of over 3,000 titles, including the MGM library (2200 fea-
tures), the pre-1948 Warner Brothers library (750 films), and the RKO
film library (700 features). From 1976 until 1986, MGM (now owned by
Turner Entertainment Company) spent $30 million to maintain film ele-
ments in its library and to transfer to safety film those materials pro-
duced before 1950. In the past two years, Turner Entertainment
Company has spent $2.8 million in restoration and preservation of its
library. Turner predicts a "chilling effect" on current private film resto-
ration activities if Congress restricts its rights to exploit the restored
works.
One important method of exploitation used to recoup those costs is
computer color encoding. The Turner Company has indicated that the
opportunity to distribute colorized films has provided a great economic
incentive for restoration. Turner's colorization activities are a byproduct
of its efforts to restore the films in its extraordinarily valuable collection.
Many of the films now being colorized had little or no commercial
life without the addition of color according to their copyright owners.
Joseph Adelman, Senior Vice President of Color Systems Technology,
stated: "this revitalization of a dormant product through application of a
newly-developed technology will encourage future owners of film to al-
ways preserve the original material for availability to distribution/exhibi-
tion technologies yet to be invented." '269
Colorization does result in an improved black and white version,
since the colorizers often splice together segments of several copies of the
same film in order to come up with the best possible copy. This repre-
sents an important form of restoration. However, colorization does not
always require restoration of a black and white print, and thus in many
cases, the new copy is only a videotape or a single black and white print
with no preservation of preprint materials.
Copyright owners are obviously not the only group concerned with
film preservation. 70 The federal government currently has two major
archives for film storage - the Library of Congress, which contains the
largest archive of film in the United States, and the National Archives
and Records Administration. Both of these facilities have their own
preservation activities, and in addition, the Library provides assistance to
the American Film Institute in the preservation and storage of the AFI's
269. Comment No. 3 at 6.
270. For information concerning the preservation efforts of the Directors Guild of America




The Library of Congress is not only the largest archive of film, with
over 100,000 titles, but it is also the largest converter of nitrate film to
acetate "safety stock." Since 1971, the Library has converted almost
12,000 titles to safety stock. It is estimated, however, that there remain
over 60 million feet of nitrate stock that still must be converted. At the
current rate, the Library will not complete its conversion project for an-
other twenty years.272
In addition, the Museum of Art in New York City, the University of
California at Los Angeles, and the George Eastman House (International
Museum of Photography) in Rochester, New York carry on film preser-
vation activities. 273 The American Film Institute also carries out impor-
tant preservation activities by raising and distributing millions of dollars
to archives nationwide for preservation projects.274
Although private sector preservation has created new markets for
old films, public archives, including the Library of Congress, cannot mar-
ket copyrighted films, and are not set up to market public domain films.
They may, however, allow their collections to be studied and may, under
certain circumstances, make video tape copies available.
Educators have indicated that videotape is an inadequate teaching
format since it does not represent the original composition of the motion
picture. Instead, educators prefer the 16mm format. Unfortunately, the
number of companies providing films in this format and the number of
titles available has decreased steadily over the years. Yet, representatives
of the Turner Company inform us that they have a large library of 16mm
films which they would be delighted to license, more or less at cost.
This chasm between demand and supply points out the need for bet-
ter coordination of private sector and public interests. Preservation is an
expensive, time-consuming process that requires both the incentives of
copyright and the free market as well as the efforts of expert archivists.
271. For a detailed look at the amount of materials contained in the largest public and
private archives, see material of Gregory Lukow, Acting Co-Director, The National Center for
Film and Video Preservation, The American Film Institute, reproduced in Comment No. 20.
272. The Library also preserves television programming in its American Television and
Radio Archives, established under the 1976 Copyright Act. See P.L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541, § 113 of the Transitional and Supplementary Provisions. See also H.R. REP. No. 94-
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 182-83 (1976).
273. Film preservation is not limited to black and white films on nitrate stock. Technicolor
film prints were beginning to fade as early as three years after initial use. Eastman Kodak, in
response to the efforts of director Martin Scorsese, developed an improved color print in 1982
that is expected to last between 88 to 100 years before fading.
274. The National Film Preservation Board, established during the 100th Congress may
play a role in educating the public about classic works of film.
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Greater collaboration between these groups would, no doubt, lead to im-
proved preservation and access. Congress may well decide that a forum
at which both of these groups can coordinate their efforts would be valu-
able to present and future film preservation activities. In 1976, the
House Committee on the Judiciary noted the "deplorable fact that in a
great many cases the only existing copy of a film has been deliberately
destroyed . . . ." It noted that the efforts of the Library of Congress, the
American Film Institute, and other organizations to "rescue this irre-
placeable contribution to our cultural life are to be applauded, and the
making of duplicate copies for purposes of archival preservation certainly
falls within the scope of 'fair use.' "275
Thirteen years later, these efforts are no less worthy of support.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS
In reaching our conclusions, we have had benefit of detailed, inform-
ative written comments, a full day of testimony from a wide cross-section
of industry, academic, and public interests, as well as four years of con-
gressional hearings that touched on the question of moral rights.
The term "moral rights" does not have a precise definition; in gen-
eral, it refers to noneconomic rights permitting a creator to ensure that
his or her personal vision, as embodied in a work of authorship, is
respected. The principal moral rights are those of the right to claim (or
disclaim) authorship and the right of integrity. The right to claim or
disclaim authorship protects an author's ability to receive credit for his
or her creations, or to disclaim authorship of works that he or she did
not, in fact, create. The right of integrity permits an author to prevent
changes in his or her work that are injurious to his or her reputation; for
example, changes which distort or mutilate the author's vision.
Motion pictures are the result of technological innovation. As that
technology has improved, the industry and the public has benefitted.
Technology, however, has also been used to alter motion pictures after
their theatrical release. This has principally occurred in transferring
films for broadcast on television and cable systems, and for the home
videocassette market. These alterations include the electronic compres-
sion or expansion of the running time of the film in order to fit it into
broadcast time slots, as well as "panning and scanning" - an older form
of technology used to compensate for the different size of theatre and
television screens. A recent technology, introduced commercially in
1985, is computer color encoding ("colorization") of black and white
275. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1976).
[Vol. 10
REPORT
films. This technology is now used only for the home videocassette mar-
ket, and for cable and broadcast television.
The Directors Guild of America, and some actors, writers, and cine-
matographers, have protested these post-theatrical changes to motion
pictures and have sought federal legislation granting them a higher level
of moral rights than they now enjoy, which they would use to prevent (or
permit) these alterations. The motion picture producers and corpora-
tions doing the computer color encoding, as well as broadcasters and
video retailers have all resisted these efforts. These groups argue that the
marketplace and individual and collective bargaining adequately protect
the rights of all involved, including the public, and that legislation along
the lines advocated by the directors would adversely affect both the crea-
tion of motion pictures and the public's access to existing motion
pictures.
Predictably, some of the evidence presented to us was speculative;
e.g., the effect of an increase in the level of moral rights on the market-
place for motion pictures. Not surprisingly, the parties offered opposing
opinions on the nature of that effect. Of course, absent actual implemen-
tation of such increased rights, hard data will not be available. We are
not bereft, however, of any evidence. In the past, directors and others
involved in the creation of motion pictures have collectively bargained
for increased artistic control of their contributions to the film, while the
producers have fought these demands tooth and nail, claiming that if
they were adopted, the industry would suffer irrevocable damage. In
some instances, the directors and other creative participants won the bat-
tle for increased artistic control, and in these instances, the predicted
damage did not occur. As a consequence, we have not uncritically ac-
cepted either side's predictions that civilization as we know it will cease
to exist if their respective positions are not completely adopted.
We have also had the benefit of the experiences of foreign countries
that have both developed motion picture industries and a high level of
moral rights.
Accordingly, the conclusions we have reached are based upon a
careful analysis of the best available evidence, with the realization that
evidence is, of necessity, partially incomplete. It is not so incomplete,
however, that informed judgment is impossible.
Before proceeding to our conclusions, we pause to note a fundamen-
tal assumption we have made - namely, that in adhering to the Berne
Convention, the United States has affirmatively declared its acceptance of
moral rights. This assumption is based on Article 36(2) of the Paris text
of the Berne Convention, which states that "at a time a country becomes
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bound by this Convention, it will be in a position under its domestic law
to give effect to the provisions of this Convention," and on Section 2(3) of
the Berne Implementation Act of 1988, P.L. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853,
which declares that "[t]he amendments made by this Act, together with
the law as it exists on the date of enactment of this Act, satisfy the obliga-
tions of the United States in adhering to the Berne Convention . .. ."
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention mandates the provision of the
right to claim authorship and of the right of integrity. The legislative
history of the Berne Implementation Act of 1988 is replete with refer-
ences to existing federal and state law as providing a sufficient level of
moral rights to fulfill our obligations under Article 6bis. While there has
been a healthy debate over the accuracy of this opinion, it nevertheless
reflects Congress' considered judgment, and our charge from the Sub-
committee did not include reexamination of this question.
The issue then, is not whether there should be moral rights at all -
Congress has already answered that question affirmatively - but,
whether there should be changes in existing law, at least with respect to
the motion picture and television industries. Our conclusions on that
issue follow:
(1) The Subcommittee should seriously consider a unified federal
system of moral rights protection.
Isolating the motion picture and television industries from the larger
context of moral rights for all forms of authorship is difficult, if only
because of those industries' pervasive use of other forms of authorship,
including novels, short stories and musical compositions. Beyond this,
we conclude that the fundamental policy reasons supporting moral rights
in the motion picture and television industries apply with equal, if not
greater, force to other forms of authorship, and exist independently of
industry-specific problems.
While much can be said for permitting a diversified approach to
moral rights to develop in the states, strong arguments can be made for
creating a unified federal system. As the Register of Copyrights wrote in
his 1965 Supplementary Report on the general revision effort:
A single federal system would carry forward the basic purposes
of the Constitution which, as Madison's famous statement in
"The Federalist" shows, was to promote national uniformity
and to avoid the practical difficulties of determining and enforc-
ing an author's rights under the differing laws and in the sepa-
rate courts of the various states. Today, when works can be
disseminated instantaneously throughout the world, this uni-
formity is not only a positive advantage with respect to the use
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of works on national scale, but it also has tremendous impor-
tance when it comes to international dealings.
Register of Copyrights' Supplementary Report on the General
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law: Copyright Law Revision
Part 6 at 82 (1965).
These sentiments ring ever more true today, twenty-four years later,
and especially after our adherence to the Berne Convention.
(2) If Congress adopts a unified federal system of moral rights, it
should partially preempt state moral rights protection.
Adoption of a federal moral rights regime necessarily requires at
least consideration of preemption of moral rights under state statutory
and common law. Congress could adopt a number of possible ap-
proaches in resolving this issue. First, it could provide that nothing in
the Copyright Act as amended would preempt any state law, thereby
giving the states the freedom to provide variations on moral rights found
in the federal statute as well as permitting them to provide additional
rights. Second, Congress could preempt all efforts by the states in the
entire field of moral rights, regardless of whether such rights were pro-
vided in the Copyright Act. And, third, Congress could preempt state
efforts only in the areas covered in the Copyright Act, as amended, while
permitting the states to accord other rights.
There are advantages and disadvantages inherent in each approach.
The first approach permits states free rein to experiment and adopt rights
fitting local conditions; however, by so doing, Congress creates the possi-
bility of a patchwork quilt of treatment for the same right. For example,
Congress could amend the Copyright Act to provide for a right to claim
authorship for certain works but deliberately exclude computer pro-
grams. California could then provide a right to claim authorship for
computer programs. Since computer programs are marketed nationally,
the practical effect would be national adoption of the California statute.
For this and other reasons, the first approach has serious drawbacks.
The second approach - preempting all state moral rights regardless
of whether the federal statute provides the right - appears to interfere
needlessly with the valuable role states play in experimenting with new
rights. The need for national uniformity is not so strong that it need
preempt state efforts in areas outside the right to claim authorship and
the right of integrity. Indeed, Congress may well benefit from state ex-
perimentation in such areas. A possible disadvantage with this approach,
though, is that such state rights might conflict with economic rights pro-
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vided in the Copyright Act. Of course, should such conflicts arise, Con-
gress is free to pass legislation preempting the state right.
(3) If the Subcommittee prefers an industry-by-industry approach
to moral rights, it should carefully consider whether the existing web of
collective and individual bargaining in the motion picture industry pro-
vides an adequate network for resolution of the issues.
We recognize there are good arguments supporting a cautious, in-
dustry-by-industry approach, one that accords rights only to particular
types of subject matter, e.g., works of the fine arts. Rights and exemp-
tions could be crafted with some precision and experience could be
gained about the practical effects of a higher level of moral rights in the
marketplace.
Should the Subcommittee opt for this approach, we are not con-
vinced directors have necessarily made out a sufficient case to warrant
extraordinary treatment outside of omnibus moral rights legislation. Of
all categories of authors, directors are, in many ways, in the best position
to obtain the desired rights through individual negotiation or collective
bargaining. That such rights have not been fully obtained does not auto-
matically indicate that legislation is needed. In any individual or collec-
tive bargaining negotiation, priorities are established and compromises
are made. We are not convinced that the present situation is the result of
inequitable bargaining strength, at least if one compares the present
rights and income enjoyed by members of the Directors Guild in contrast
with those of the U.S. workforce as a whole.
The evidence also suggests that directors do not seek moral rights
legislation strictly for the purpose of preserving the original theatrical
version of the motion picture, but rather seek increased rights for the
purpose of giving individual directors the option to permit or prohibit
alteration of their work.276 While there is nothing wrong with such a
desire, it does undercut the directors' invocation of the public interest as
a basis for legislation.
Nor do we conclude that the public interest has suffered under the
present structure. Never before in the history of the motion picture in-
dustry have so many works been so readily available in so many formats.
It is true that the marketplace is not perfect and that some of these for-
mats may represent alterations of the original work that directors and
others decry. However, there is no evidence suggesting that copyright
owners are withholding or intend to withhold the original forms of these
276. This does not, of course, apply to directors' attempts to prevent material alterations to
works of other directors created during Hollywood's "Golden Era."
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works from the marketplace for aesthetic reasons, or because they sup-
posedly want to "push" the "colorized" version of the work. The
number of original works is decreasing due to other market forces.
Nevertheless, moral rights do serve a valuable public purpose, and
the Subcommittee may conclude, therefore, that legislation to increase
the rights is appropriate.
(4) If the Subcommittee chooses to increase moral rights in the
motion picture industry, such rights should be prospective and should be
granted to authors of preexisting works as well as to other creative par-
ticipants in the motion picture.
If the Subcommittee chooses to increase the level of moral rights
protection in the motion picture industry apart from omnibus moral
rights legislation, the Copyright Office could, in principle, support appro-
priately drafted constitutional legislation. Due to the likelihood that the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment would prevent Congress from
enacting restrictions on existing motion pictures, Congress might want to
encourage the establishment of a voluntary industry-wide steering com-
mittee apart from the collective bargaining apparatus to work toward
establishing voluntary standards or industry guidelines that would iden-
tify practices that are acceptable and those that are not. Congress should
leave this to those in the industry with the technical knowledge to spell
out the exact nature of the differences between copyright owners and
those opposed to the alterations being made to present and future works.
Any future legislation should extend moral rights prospectively only
to works created on or after the date of enactment and would extend
those rights to authors of preexisting works used in motion pictures cre-
ated on or after the date of enactment (e.g., to authors of novels and
short stories and to composers), as well as to all participants who make
copyrightable contributions to the actual creation of the motion picture
(e.g., cinematographers, art directors, editors, and perhaps, actors and
actresses).
On an issue not directly related to copyright, we received evidence
suggesting that the economics of the marketplace has resulted in reduced
general availability of unaltered theatrical and post-theatrical forms of
motion pictures. This trend will most likely continue. Accordingly,
Congress should encourage preservation so that the public will have con-
tinued access to what, all agree, constitutes a significant part of our
cultural heritage. Such steps might include coordinating existing govern-
ment, private sector, and academic preservation efforts, as well as study-
ing ways to improve and fund future preservation efforts.
The issues raised by the present study are manifold, complex, and
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not susceptible of "sound bite" conclusions. The conclusions we have
reached represent possible legislative responses to these issues.
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APPENDIX: THE FINANCING OF MOTION PICTURES
In this appendix, Mr. Schwartz describes how motion pictures are
financed - who bears the burdens of the financial risks and under what
conditions.1 Although not central to our assignment, this topic bears
importantly on the environment in which the parties must operate.
Many of the parties involved today in film financing are new, but today,
as always, motion pictures are still prepared as works made for hire. The
people who own the copyright are not necessarily the same people who
bear the financial risks in a work. This fact of copyright ownership does,
however, explain who has the basic creative control over the work itself,
and any subsequent derivative works, outside of any formal contract
specifying creative control.
The courts have applied contract principles to interpret the rights
retained by creative artists or the rights assigned by the copyright own-
ers. "Once the rights of ownership are transferred by the original film-
maker, the copyright statute will not protect the integrity of the original
film, unless the filmmaker provides for protection[s] in the contract."
'2
Of course, under the traditional copyright principle of the divisibil-
ity of rights, the right to exploit a work for other markets - markets
created by the techniques of colorization, panning and scanning, or lex-
iconning - can be contracted for without regard to the integrity of the
original work. In the case of motion pictures, sometimes as many as five
hundred prints are issued for the first theatrical release, and it is possible
for all five hundred to be of different lengths and variations within a year,
due to editing and post-production changes in the various theaters, not to
mention the different copies owned or leased by television studios and the
various videocassette formats offered for sale or rental.
The financing of motion pictures is risky in an investment sense -
most films lose money. Producers argue that since they take the brunt of
the financial risks, they should generally own the rights to exploit the
works using every available technology in every available marketplace.
The Producer and the Economics of Filmmaking
The role of a film producer has become somewhat blurred today
because, in part, there are so many different ways of crediting production
functions in a film including: "produced by," "presented by," "execu-
1. For a full discussion of these issues, see J.E. SQUIRE, THE MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK,
(1983), which is a collection of 42 essays about the movie business written by individuals in the
industry.
2. E. K. Bader, A Film of a Different Color: Copyright and the Colorization of Black and
White Films, 5 Cardozo Arts & Ent., 497, 531.
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tive producers," "associate producers," and "executive in charge of pro-
duction." All of these terms have no meaning without understanding
what role the individual or company plays, whether this "producer" is a
financial arranger and investor, or a packager of creative material with
the artists, directors and studios all pre-arranged, or an agent of the
film's star, or something else altogether.3
Basically, there are five stages of picture making: research and de-
velopment, pre-production, production, post-production and marketing.
The difference between the "pure producer" and the "packaging pro-
ducer," is how far along in this process the producer continues to main-
tain a financial risk.4
Since it is too difficult to describe the whole array of possible roles a
producer might have, what follows is a somewhat traditional explanation
of the functions and financial risks incurred. In most instances, the pro-
ducer starts work on a film project (the research and development stage)
with the purchase and clearance of copyrighted material in the form of a
book, a screenplay or a treatment (a long synopsis of the events of a
story). This can be done either by purchasing or optioning the material
from the author or screenplay writer.5 In some instances, a well-known
screenwriter can enter into a partnership with the writer and jointly ne-
gotiate with the producer for a share of his profit.
Under such an arrangement, the writer takes a risk along with
the producer, but he also stands to be rewarded along with the
producer if they're successful. This doesn't mean that the pool-
ing and division necessarily result in a 50/50 split. It could be
66/33, 75/25, 60/40, or some other percentage. But the pool-
ing and division partnership has become a rather frequently
used device to accomplish a deal between a producer and a
writer or the owner of a piece of material when the producer
doesn't want to lay out a lot of money and the writer doesn't
want to accept short money up front without a commensurate
3. W. GOLDMAN, ADVENTURES IN THE SCREEN TRADE, 60 (1983).
4. Robert Evans, The Producer contained in ibid Squires, 14.
5. Options are usually for a period of time, for example one year, with a renewal period,
often an additional year, after which the author/screenwriter can sell his work to another
buyer if the purchaser of the option doesn't exercise the option. The second year of the option
is usually necessary to give the producer time to start the production and to secure financing.
How much money the author/screenwriter gets for the option depends of course on the mate-
rial itself, the reputation and success of previous works by this author, etc. Usually, there is a
cash payment for the option and a bonus if the option is exercised. The latter provision is
either in the form of cash and/or a "back end" deal to provide a percentage of the picture's net




back-end reward for doing so.6
Work for hire development deals are the most common methods for
producers to hire screenwriters, either paying the writer with the studio's
development money or with the producer's own money. Often the writer
will be paid more than the Writers Guild minimum by giving the writer a
large cash fee and a share of the profits and a share of the subsidiary or
separated rights (such as theatrical and television sequel, print-publish-
ing, and merchandising rights).7
After the copyrighted material is obtained and cleared and the
screenwriter is paid, the producer must obtain production financing to
begin developing the picture. The producer can act as a packager of the
creative material (consisting of the script and the rights), and of the crea-
tive talent (actors and/or director) and sell the package deal to the finan-
cier, either an independent production company or a major studio.' Or
the producer can create a "mini-package" consisting of the script, rights,
and producer's services and sell that to the studio. The studio then must
hire the director, the actors and actually shoot the picture and take the
development risk (that the picture will even be made at all) based on
what they purchase, which is a script and the copyright to the script plus
any other production services the producer is selling.
The further a producer has moved the project - that is, the
greater the investment he has made in terms of time, effort, and
money and the more finished the product he is delivering - the
more he's going to get for it both in cash and in back-end con-
tingent interest. If he's in a position to bring in what is nearly a
completed movie that just hasn't been shot yet, he's going to be
able to make the best deal with the financier. However, there
are some risks to this approach, both strategic and financial.9
All the activities that precede the actual setting of a starting date are
part of the research and development stage. Once they set a start date
for shooting the pre-production stage begins."° One of the highest finan-
cial risks for producers in film production is the completion guarantee -
actually getting a picture made after beginning the development deal.
A completion guarantor is a kind of cost insurer, or insurance
6. Ibid., Garey contained in Squire, 97.
7. Ibid. Garey/Squire p. 98.
8. The difference between these two entities is that only the major studios have distribu-
tion arms, which is necessary to get every film from the production/post-production stage out
to the general public.
9. Ibid. Garey/Squire at p. 99.
10. Ibid., Evans contained in Squire, p. 16.
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company. He agrees (for a premium usually computed as a
percentage of the picture's production costs) that out of his re-
sources or financial contacts, he will guarantee the money nec-
essary to complete the picture if the money that has been raised
from other sources turns out to be inadequate; for example, if
the picture runs well over the original budget.ll
The longer the producer stays in the process and guarantees comple-
tion the more financial rewards he or she is entitled to, including copy-
right ownership. Generally, if the producer simply packages the deal,
then signs a contract with a studio to have the studio actually make the
picture, with the producer providing personal services, the studio will
own the copyright. This is the case with a "packaging producer," who is
in a work made for hire agreement with the studio/copyright owner.
If however, the producer acts as a "pure producer" and continues to
make the picture with independent financing, renting equipment, hiring
the actors - generally financing both "above the line" and "below the
line" costs,' 2 then the producer will own the copyright and will then
have to assign the rights to the distributor. Here the producer is at great
risk, assuming all of the production costs, and he or she is rewarded with
copyright ownership. He or she will be able to make more money, how-
ever, by negotiating for ancillary rights, including the soundtrack album
and publishing rights to the film's music, merchandising rights, and any
book publishing rights associated with the film. The risks involved in
filmmaking have increased for producers and studios as fewer pictures
make profits and as costs rise. For example, "below the line" costs have
tripled since 1967.13
The actual production costs of a film include studio overhead, which
is computed as a percentage of the total production costs. The amount is
charged by the studio for the costs of producing the film itself and must
be figured into the film's budget.14 On independent pictures (i.e., not
11. Ibid., Garey contained in Squire, p. 100-101.
12. Above the line costs are: the fixed costs of the key creative costs prior to the beginning
of shooting, including the personnel costs (and all travel expenses for location pictures) for the
producers, writers, actors, directors and the purchase costs of the story and other rights con-
nected with the acquisition of the underlying literary material including the screenplay costs.
Below the line costs are: the costs incurred in physically making the picture including all the
other personnel and materials. Usually, below the line is broken down into three sections,
production period, post-production period, and "other charges." From Paul Maslansky, The
Line Producer contained in ibid., Squire, p. 209.
13. Ibid., Evans contained in Squire, p. 16.
14. "It covers services from preparing legal contracts, researching copyrights, making out
payroll and accounting for production and distribution to simple janitorial and maintenance
services. Most studios also provide cameras, lights, grip equipment, editorial and transporta-
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made by studios), there is no overhead charge but, instead, a charge for
the rental of all the studio facilities and services (usually charged on a per
studio day basis).
The production stage concludes when filming is completed. Next
comes the post-production stage involving the editing of the film, the
scoring of music and the synchronizing of sound, and finally the making
of prints for distribution into theaters. The director, by contract, has the
right to edit the film and turn in his version, known as the "Director's
Cut." After that, the producer can edit the film into its final version
usually in some collaborative effort with the director and editor. As pro-
ducer Robert Evans says,
In post-production, I work most closely on the editing. It's
taken me many years to build respect with directors and edi-
tors, and this, too, is very much a collaborative effort. The di-
rector has the prerogative to mold and shape the film in his cut.
Then, I work with him and the editor to fine tune the editing
process, which is critical to the form and impact of the final
picture. '
5
The fifth and final stage of filmmaking is the marketing stage, which
involves the advertising and distribution of the picture. For distribution
a major distributor (all the major studios have distribution arms) must be
used to make the "teaser" (the coming-attractions) for theaters and tele-
vision, to organize the print advertising campaigns, to set the dates,
terms and theaters for release of the picture, to make foreign language
copies (dubbed or subtitled), to preview the film, and finally, open the
film. Because of the huge risks and expense involved in distribution, a
large presentation of the film costs, including returned profits, goes to the
distributor. The domestic box-office gross on all films released in 1980
was over $2.7 billion, and the costs of marketing films was about 25 per-
cent of that or a little over $700 million, which includes advertising, pro-
motion, and market research.'
6
The more studio money the producer accepts and the ear-
lier he accepts it, the greater the risk he asks the studio to take
and the more the studio will expect to be rewarded for it.
Again, the risk/reward ratio operates. If the financier-distribu-
tor is asked to take the entire production risk, the best the pro-
ducer can expect - assuming he's assembled all the elements
tion equipment, offices, and projection facilities for the overhead charge." From Roger L.
Mayer, Studio Operations, contained in ibid., Squire, p. 159.
15. Ibid., Evans contained in Squire, p. 18.
16. Richard Kahn, Motion Picture Marketing, contained in ibid., Squire, p. 264, 270.
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and has paid the entire development cost - is usually a 50/50
net profit deal. For that much risk, the financier-distributor is
generally considered to be entitled to at least 50% of the net
profits, and perhaps more, and to insist on the standard distri-
bution fee of 30% for the U.S. and Canada.
17
For all the risks associated with the making of motion pictures, the
producer usually ends up with 10-20 percent of the net profits and often
less after paying for profit participation by others, especially the distribu-
tor and the creative participants, including the writer and the director
and, in some cases the star."8 Of course, because of the producer's role in
making a motion picture, and because of the financial risks he or she
takes, "pictures with runaway costs can be traced to negligent producers
or financing sources."19
The Director, Screenwriter and Other Creative Participants
Making the movie is analogous to building a building on a lot.
The literary property is the lot, the piece of real property. The
movie is analogous to the building. The screenwriter is the ar-
chitect, the director is the contractor, and the producer is theo-
retically the owner. The major studio (if one is involved) can
variously represent a lending institution, equity partner, and/or
leasing agent for the finished building (in its capacity as
distributor).2"
The director is hired by the producer (or the studio if it is the pro-
ducer) in most cases as an employee in a work made for hire situation.
The director signs a service contract and gets a flat fee and may also
receive net profit participation.2 Many actors and directors also get
17. Ibid., Garey contained in Squire, p. 103. An excellent example of the breakdown of
profits is provided at the bottom of p. 103 continued on p. 104.
18. Ibid., Garey contained in Squire, p. 103.
19. Ibid., Evans contained in Squire, p. 15. For additional information on the financial
and accounting practices in the motion picture industry, see ibid., VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT
INDUSTRY ECONOMICS, Ch. 4, especially part 4.4, beginning at p. 101. Vogel describes the
production-financing-distribution (PFD) agreements used by most producers, participation
deals (including "pick-ups" of incomplete projects), and producers' participation and cross-
collateralization deals which are used in this industry today.
20. Ibid., Garey contained in Squire, p. 102.
21. "There may be half a dozen directors in the world who command first dollar gross
participation of a significant kind, and hardly any writers who can. However, there are many
actors and directors, and even a few writers, who are given gross participation from break-
even, that is, once break-even is achieved." From Garey contained in Squire, p. 105. In addi-
tion, directors, writers and actors get fringe benefits under their guild contracts which can add
as much as 20% to the labor costs of making a picture. From P. Maslansky, The Line Pro-
ducer, contained in Squire, p. 209.
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"holding money" or option money. Since star actors and directors will
not agree to undertake a project in development unless they are certain
they will get compensated, they are paid this money to pledge their
availability.
By signing net profit participation schemes (and, only very rarely,
gross profit arrangements), directors, like producers, share the risk of
financial failure on the pictures they direct. But, in most cases, they are
compensated primarily as employees under work made for hire arrange-
ments so they are paid whether or not the picture is a success. But dam-
age to their reputation can have several economic consequences for the
future of their directorial careers. Operating as Hollywood does under
the motto - "You're only as good as your last picture" - directing a
bad picture can have severe career consequences.
If the commercial failure of a picture is blamed on a pre-production
or production problem such as a poor script or a low budget, the director
has no one to blame but himself or herself, since they agreed by contract
to the script and budget and the actual filming when they signed onto the
project. But post-production changes, only provide for minimal rights of
"consultation" (though the directors have agreed to this consultation
right by contract)22 for any editing, colorization, panning and scanning,
or lexiconning which the producer/copyright owner agrees to. Worse
yet, a poor or nonexistent marketing scheme on a picture can ruin its
financial chances. Obviously, if the picture is going to be a commercial
success, the studio marketers know it and will spend the money on it.
But often the directors bear the brunt for failures. In a just world they
might share the blame with the producers, but most often the finger of
blame points at them. Often the directors of today "function as their
own producers, though they are not credited as such."2 3 This is because
of the fact that many "producers" are simply business dealmakers with
no creative experience - and this vacuum must be filled by the
director.24
Screenwriters have even fewer financial risks than directors and
have even less influence in the creative process. Usually they are com-
pensated, often well compensated, up front, bearing few of the financial
risks of picture-making, unless they participate in profit participation
agreements. William Goldman, a well-known screenwriter says that
screenwriters are not supposed to have collaborative powers in creating
22. Article 7, 1987 Agreement of Basic Minimum Rights between the Directors Guild of
America and the Alliance of Motion Pictures and Television Producers.
23. Ibid., Sydney Pollack, contained in Squire at p. 28.
24. Id.
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films. "Long ago, Hollywood decided that the way to keep people quiet
is to overpay them. An author paid all that money should go home and
count it and be content.
25
According to Goldman, only the well established screenwriters have
the power to influence the details of a production of a film.
Generally, the answer is that the writer gets as close to the pro-
duction as his director allows. The production is really the di-
rector's baby. If he has faith in the author's judgment, the
director will be more willing to tolerate his presence during
filming. If the director doesn't want him, there is nothing the
writer can do about it.
26
Goldman says that an author is "blessed" if the director is interested
in working with him in production (and pre-production). The situation
for screenwriters is very different than for playwrights.
The motion picture producer acquires all rights necessary to
alter or change the screenplay in any manner he feels it appro-
priate and . . . requires the writer to waive rights of 'droit
moral.' Except in rare instances, he will be authorized to pro-
duce the picture using his directorial, acting and other talent
which he determines. Conversely, the producer of a play gener-
ally acknowledges that the play is an artistic creation of the
author and agrees that the author is entitled to approval over
the cast and director, and when appropriate, conductor and
dance directors. Further, once the completed script has been
delivered, no addition, alteration, or omission may be made
without both the author's and producer's consent.27
Compare this situation to what director and screenwriter Mel
Brooks says in acknowledging the different amounts of creative control
his different roles afford him. "I direct a film to protect the writing. I
produce the film to have total business control as well as creative control
over the film's future."
28
For screenwriters, as with directors, however, once they lose control
- whether creative or commercial - they feel powerless to salvage the
25. WILLIAM GOLDMAN, The Screenwriter, contained in Ibid., Squire at p. 58.
26. Id., at 59.
27. Michel I. Rudell, Behind the Scenes: Practical Entertainment Law, LAW & BUSINESS,
INC., p. 123 (1984). According to Rudell, since movies rarely make money, profit participa-
tion agreements are of little value to screenwriters, while playwrights, often sharing in gross
box office receipts often profit handsomely (so long as the play is running). Id., at 124.




work or their reputation. Goldman says that when Butch Cassidy and
the Sundance Kid, for which he wrote the screenplay, opened in New
York, the reviews in the three daily papers were split - "two terrific, one
pan. In neither of the laudatory reviews was my name even mentioned.
But you better believe I got top billing in the pan. I had screwed up
[director] George Hill's movie."29
If producers take the primary financial risks, then directors and
writers primarily take reputational risks. The producer is most worried
about completing a picture and he or she gambles on the creative partici-
pants to do this. Returning to the building metaphor, one commentator
has compared a director to a general contractor. "He's responsible for
building the building, and if the costs are going to run over, it'll probably
be because of him."
30
All of the other creative talents - the cinematographer, editor, art
director and the "crew" - are employees for hire paid under service
contracts for single pictures, or multiple service contracts. Because films
are by nature "research and development products ... they are perisha-
ble and cannot be test marketed in the usual sense."' 31 Since most of the
creative talent, including the directors, screenwriters, and "below the
line" employees, are paid as employees, their share in the financial risks
is reduced considerably. Only for directors and screenwriters with profit
participation agreements are the rewards for financial success tied to the
picture's success. But the downside is that these two creative artists
share in the reputational hazards of unsuccessful pictures as well. The
increase in other financial markets, such as the videocassette market, and
twenty years ago, the television market, has rewarded the producers
more than any other participants in filmmaking. But the directors and
screenwriters share in the profit-making from these other markets, espe-
cially television.32
29. WILLIAM GOLDMAN, ADVENTURES IN THE SCREEN TRADE, 79 (1983) p. 79.
30. Ibid., Garey contained in Squire at p. 101.
31. HAROLD L. VOGEL, Entertainment Industry Economics: A Guide for Financial Analy-
sis 89 (1986)
32. In 1960 four guilds (the Directors Guild of America, Screen Actors Guild, Writers
Guild of America and the American Federation of Musicians) signed collective bargaining
agreements with the Association [now call the Alliance] of Motion Picture and Television
Producers which waived the guild's rights to revenues in theatrical motion pictures made prior
to 1960 and released on free television. In exchange each of the guilds was given a cash settle-
ment for the establishment of pension plans for their members. For theatrical motion pictures
made since 1960, which are released on free television, the guilds divide up a total of 12'/2% of
the gross revenues from those pictures (the guilds share is: 1.2% each for the DGA and WGA,
3.6% for the SAG, 1% for the AFM and 5.4% for the International Alliance of Theatrical
and Stage Employees (IATSE)).
1990]
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In sum, the directors, arguing for all creative artists, said, "it is not
entrepreneurs alone that rely on the developed systems of publishing,
marketing, licensing, reproducing, and syndicating artistic materials.
Artists rely on these systems, too."3 3 And artists clearly have a stake in
the economic well-being of the industry upon which they depend for
their livelihood, and generally can be relied on to act accordingly.
33. Statement of the Directors Guild of America before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, Sept. 30, 1987,
p. 6, reprinted in the Directors Guild of America prepared statement for the Copyright Office
hearing of Sept. 8, 1988, docket RM 88-3, comment letter 8, Aug. 24, 1988.
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